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ABSTRACT
The three essays in this study investigate a series of issues recently emerged in the literature 
on fiscal policy. The first two chapters are more related to each other and are contributions 
(theoretical the former, empirical the latter) to the Political Economy approach to fiscal policy 
that has emerged in the last two decades. The third chapter abandons that perspective to 
investigate fiscal policy no longer from the point of view of its determination, but from the 
point of view of its effects.
The recent contributions investigating the relation between the degree of government 
fractionalisation and fiscal policy see the strategic interaction between coalition partners as a 
consequence of their incomplete information. In chapter 1 I propose a complete information 
model in which it is the lack of binding commitments that makes the decision-making process 
of a coalition difficult, which is related to the type of institutional environment. This also 
allows for a better insight into the welfare analysis of delayed stabilisations. I also consider 
the problem why coalition governments with conflicting fiscal goals exist. My answer is that 
this happens when economic agents care for some extra-economic issue a great deal and there 
is a strong polarisation on the subject.
Some empirical contributions have already answered affirmatively to the question whether the 
presence of coalition governments favours excessive public spending and fiscal deficits. In 
Chapter 2 I consider whether it is possible to do better by looking not at the type of 
government in charge (single party vs. coalition), but at its nature. I distinguish between 
homogeneous and non-homogeneous governments; the latter are held together only by extra- 
economic motives, while in the former there is also a common view on economic policy, as is 
the case not just with single party, but also with a number of coalition governments. By using 
cluster analysis on data regarding 11 OECD countries from 1960 to 1990 I come to the 
conclusion that treating homogeneous and non-homogeneous coalitions as two separate items 
makes more sense, as it isolates those coalitions where a strategic interaction over fiscal 
policy takes place between paitners. Non-homogenous coalitions have a greater probability to 
be associated with strong positive fiscal impulses, but also with strong negative ones. I argue 
this is not in contrast with the conclusions of Chapter 1 and Alesina and Drazen (1991).
As for Chapter 3, its focus is consumption. In recent years a number of works have considered 
the possible direct crowding out effect caused by government consumption and embedded it 
in the neoclassical approach to fiscal policy. The relevance of this effect, however, is debated, 
and though many have tried to assess empirically how much public consumption substitutes 
for private consumption, they have come to different conclusions. Here I follow the approach 
suggested by Darby and Malley (1996), who stress the importance of making a distinction 
between the various components (defence/nondefence) of government consumption. The 
regression results obtained using Italian annual data on the 1862-1996 sample confirm that 
composition matters: the direct crowding out effect is higher when the relative weight of 
government consumption in nondefence increases. The degree of substitutability has therefore 
followed an upward trend in the post WW2 period, reaching values as high as 0.67 in the 
most recent years.
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Introduction.
1. Putting this thesis in context.
There has been a constant effort to loiow more about fiscal policy in the last three decades. 
The interest in the subject is primarily justified by the fact that in a large number of countries, 
especially in Europe, public spending keeps being an extremely relevant heading in national 
accounts, a feature that dates back to the end of World War I l \  Besides, some countries^ have 
witnessed in their recent history a rapid rise of the public debt over GDP ratio, which reached 
unprecedented levels for peace periods. This phenomenon has stimulated a lively debate about 
its possible effects. Finally, the process of creation of a single European cuiTency has 
suggested the opportunity of fiscal policy rules for national governments, because running 
large deficits would seriously undermine the credibility of a rigorous monetary conduct.
The effort has not been in vain, and though some questions remain unanswered, a substantial 
progress in the understanding of fiscal policy has been reached. The New Classical 
Macroeconomics has deeply investigated fiscal policy effects in an intertemporal context 
where agents have rational expectations and all markets clear. The Political Economy 
literature has offered new interesting insights into the process of fiscal policy determination, 
thus making the positive approach to the subject richer in suggestions for institutional design. 
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to both these streams of macroeconomic literature.
As far as economic theory is concerned, the New Classical school has highlighted that fiscal 
policy effects are mainly on private consumption, with agents consuming less as a 
consequence of being taxed. However, aggregate demand does not necessarily stay the same 
in the short run, and, when it does not, there are also effects on the growth rate. Much depends 
on the kind of fiscal measure: whether temporary or permanent, expected or unexpected. How 
elastic labour supply is also relevant, as well as the availability of either distortionary or non- 
distortionary taxes, as these factors determine the type of wealth effects. As for the debt 
option, how deep intergenerational altruism is determines whether the Rieardian Equivalence 
holds or not, the overlapping generation model conclusions being the alternative. Debt
‘ The relative weight of public consumption (G) in government cunent expenses has seen a constant decline in 
recent years, transfers being much more dynamic. Not all studies about fiscal policy have taken account of this 
change in the nature of the State’s intervention in the economy, it has to be said. The usual approach considers 
transfers just as negative taxes, so that fiscal policy enters agents’ utility maximisation problem through the 
introduction of the G and (T-TR) terms into the budget constraint. Therefore, fiscal policy is still mainly 
intended as the determination of the value of G and of the way it is financed (debt or taxes net of transfers).
neutrality is denied also if taxes are distortionary, in which case tax-smoothing is suggested as 
a benchmark.
Also as far as the empirical literature is concerned the most hotly debated issues have been the 
effects of government expenditure in goods and services on private consumption and debt 
neutrality. In some of these works a further element highlighted by the theoretical literature 
has been considered, namely that even the type of goods a government purchases does make a 
difference, so that not just the distinction between capital and consumption goods is relevant, 
but different types of consumption goods are to be considered separately.
Chapter 3 is my contribution to this specific niche of the literature. I do believe that in some 
national contexts the degree of substitutability between government and private consumption 
is much higher than usually assumed, which makes a government’s intervention in the 
economy just a redirection of resources from market to State control. My being Italian 
probably makes me particularly sensitive to the problem^, and my intention has been to work 
on national time series both because these had not been thoroughly investigated before and 
because I wanted to see if my intuition of a higher substitutability between public and private 
consumption in Italy with respect to countries such as the US was right.
It is interesting to notice that in most of the New Classical Macroeconomics literature on 
fiscal policy the level of public spending is not considered as an issue. This has probably to do 
with the fact that we are in a world where public spending has no longer a role as an income 
stabiliser, as it was in the keynesian model, but, in theoiy at least, it is only a remedy for 
market failures such as the case of public goods. It is the amount of market failures to 
determine the value of G: in other words, it is a matter for Public Economics.
But since the Public Choice school. Public Economics has dealt not only with the problem of 
how much a government should spend, but also with the question of how much it spends in 
reality and why it does not possibly stick to the benchmark. The legacy of this stream of 
literature has interwoven in the last two decades with that branch of Macroeconomics known 
as credibility literature"^ to give birth to the so-called Political Economy of fiscal policy. This 
is essentially policy game literature with a strong stress on political (electoral and 
institutional) determinants. Although complicated by the nature of public debt as a state 
variable, which makes multistage games hard to deal with, and often characterised by the
 ^Italy, Belgium and Ireland were the most dramatic cases.
 ^Up to about the end of the 80s the Italian public sector would produce as wide a range o f products as to include 
cars and chocolate bars, using tax revenues as the main source of financing.
The eredibility literature started as literature on monetary policy, but it soon invested the field of fiscal policy, 
as well.
usual problem of multiple equilibria, this stream of literature is particularly fascinating in that 
it concentrates on fiscal policy institutions, and it is a widely accepted idea that the greatest 
imiovation in macroeconomics in the last years is the fact that policy institutions have become 
a centrepiece.
At first, the focus was on public debt, and the first models, dating back to the mid-Eighties, 
were Stackelberg games: the strategic interaction causing welfare loss^ was the one between 
an incumbent and its successor. However, there was soon a shift to the analysis of the 
strategic interaction between parties in office at the same point in time. Since real-life 
coalition, minority and divided governments were found by extensive empirical work to be 
also characterised by higher levels of public spending, these models were conceived with the 
wider objective to explain the whole of a governmenf s set o f decisions regarding fiscal 
policy, from the level of public spending to its financing.
Chapter 1 of this thesis is an attempt to contribute originally to the theoretical literature 
focused on coalition governments. The model I present stresses the extra-economic 
motivation of voters and political actors, which is identified with the factor bringing parties 
without a common fiscal agenda together and the ultimate reason for the presence of strategic 
inefficiencies. Again, my national context has been an invaluable source of inspiration. 
Chapter 2 is closely linked to Chapter 1, and may be read as its empirical counterpart. Two 
interesting conclusions reached by Chapter 1 are the idea that not all coalition governments 
are debt- and inflation-prone, but only those the cohesive element of which has to do only 
with extra-economic issues, and the fiscally irresponsible coalitions are not unable to stabilise, 
only they do it too late, so they must do it using a stronger hand. I use data from 11 countries 
from 1960 to 1990 to assess whether these conclusions are acceptable. My tool is cluster 
analysis on country-year cases; to my knowledge, it has never been used before in application 
to the subject.
2. Acknowledgements.
In the development of each chapter I benefited fi'om the advice and suggestions kindly offered 
by a number of people. Although the responsibility for all errors is mine, I wish to express 
here all my gratitude to them.
Chapter 1: the material later used to write Part 1 is in a working paper: “What is the real 
problem with coalition governments?”. University of Brescia, Discussion Paper del
 ^Tax-smoothing is the benchmark of this type of models.
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Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche no. 9710, and some contents of Part 2 are in another 
working paper: “Ideological polarisation, coalition governments and delays in stabilisation”, 
University of Glasgow, Discussion Paper in Economics no. 9710. However, some substantial 
revisions have been done after fruitful discussions with the participants to the seminars at the 
University of Brescia, Trento, Pavia. I must also thank Fabrizio Carmignani for his 
comments, and an anonymous referee.
Chapter 2 was inspired by the fact that Fracesco Daveri had used cluster analysis to test 
Political Business Cycle models, and I must thank him for introducing me to the literature on 
this methodology. I benefited also from discussions with the participants to the XI annual 
conference of the Societa Italiana di Economia Pubblica (SIEP) in Pavia, where this work was 
presented and in the proceedings of which if it was published in Italian (V. Dardanoni and G. 
Sobbrio eds., 2000, “Istituzioni politiche e fmanza pubblica”, Franco Angeli Editore). A twin 
article, "I governi di coalizione sono tutti "fiscally irresponsible"? Un'indagine empirica con 
I'utilizzo della cluster analysis" was published in Politica Economica, 2000, 1. In rewriting the 
proceedings in English I have taken some elements of this article and added them to the text 
of the working paper presented in Pavia.
Chapter 3 has taken advantage of the elaboration of a data set which was constructed in 
collaboration with Mariacristina Cristini, a colleague of mine at the Department of Economic 
Sciences, University o f Brescia, and of usefril discussions with Jim Malley and Julia Darby.
escapes out of ecometrical impasses. I would also like to thank Franco Spinelli, Paolo 
Panteghini and Rosella Levaggi and all the seminar participants at the University of Brescia 
for comments. The material in this chapter has been used for a discussion paper of the 
University of Brescia with the same title (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche Discussion 
Paper no. 0103).
:rOther colleagues in Brescia offered important suggestions, among whom Stefano Fenoaltea 
for the data description part. Gianni Amisano’s advice was of invaluable help in suggesting
Chapter 1.
NEW INSIGHTS INTO COALITION PARTNERS’ CONFLICT OVER 
FISCAL POLICY.
1. INTRODUCTION.
Some recent empirical works (Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b), Grilli Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1991), Alesina and Perotti (1995) among others^) have pointed out that a factor 
playing a major role in determining the accumulation of large public debts may be a high 
degree of fractionalisation of governments. Running large budget deficits is likely to be the 
consequence of the difficulty that a coalition government may find in taking decisions, which 
is related to its divided nature. Since in the last decades only some countries have run large 
budget deficits over several years, the explanation must indeed lie in some country-specific 
factor, and political institutions and contexts have rightly been considered as good candidates 
in this respect within the literature^. However, there have been just a couple of attempts so far 
to build a rigorous model on the subject of coalition governments. One is to be found in the 
pioneering work by Alesina and Drazen (1991)^. I briefly summarise this model here, as it is 
the main source of my work.
In the Alesina and Drazen model, the economy is made up by two agents; there is a 
polarisation on an economic subject, namely the distribution of the costs of a public good to 
be produced in a given amount. The institutional context is such that it allows agents to form a 
coalition and rule together as an alternative to alternating in office, and a coalition is assumed 
to be in power. Both agents would like their coalition partner to pay for the larger amount of 
public spending, so no decision about the amount of tax revenues to be raised from each of 
them can be taken co-operatively. The use of debt and seignorage to cover the budget deficit 
is a consequence of this. But inflation is distortionary, and each coalition partner suffers from 
it. How much inflation affects each agent's utility is private information. This makes it
‘ A survey of this literature is in Chapter 2, par. 2.
 ^Alesina and Perotti (1994) is an excellent suivey of all contributions of the Political Economy literature to the 
debate.
 ^The other one is in Velasco (1997).
possible to identify the strategic interaction between the coalition partners with an incomplete 
information game that is well-known in game theory: the War of Attrition. Delays in 
stabilisation happen because only time can work as a revelation mechanism here. At each 
point in time both players declare to be either ready or not to be burdened with the greater part 
of the fiscal deficit from then onwards. Potentially, there is an incentive to be a free rider, but 
delaying the stabilisation is costly, while the expected marginal gain from waiting is 
decreasing with time, because time gradually reveals the true "type" of the opponent. In fact, 
the player with the higher sensitivity to the distortions associated with seignorage is 
eventually the first one to "concede", because seeing that the partner has not conceded, yet, 
makes him realise he is actually the one who most “dislikes” inflation, hence it is not 
convenient for him to wait longer (which would imply marginal costs greater than expected 
marginal gains).
My aim is here to consider two unexplored aspects of this story:
one is the possibility to identify a coalition governments’ strategic interaction with a game
of complete information with finite horizon;
the other is to justify the presence of a coalition between parties with conflicting fiscal
goals.
Clearly, the assumption about the players' information set plays a crucial role in the Alesina 
and Drazen model: if the coalition partners had complete information there would not be any 
delay in the adoption of non-distortionaiy taxes to finance public spending. This would be 
true in most cases also with a finite horizon, as Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) show" .^ There 
are, however, some cases in the finite horizon set-up in which a delayed stabilization may take 
place.
This may seem as just a sterile game theory excercise, but in my view it is not. Sometimes the 
partners of a coalition do know each other's payoffs, and anyway, their strategic interaction 
may have more to do with their inability to create binding commitments between each other, 
as suggestively pointed out in Roubini and Sachs (1989a). This is likely to be due to special
The incomplete information regards the value of the parameter measuring the dislike for inflation in the utility 
function, but the very fact that the distortions caused by seignorage enter the consumer’s problem not through 
the budget constraint, but because utility has a “dislike for inflation” component is a somewhat strange feature of 
this model. Choosing to identify the relationship between coalition partners with a game o f complete information 
makes it unnecessary to keep it.
aspects of the institutional set-up. A typical example is a procedure for approving a financial 
bill entailing non-contemporaneous votes, because this makes vote-trading easy to renege on^. 
My analysis of the strategic interaction between coalition partners in a complete information 
setting also highlights the dependence of those policies on the amount of distortions inflation 
brings about and the implications as far as welfare is concerned. I also reconsider the role 
played by exogenous shocks.
As for the reasons why coalition governments likely to start wars of attrition are formed, if 
they are not investigated only half of the story is told. A favourable institutional context 
(parliamentary democraeies with proportional representation) is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition. My answer is that a strong polarisation of the electoral body on some extra- 
economic issue can play a major role, and ends up being the real cause for inefficient fiscal 
conducts^. My contribution may then also be read as an investigation into the relation between 
extra-economic polarisation and fiscal policy.
The question is relevant also for the formulation of a thesis to test empirically. Not all 
parliamentary democracies with proportional representation have a story of coalition 
governments, and not all coalition governments are debt- and inflation-prone. These theses 
are not the direct consequence of the Alesina and Drazen model, but they have often, 
wrongly, been seen as such. Identifying the true detenninant of the accumulation of large 
public debts with the presence of a polarisation on some extra-economic issue highlights the 
fact that the coalition governments likely to determine a deterioration of the fiscal stance are 
only those whose unique cohesive element is extra-economic, formed by parties with 
conflicting views on fiscal policy. Too often has this been forgotten in the empirical works on 
the subject. As Chapter 2 will show, considering it allows to capture the relationship between 
degree of fractionalisation of governments and fiscal irresponsibility in all its strength.
This chapter is organised in two parts. In Part 1, a model is presented in which the interaction 
between coalition partners is modelled as a symmetric game of complete and imperfect 
information. Nothing is said about the political scenario, i.e. the presenee of a coalition 
government with conflicting fiscal goals is given, not explained. In Part 2, some assumptions 
about the economy are modified and some about the political context are added to present a 
non-symmetric version of the same game. An electoral equilibrium is then investigated
 ^ See Weingast and Marshall (1988).
 ^ Male (1993) suggests that in Italy, for instance, party’s economic agenda is not the main item in the
determination of voters’ choice.
leading to the formation of a fiscally irresponsible coalition government, which had been 
taken for granted. The importance of the presence of an extra-eeonomic issue in rational 
voters’ utility is stressed.
Part 1.
COALITION PARTNERS’ CONFLICT OVER FISCAL POLICY AS A GAME OF 
COMPLETE INFORMATION.
2.1. ModePs assumptions.
There are two social groups: workers and rentiers. Workers only earn from their labour, 
rentiers from the rent of their land. Per capita income is exogenously given, constant and 
corresponds to the actual income each individual earns.
There is a public good to be produced, the optimal amount of which, g , is constant and 
exogenously given. There are two non distortionary taxes available: a lump sum to be paid by 
workers and a lump sum on land. The polarisation on the subject of the allocation of the fiscal 
burden is extreme: if rentiers were in power, they would set the tax on land to 0 and charge 
workers with the whole of it, while if  workers were in charge they would do the opposite.
If a government runs a budget deficit, they can issue public debt to cover it and, up to a 
certain extent, use seignorage. It is assumed that when public spending is financed through 
seignorage and public debt, this is done in fixed proportions: y  and I - y respectively.
Public bonds are sold abroad^. We are in a discrete time set-up: the life o f public debt bonds is 
one year, and on the first day of each year, the day the government presents their financial 
bill, it can either be renewed or paid back. At the beginning of the game (T=0^) public debt is 
equal to 0.
 ^ Y may be thought of as the ceiling to the monetisation of budget deficits imposed by the law or by central 
bank’s independence.
® Public debt pays an exogenously given world interest rate, r, to the holder; for simplicity, however, we will set 
r to 0.
 ^T is the first day of the t+1 year.
Seignorage may be distortionary. The incidence on each agent’s consumption of these 
distortions, K , is proportional to the amount of taxes raised as seignorage;
K,{6) = e7t,
0 >Q is a parameter measuring how distortionary inflation'^ is in tenns of individual 
consumption. When it is greater than 0, inflation has two effects on utility: a real balance 
effect (which is always present) and an indirect effect via the distortions it generates. Both are 
the same for everyone.
Just like in the Alesina and Drazen model the utility function is the following^
;=0
c , - y
where:
c is consumption o f private goods
y  is yearly per capita income, and by subtracting it I am just nomialising.
Since agents' utility is linear in eonsumption, all consumption paths satisfying the budget 
constraint with equality give the same (maximum) utility. One of those paths is the following: 
at eveiy time eveiy agent consumes all disposable income. I assume then that this is the path 
our economy chooses, so this a world with no saving^
There is a maximum length of time by which public spending can be financed by issuing debt 
bonds. I assume that from T=2 on such a practice is forbidden^"^. This may be seen as the 
requirement imposed by an international agreement our economy has signed up for. A coin is 
tossed to decide which of the two lump sum taxes to use to finance public spending. What we
For simplicity, inflation is assumed to be equal to seignorage. I will therefore use the two terms 
interchangeably.
'* We have set the rate of discount equal to 0 for simplicity. All it takes for my results to obtain is that the rate of  
interest be equal to the rate of discount.
Utility may also be dependent on the consumption o f the public good, but since the level of public spending is 
given it plays no role in the game and is therefore omitted.
This obviously means that Ricardian Equivalence does not hold here. However, public debt is still neutral in 
itself, because different intertemporal allocations of any given amount of consumption give the same utility. This 
is due to the special form the utility function takes: it is linear in consumption and characterised by time 
separability. It is only when inflation is introduced alongside with debt, and it is distortionary, that there is a 
reduction in welfare.
need is a time the game will end at, while what happens afterwards may be specified in 
different ways. I have chosen the random draw just mentioned because it makes the game 
symmetric.
As for the political context, the setting is a parliamentary democracy with proportional 
representation^^, with the presence of more than two parties. Political parties' representatives 
are not "office motivated", and therefore have the same utility function as any other agent in 
the economy. Elections take place every second year, precisely at T=0 and T=2. The winner 
must immediately produce a financial bill. The number of voters, the same as the number of 
agents of the economy for simplicity, is 2n, n of which are rentiers and n of which are 
workers.
I take for granted that the actual political scenario is such that the elections at T=0 gave no 
absolute majority to any party, and that by fomiing a coalition R, a party representing rentiers, 
and W, a workers' party, produce a government with sufficient parliamentary support. 
Generally speaking, R and W may have an interest in fonuing a coalition because they share 
the same extra-economic Weltanschauung, which will then be represented in power. 
However, they have conflicting goals as far as fiscal policy is concerned.
2.2. The game: general framework.
The very moment of their election (T=0) a government must take a decision about the 
allocation of the fiscal burden and produce a financial bill. Since the government is a coalition 
with conflicting fiscal goals using either of the available lump sum taxes is impossible, and 
fiscal policy is then the outcome of the coalition partners' strategic interaction.
The rules of the game are peculiar. The coalition partners must simultaneously choose an 
action: whether to concede, that is, declaring oneself ready to be burdened with the whole of 
the fiscal deficit for the rest of the mandate, or whether not to concede. If both parties 
concede, a coin is tossed at T=0 to choose between raising a lump sum tax from rentiers and 
raising a lump sum tax from workers in both years of the term. If only one concedes, the 
social group it represents will be the one financing public spending for the whole length of the 
mandate. Finally, if both parties do not concede, neither lump sum tax can be used, and public 
spending at t= l (the first year of the temi) is financed through debt and seignorage. This is a
My results would not change qualitatively if  we considered a longer term (i.e. end of the game at T=3,4 etc.). 
Changing the set-up in this respect only complicates calculus.
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viable option because inflation is a tax affecting everyone's utility in the same way. At T=1 
debt must be either repaid or renewed, hence a new stage of the game takes place, with both 
players having to declare again "concession" or "no concession".
Unlike in Alesina and Drazen (1991), the actions are not statements about the players' nature: 
we are in a context o f complete information. Rather, no concession is something like reneging 
one's word (by proposing amendments to the financial bill in Parliament, for instance). The 
co-operative solution by which both coalition partners concede is never reachable, since 
because of the existence of the option not to concede commitments are not binding, and 
therefore not credible.
We can summarise all this by saying that the game is one of complete but imperfect 
information (simultaneous moves), where a second stage is reached only if there was a certain 
outcome, namely “no concession, no concession”, at stage one. It is also a symmetric game.
2.3. The game: normal form.
To write down the game in normal form and find its equilibrium we need to know both 
players' payoffs. First of all, let us consider how debt and inflation evolve if neither player 
concedes at any time:
= ( i - y ) g
^ 2  = (1 -  r ) [ i + (1 ~ r)]g 
^ 2  == f  [i + (1 "  r)]g
Note that the incidence of seignorage at an individual level (r;') is equal to seignorage 
revenues divided by the number of agents/taxpayers^^:
The end of the game may also be interpreted as a major political reform such as a switch to a voting system 
like the first-past-the-post one.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) assume that each of the two groups pays one-half o f taxes before a stabilisation; if 
I normalised n to 1 I would obtain exactly the same.
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(the superscript "d" stands for distortionary). Correspondingly, the incidence of a lump sum 
tax (r'"^) on one rentier is equal to its revenue divided by n, and the same for a lump sum tax 
to be paid by any worker.
Since there is no saving, expected consumption is equal to expected disposable income:
E{cr)  = y
, n c l
where the superscript "be" means "before anyone plays concession", "w" means "winner" (the 
one who has not conceded in an outcome with unilateral concession), "1" stands for loser (the 
one who has played concession in an outcome with unilateral concession) and "bil" for 
bilateral concession, associated with the tossing of a coin.
Let us then turn to utility. By substituting out for consumption and considering the 
distortionai'y effects of inflation, expected utility at time t before anyone has conceded may be 
written as:
while the expected utility at a time after someone has conceded is equal to 0 for the winner, 
minus the non-distortionary tax for the loser and minus the non distortionary tax multiplied by 
the probability 0.5 for both players in case o f a bilateral concession.
However the game evolves, there is by assumption a stabilisation at T=2 by which all debt is 
repaid. The effects of the strategic interaction between the coalition parties camiot stretch out 
beyond t=3, that is, the first year of the next mandate. Therefore, while writing down the 
payoffs of the game I must only consider the utility of the players at t= l, t=2 and t=3.1 eannot
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neglect t=3 utility, because according to how the game evolves there will or will not be a 
transmission of debt from this mandate to the next. If there is transmission of debt, the 
stabilisation that must take place will obviously be stronger, as extra tax revenues must be 
obtained to pay back the debt to foreign investors.
Given the game structure, the payoffs of the game can be easily evaluated. The normal form 
of the game is shown in Table 1. Notice that what makes the game symmetric is both the fact 
that there is a number of rentiers equal to the number of workers and the assumption of an 
equal expected share of the fiscal burden at t=3.
The players use backward induction. They can anticipate the Nash equilibrium of the second 
stage of the game; they insert the eorresponding payoffs in the first stage and finally ehoose 
their strategies. The result is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
It is easy to see that, as antieipated, "concession, concession" is never an equilibrium. At 
eveiy stage, if  the opponent concedes, any player will play "no concession", because by so 
doing he avoids being fiscally burdened altogether (he will only expect to pay the fiscal
burden of t=3 times the probability 0.5, as required by the international agreement). The
comparison between the payoffs associated with conceding and not conceding, given that the 
opponent does not eoncede, is less clear-cut instead. Both options imply costs in terms of 
utility, and whether not conceding is more or less costly depends on how distortionary 
inflation is, that is, on the value of the parameter 0 .
In what follows I will use short names for the payoffs in Table 1 :
A is any player's payoff when he is the winner at T=0;
B is his payoff when he is the loser at T=0;
C is his payoff when there is bilateral concession at T=0;
D is his payoff when he is the winner at T=l;
E is his payoff when he is the loser at T=l;
F is his payoff when there is bilateral concession at T=l;
G is his payoff when there is no concession before T=2.
2.4. Equilibria.
Depending on the value of the parameter ^ , the interaction between coalition partners 
determines the implementation of different fiscal policies. Let us consider the three possible 
eases.
13
Proposition 1. I f  the condition.
nr{2>-r)
is met, then the game has a unique Nash equilibrium implying the longest delay in
stabilisation^^.
The proof is straightforward. At T-1 each player's payoff associated with "no concession", 
given that the opponent does not concede, is greater than the one associated with 
"concession", still given that the opponent does not concede, only if:
2ny
which holds, given Proposition 1. The game at stage 2 is then a Prisoner's Dilemma.
The next step is to compare the parties' payoff associated with the unique NE at T=l, (G, G}, 
now seen as the outcome of playing "no concession, no coneession" at T=0, with the payoffs 
associated with conceding at T=0, given that the opponent does not concede. We have just 
another Prisoner's Dilemma here if the condition stated in Proposition 1 is met; hence {G, G} 
is the outcome associated with the unique NE of the entire game.
Notice that quite obviously the condition in Proposition 1 is more stringent than the one that is 
required in order for {G, G} to be the outcome associated with the NE at T=l. Note also that 
in the condition in Proposition 1 the RHS is positive for all possible values o f the parameters. 
This tells us that assuming that this condition holds does not contradict assuming that inflation 
affects utility negatively through the distortions it produces (i.e. 6 > 0). Finally, consider that 
the lower the value of y , the more likely this eondition is met. Since in the OECD countries 
the degree of monetisation of the budget deficit is usually not so high the case here analysed is 
therefore particularly interesting.
Let us now consider the economic meaning of what is going on here. By playing "no 
concession" instead of "concession", given that the opponent does not concede, any player is
The value o f the upper bound for 6  is dependent on the choice about the duration of the electoral term. If the 
term were longer than 2 years, the condition to be met in order for the game to have a unique NE with both 
players play "no concession" at every stage would be even more stringent. However, for any finite time of 
duration there always exists a positive upper bound for 9 under which the game evolves in the way here 
considered.
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better off, because the fiscal burden of the two years of the mandate is shared. In fact, the 
amount of it that is transmitted to t=3 through public debt is shared in expectation, because a 
coin is tossed, while the rest is paid during the mandate as seignorage, and the real balance 
effect of inflation is the same for everyone by assumption. There is also an additional 
distortionary effect attached to inflation, but it is small enough to be offset by the benefit of 
paying just half, not the whole of the fiscal burden of the two years of the term (as it would be 
the case by playing "concession", given that the opponent does not concede).
It may seem that much depends on the fact that the assumption about the end of the game is a 
favourable one for both players, in comparison with what happens to them if  they play 
"concession", given that their partner plays "no concession". But that is not the case: the result 
is far more general.
Consider for example a different assumption about the end of the game: one of the players 
(say, W) pays nothing and the other (R) is burdened with the whole cost of the stabilisation. 
Imagine at first that ^  = 0. Whatever R plays, quite obviously W does not concede. But what 
happens to R? Whatever he does, he will have to pay for the whole public spending of t=3. 
But by playing "concession", given that W does not concede, the outcome will be such that R 
will have to pay also for the whole of public spending of year 1 and 2, while by playing "no 
concession" at both stages of the game he will only have to pay part of that, namely the 
repayment of public debt at T=2 and his share of seignorage during the mandate. In other 
words, by playing "no concession" at T=0 and T=1 R benefits from the fact that the 
consequent use of debt and inflation for the whole of the mandate will make W pay, through 
seignorage, part of the cost of public spending of t=l and t=2, which he would pay entirely if 
he played "concession". Let us now remove the assumption 9 = 0. The result still holds if the 
costs of inflation (linked to its distortionary nature) R has to pay are smaller than the benefits 
(in terms of a redistribution of the costs of public spending at t=l and t=2 that is favourable to 
him). A range of low but positive values for 0 may still be found by which this happens 
Some conclusions may be drawn as far as the welfare analysis is concerned. Two different 
cases are here comprised: ^ = 0 and 0 positive but small. In the first case, no inefficiency is 
introduced, in spite of the long delay in stabilisation. As for the second case, since seignorage 
is here used for the whole length of the electoral term with certainty, the maximum amount of 
inefficiency is introduced in the economy. However, the condition on the value for 0 that is 
necessary for the game to be played this way takes the form of an upper bound, so that the 
welfare loss cannot be so great, because the distortions caused by inflation are small.
The condition on 9 referred to this version of the game is available upon request.
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Notice also that the partial derivatives o f Q \\\ 0 ,  y  and g  are all negative, so that a small 
increase in any of these parameters makes the inefficiency introduced by the strategic 
interaction between the coalition partners greater.
Proposition 2. I f  the condition:
2ny
is met, then the game has a mixed strategies equilibrium implying the possibilit}> fo r  debt and 
inflation to rise in the first or in both years o f  the mandate.
The condition in Proposition 2 implies E > G, so now both players find it convenient to 
concede at T=l, given that the opponent plays "no concession". This is then a Chicken game. 
There are therefore two pure strategies Nash equilibria, at {D, E} and at (E, D}. In any game 
with two equilibria in pure strategies there is also an equilibrium in mixed strategies. As it is 
usual in case of multiple equilibria, the question arises of what criterion to use to single out 
the most plausible one. Some authors have suggested symmetry is a reasonable choice rule: an 
asymmetric equilibrium is in fact an improbable "focal p o i n t " T h e  two pure strategies 
equilibria are extremely asymmetric. This is a symmetric game and therefore the mixed 
strategies equilibrium is also symmetric (both players play "concession" and "no concession" 
with the same probability). I am therefore interested in identifying the mixed strategies 
equilibrium^^. I can then single it out and insert the associated payoffs into the first stage of 
the game, thus presumably following the players' backward induction.
In the mixed strategies equilibrium at T=1 let us call p  the probability with which any player 
plays "concession"; this probability has been calculated to be;
2n9y
See Rasmusen (1989).
As pointed out by Harsanyi (1973) mixed strategies equilibria of complete information games may be thought 
of as "limits" to pure strategy equilibria in games with players having a small amount of private information, 
which highlights the correspondence between the equilibrium here selected and the one analysed by Alesina and 
Drazen.
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If I call M IXl the expected payoff associated with the mixed strategies equilibrium at T=l, I 
can then write it as:
2 - y +
An^er ^
After replacing "next stage" with {M/X1,M/X1} (see Table 1) I can analyse what happens at 
T=0. Once again there are two NE in pure strategies, namely: “no concession, concession” 
and “concession, no concession”, because:
B > M IXl
so every player concedes, given that the opponent does not concede (Chicken again). 
Following the same reasoning as in the second stage of the game, let us select again the mixed 
strategies equilibrium. Through simple calculations the probability with which any player will 
play "concession" at T=0, which I will call z , can be found:
With some further calculus the expected payoffs characterising the mixed strategies 
equilibrium at T=0 (called M IX2) can also be found, which can be thought of as the expected 
utility of any player at the beginning of the game. Its value is the following:
6-?>y +%nOy ^-\2n^6^y^
Let us finally consider what happens to public debt and inflation in this context, and the 
implications as far as welfare is concerned.
The first thing to point out is that the mixed strategies equilibrium of the game implies the 
possibility of a delay in the adoption of non-distortionary taxes (and a contemporaiy rise in 
debt and inflation), and that this possibility is present only if the mixed strategies equilibrium 
is selected. In fact, it can easily be shown that if at stage two either of the pure strategies 
equilibria (at {D, E} and at {E, D}) were singled out, the equilibrium at stage one would be in
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pure strategies, too (at (A, B} in the first case and at (B, A} in the second). This means that 
there would be a winner and a loser at T=0, thus making the use of debt and inflation 
unnecessary. However, I have motivated why the mixed strategies equilibrium is to be 
considered as the best candidate for selection in this context of multiple equilibria.
The second point I want to emphasise is that in this mixed strategies equilibrium rises in debt 
and inflation of different duration are possible. In fact, the game may reach its second stage 
(because neither player has conceded at T=0) and either end there, because a uni- or bilateral 
concession takes place theif \  or go on (when “no concession, no concession” is the draw at 
T=l), which implies no stabilisation before the end of the term.
As far as welfare is concerned, it is interesting to notice that the condition on 6 characterising 
this set-up takes the form of a lower bound. This means that the distortions seignorage brings 
about may now be great. All outcomes of the game save for those implying immediate 
concession are therefore bound to cause a great deal of inefficiency. Ex ante, both players 
would be better off if  co-operation were possible.
In terms of comparative statics, it is interesting to notice that a greater 6 does not necessarily 
mean a smaller expected utility. This is because an increase in the amount of distortions 
caused by inflation affects the probabilities of playing "concession" at both stages (see 
Appendix A).
Proposition 3. I f  the condition:
ny{2>-~y) 2ny
is met, then the game has a mixed strategies equilibrium by which either there is immediate 
stabilisation, or a delay lasting fo r  the whole o f  the term.
Since 9 is not so high here, if the second stage of the game is reached both players find it 
convenient not to concede, given that the opponent plays "no concession". {G, G}, the 
expected payoffs of the equilibrium at T=l, are then inserted in the first stage of the game, 
just like in the case sub Proposition 1. Here, however, 9 is not so small, either; its value is not 
as low as to have both R and W play "no concession" at T=0, given that the opponent does not
We do not agree with Alesina and Drazen (1991) when they identify concession by either side (or both) with 
giving up being part of the government. Declaring to be ready to be burdened with the whole of the fiscal deficit
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concede. On the contrary, both players choose to concede at T=0, given that the opponent 
does not concede, and there are therefore two NE at that stage of the game, leading to the 
outcomes {A, B} and {B, A}. Both of these are in pure strategies, and just like in the case sub 
Proposition 2 a third equilibrium, the mixed strategies one, will be the one I focus on.
Let us therefore analyse the mixed strategies equilibrium of this game. The value of the 
probability with which each coalition party plays "concession" at T=0, called z , is:
n O y i f - y )
Given the value of z , the expected payoff of both players at T=0, called EP, is easily found:
2 » '6 y (3 -y )  ^
What does all this imply from the point of view of the dynamics of public debt and inflation? 
How much inefficiency does a coalition government introduce in such a context? The peculiar 
aspect of this mixed strategies equilibrium is that if  the second stage of the game is reached, 
both players play pure strategies ("no concession"). So depending on the actions taken by the 
players at T=0, either there is immediate adoption of non-distortionary taxes to cover public 
spending (immediate uni- or bilateral concession), or the government issues debt bonds and 
creates inflation, in which case a stabilisation is excluded before T=2, i.e. the time of the 
enforcement of the international agreement. Public debt may or may not rise during the 
mandate; if it does, it rises for the whole length of it and is transmitted to the next 
government. Wlien this is the case, inefficiency is introduced because debt is always matched 
by inflation, and inflation determines a reduction in expected utility because of its 
distortionary effects. The value of 6 is here intermediate with respect to the ranges 
considered in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
It is interesting to notice that here, too, an increase in 6 influences the probabilities with 
which the coalition members play "concession" at T=0. The comparative statics is done in 
Appendix B.
while remaining part of the iiiling coalition is not an incoherent behaviour if the coalition parties are strongly 
motivated by extra-economic issues, for instance.
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2 .5 . A p p e n d ix  A .
In the context of the mixed strategies equilibrium of Proposition 2 a small increase in 0 may 
increase the probability with which both players play "concession" at T=0, thus making the 
expected payoffs greater (because waiting is costly). To see the point, consider first of all that 
a small increase in 6 increases the probability with which both players play "concession" at 
T=l, if  that stage of the game is reached:
■ ^ = - V > oâô 2n0 Y
Notice the above derivative is decreasing in 6 . The next step is to look at the effect on M IX l. 
This payoff may be thought of as a weighted average of the payoffs associated with the four 
possible outcomes of the game at T=l, where the weights depend on the value of p .  There are 
therefore two effects of a small increase of the distortions caused by inflation on M IXl\ one 
is indirect, as it affects it via effect on p , and is positive; the other one is direct, as it concerns 
the values of the payoffs M IXl is a linear combination of, and is negative. As the derivative 
of p  in 6^ is decreasing, the smaller the starting value of $ , the greater the indirect effect, 
which turns then out to prevail over the direct one. Precisely, for starting values of 0 lower 
than:
0 = E E Z
2ny
a small increase in this parameter makes M IXl increase, while the contrary is tme when the 
starting value of 0 is higher than that.
Consider now that an increase in M IXl makes the probability with which both players play 
"concession" at T=0, z , smaller. This is also intuitively clear, because M IXl is the payoff 
associated with the outcome "no concession, no concession" at T=0 and if its value is not so 
small, the probability with which both players concede at that time is not so great.
I then finally come to the effect of a small increase in 6 on MIX2. This payoff is a weighted 
average of A, B, C and M IX l, the weights depending on the value of z . Again, there are two 
antagonist effects: 0 enters the M IX2 function via M IXl and via z , and when an increase in 
9 makes the former greater (which is the case when the starting value of that parameter is
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small), it makes the latter smaller, and vice versa. It is the effect working through z that turns 
out always to be the dominant one here. The conclusion is that when the starting value of 0 is 
small a small increase makes the value o f MIX2  decrease, but if the starting value of 0 is 
sufficiently high its increase determines an increase of MIX2. The latter result is not so 
distant from what Drazen and Grilli (1993) describe as “the benefit of crises”.
It may be shown that the comparative statics involving the y  parameter is totally analogous, 
so that for small starting values of the rate of monetisation o f public deficit a small increase 
makes the value of MIX2 decrease, while the contrary effect is found when the starting value 
is conveniently high.
On the contrary, the partial derivative in g o f the expected payoff associated with the mixed 
strategies equilibrium is always negative. In fact, the cost of public expenditure does not 
affect the probabilities with which the players play "concession" at any stage.
2.6. Appendix B.
Also in the equilibrium synthesised in Proposition 3 the value of 6 influences the probability 
with which the coalition members play "concession" at T=0, as well as the payoff associated 
to the outcome {G, G}. A small increase makes this probability greater, as it is possible to 
infer from the positive sign of its partial derivative in 6 :
^  1
âO n0^y{3 ~ y)
This is the reason why the value of EP also increases as a consequence of a small increase in 
0 , as shows the positive sign of its partial derivative:
âEP 1
âO n 6 y (3 — y)
In fact, the game is now more likely to end with uni- or bilateral concession at T=0, and this 
makes expected utility increase, as delays in stabilisation are costly. It is true that if "no 
concession, no concession" is the outcome at T=0, the expected utility is smaller as a 
consequence o f an increase in 6 , but the first, positive effect always prevails here.
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The comparative statics involving the y  parameter is totally analogous, and in fact the partial 
derivative of EP  in the rate of monetisation of the public deficit is positive:
âEP 3 - 2 y
The partial derivative in g  is negative instead, as the value of public spending does not affect 
the value of z .
Part 2.
WHY DO PARTIES WITH CONFLICTING FISCAL GOALS FORM COALITIONS?
3.1. Modification of Part 1 model’s assumptions about the economic context.
As far as the economic context is concerned, the only modifications I make to Part 1 model’s 
assumptions regard the utility function and the size of the social groups. I assume now there 
are two types of agents. For the first type, some extra-economic issue is of paramount 
importance. Let us suppose this issue is something related to morality (abortion, for 
instance)^^. These agents have lexicographic preferences with the moral issue on top of the 
ranking, and if the government adopts a policy which is contrary to their moral position their 
utility is minus infinite. Wlien a government is in line with their moral creed, instead, their 
utility is linearly dependent on consumption, just like in Part 1, and therefore which 
attribution of the fiscal burden is implemented is relevant. The introduction of agents with 
lexicographic preferences is functional to a strong simplification of the political context. In 
fact, I will describe in the next paragraph a possible political scenario in which this type of 
agents plays an important role.
Another interesting example is some kind of ethnic division.
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The rest of the electoral body is made up by agents for whom the moral issue enters the utility 
function just like consumption. These are defined as unattached voters, and their utility 
function is the following:
17 '=  Z C/=0
u; =c, - y ,  +<%;'
The new element here is the last term, is a dummy with value 1 if a conservative 
government is in office, -1 if a liberal one is on power, where I use conservative and liberal as 
referred to the polarisation on the moral issue, q is a parameter measuring the bias for the 
conservative view and may take values from q (negative) to q (positive) I assume that q 
is a random walk:
q\ = qU + ^ t W.N.
Quite realistically, the bias has a strong autocorrelation, but it also depends on cultural 
shocks. Agents tend to be coherent, but new information may modify their views.
The number of agents in the economy, the same as the number of voters for simplicity, is now 
N=2n+a, n of which are rentiers and n+a of which are workers (a is an odd number).
3.2. More assumptions about the political context.
If there were no moral bias only two parties would compete at the elections: one would have 
workers finance public spending by paying a lump sum tax, the other would pay for it by 
imposing a lump sum tax on rentiers. The latter would always win, since workers are more 
numerous than rentiers. However, this is not the case. Some moral issue matters. It is because 
of this that the political scene may be characterised in such a way that no single party gets the 
absolute majority of votes in an election, and following that a coalition based only on
This way of modelling the utility agents derive from the presence of a government with either position on the 
exti'a-economic issue is similar to the one suggested in Milesi-Feinetti and Spolaore (1994).
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common moral views is formed. A restricted and not too unrealistic set of assumptions 
detennining this result is the following^'^:
1) the number of voters with lexicographic preferences is equal or greater than the majority 
of the electoral body ((2n+a+l)/2). All rentiers are part of this group, so unattached voters 
are all workers. Some workers, however, have lexicographic preferences;
2) rentiers are all conservative^^;
3) there are three “moral constituencies”: one is conservative on the moral issue and prefers 
imposing a lump sum on workers, one is conservative but it would tax rentiers if on power 
and one is liberal and has a preference for the adoption of a lump sum tax on land^^. The 
votes of agents with lexicographic preferences are not swinging: they stick to the political 
party that gives voice to the moral constituency they belong to;
4) no moral constituency reaches the majority of votes, and the same is true both for the 
coalition of the two conservative constituencies and for the sum of the votes of workers’ 
conservative constituency and of unattached voters;
5) all voters are rational and forward-looking. They are informed about the presence and the 
size of the three constituencies.
If these assumptions are met, those with lexicographic preferences may only vote for someone 
who is part of their own constituency, because this is the only way they can be sure that in 
case the elections will not give absolute majority to any party, those they have voted for will 
set up alliances/coalitions giving priority to the moral issue. The following three 
parties/candidates therefore exist:
CR: all members are ultra-conservative rentiers^^;
CW: all members are ultra-conservative workers;
What follows qualifies as sufficient but not necessary conditions.
What is needed is that they all share the same moral views, no matter which, while workers do not.
The characterisation o f “moral constituencies” by a preference regarding fiscal policy is not in contrast to the 
very definition of such groups. In fact, the utility of agents with lexicographic preferences does depend on 
consumption, although on the moral position of government first.
I use the adjectives ultra-consei-vative/liberal to define agents with lexicographic preferences with the extra- 
economic issue on top of the ranking.
24
LW: all members are ultra-liberal workers.
C/L stands for conservative/liberal; R/W stands for rentiers/workers and correspondingly to 
the preference on the fiscal policy to implement (R= lump sum on workers, W= lump sum on 
rentiers).
Are there likely to be other parties competing in the elections? There may be, as unattached 
voters may have their own candidates. However, it can be shown that this is not relevant to 
our model: given these assumptions, considering any richer political scenario is the same as 
considering just the tlxree parties above^^. We will then stick to the simpler set-up and say that 
the only candidates are those expressed by CR, CW, LW. Therefore also unattached voters 
must cast their vote for either of them. Given the above assumptions, voting is a non-strategic 
action for them, in the sense that what is optimal for a voter does not depend on other voters’ 
choice.
The most relevant peculiarity of the political scenario I have just described is the presence of 
a group of workers who share the same moral position as that of rentiers. In other words, the 
extra-economic issue and the fiscal agenda split the electoral body differently. If it were not 
so a two-party scenario would still be the result, but this is just what it takes to make coalition 
governments unlikely if not impossible.
The crucial vote in the elections is that of the median voter in voters’ distribution according to 
the degree of conservatism on the moral issue. Since I have assumed workers are more 
numerous than rentiers and all rentiers are ultra-conservative the median voter is a worker, 
and given the second part of assumption 4) he is an unattached voter. He will vote for either 
CW or LW.
The given set of assumptions is such that the electoral result is either absolute majority for 
LW or no party reaching absolute majority. In the latter case CW forms a coalition 
government with CR and this government is supported by a majority in Parliament. It is in 
this case that a war of attrition is likely to start. Just like in Part 1, in fact, I exclude that some 
commitment technology making coalition partners’ promises to each other credible is
The veiy presence of agents with lexicographic preferences is functional to this simplification of the political 
scenario, as well as to the requirement that in case o f no party reaching absolute majority the coalition that will 
be formed will be based on moral affinity, which is what it takes to have coalitions with conflicting fiscal 
purposes.
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available. Eventual electoral promises made by the future coalition partners to potential voters 
about their will to co-operate in the process of allocation of the fiscal burden are also not 
binding, hence not credible. Besides, T=2 elections have no disciplinary role on their 
behaviour.
Being forward-looking, unattached voters know all this. Nevertheless, the median voter’s 
conservative bias may be as strong as to have him vote for CW, in spite of the fact that if the 
next government is CW+CR he will have two disadvantages: his favourite fiscal policy will 
not be implemented, as would be the case otherwise, and he will suffer, like any other agent in 
the economy, from the inefficiency introduced by the coalition.
3.3. The model: an overview.
I will first analyse what fiscal policy measures unattached voters (workers by assumption) 
expect if LW wins the elections and, alternatively, if no party gets the majority of votes. In the 
latter case CR and CW form a coalition on the basis of their common moral views, and they 
start a war of attrition. I will analyse this game, an asymmetric version of the one in Part 1, 
and find the expected payoffs associated with every equilibrium. Given the assumptions about 
the utility functions of agents, CW’s payoffs correspond to the values of the utility that an 
unattached voter, hence also the median voter, gets from consumption in correspondence to 
the attributions of the fiscal burden the equilibria entail.
The next step is to consider how conservative the median voter must be in order for him to 
prefer to vote for CW instead of casting his vote for LW. This consists in finding the 
minimum value for his q allowing for his utility in case of a CR+CW government to be 
higher than his utility if CW is in office. This value is ultimately the sufficient condition for a 
coalition government without a fiscal agenda they agree upon to be elected. Being the median 
voter’s conservative bias stochastic, it is not known before the elections. However, if its 
density function is known, the probability for the conservative coalition to form the next 
government may be calculated.
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3.4. Fiscal policy as the product of coalition partners’ strategic interaction.
If LW wins the elections, they will finance the production of g  with a lump sum to be paid 
by rentiers only^^.
If a government is formed by CR and CW, instead, fiscal policy will be the product of their 
strategic interaction. The game is similar to the one in Part 1, the only difference lying in the 
fact that now, being workers n+a>n, it is not symmetric. Table 2 illustrates the normal form of 
this game. I will use the same short names for each payoff as in Part 1, only they refer to 
Table 2 here and have the name of the player they refer to in brackets (ex. G(CR), D(CW)).
Let us analyse the equilibria of this game. A first, pure strategies equilibrium, equivalent to 
the one of Proposition 1 in Part 1, is the only one available if the following condition holds:
, 2
Condition 1: 0 < — — + - ^  — —N  2y{n + a)(3 -  y)
The game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma at both stages of the game. In fact, concession is a 
dominated strategy at T=I for CR if:
/I 1 1$ <  h  —N  n
''\ + y  
\  /
and for CW if:
N  n + a \ 2y
Both these conditions are met if  Condition 1 holds. {G(CR), G(CW)} is therefore the outcome 
of playing "no concession, no concession" at T=0. And if Condition 1 holds, even at T=0
LW may also partially finance it by issuing public debt. However, they will not cover the rest by recurring to 
seignorage, as this would imply part of the expense is paid by workers (real balance effect) and workers, as well 
as rentiers, would also suffer from the distortions inflation causes. Public goods o f t=2 are all financed by taxes 
on land, and if LW has issued debt at T=0, they will now repay for it in the same way. In terms workers’ utility, 
this fiscal policy is exactly equivalent to a balanced budget (with g  financed by taxes on land) in every year. 
The alternative to recur to debt at T=I and/or renew T=0 debt is not convenient for workers, because it would
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concession is a dominated strategy for both players. In fact, Condition 1 is found by imposing 
that conceding gives a higher payoff to CW than not conceding, given that the opponent does 
not concede. Doing the same for CR gives a less stringent condition, namely:
N  2 n y (3 -y )
The equilibrium is therefore given by both players playing no concession at both stages of the 
game, and the associated outcome is {G(CR), G(CW)}. All considerations about the 
equilibrium of Proposition 1 in Part I apply.
A second, mixed strategy equilibrium, conesponding to the one of Proposition 2 in Part 1 is 
found if Condition 2 holds:
I 1Condition 2: ^ ^N  n
Just like in Part I there are here two pure strategies equilibria implying unilateral concession 
at T=0, hence no use of public debt, but they are highly asymmetric. The mixed strategies 
one, a Chicken game at both stages, is here not perfectly symmetric, either, but it is, at least, 
less asymmetric^^. The probabilities with which CR and CW play concession at T=l, p  and b 
respectively, have the following values:
p  = \
b =1
I
r + 26{a + n) 
1
yf^ 2Mi9 -  —I N ,
imply running the risk of paying for part of the public spending of this mandate in the next, when a coin is tossed 
to determine the terms of the stabilisation.
The source of asymmetiy is the different size of the social groups CW and CL represent, i.e. a>0. Payoffs are 
individual utilities, so they depend on individual fiscal burdens. The more numerous the agents belonging to a 
social group (workers/rentiers), the smaller their individual fiscal burden if the party representing the economic 
interests o f that group turns out to be the loser of the war of attrition.
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with p  >b for all a>0 and for all 0 respecting Condition 2. If CR and CW play concession 
with the above probabilities at T=l, their payoffs, called MIX ICR and MIXICW are the 
following:
MIXICR = {—2a^ — %an-8%^ + + \ Oany + An^y — 6a^nOy — 2Aarâ0y - 2An^6y +
-a^y^  +4a^n6y^ +San^Oy^ -4a^i f0^y^  ~\6an^6^y^ -\6n'^9^y^)g 
\^ny{2n + a){-a  + 2an6 + 4w^^)]1 - 1
M IXICW  = {-2a^ -  San -  Sn^ -  2a^y -  2any -\-4n^y ~ 6a^6y -  SOa^nOy -  4San^6y + 
-24n^6y~a^y^ -4a^0y^ -  I2a^n6y^ -  San^6y  ^ "4a^6'^y^ -  24a^n6^y^ +
~52a^n^6^y^ -4San^0^y^ -  I6n^0^y^)g  
^y{n  + a)(2n + a){a + 2a^^ + banO + 4«^6')] '
where MIX IC W >MIX 1 CR. Even in the equilibrium of Condition 1 CW’s expected payoff at 
T=1 was greater than CR’s, but here the fact that rentiers are less numerous has two effects: a 
direct one, just like for G(CW)>G(CR), and an indirect one via p>b  . By inserting {MIXICR, 
MIXICW} as the outcome of both players’ not conceding at T=0 the first stage of the game 
may be analysed. Here again two pure strategies equilibria, “concession; no concession” and 
“no concession; concession” are present, and again the mixed strategies one is of more 
interest. The probabilities with which CR and CW play concession, called s and z 
respectively, have the following values:
_  ,  1 .S' = 1 +
M IXICW2 g
z = l+  ^
-  + -M /X 1CR 2 g
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As in the second stage of the game, CR plays concession with a higher probability than CW. 
Given the values for s and z ,  the values for the expected payoffs associated to the mixed 
strategies equilibrium at T=0, called MIX2CR and MIX2CW, can be calculated:
M IXICR  -  {-6a^ -  24an -  24n^ + + 20any + \2n^y -  Sa^nOy -  32an^0y +
~32n^0y -3a'^y^ + I2a^n$y^ +2Aan^6y^ -  \2 a ^ n ^ 9 Y  -4San^9^y^ -4Sn '^9^y^)g  
(2n(2a^ + San + Sn^ -  a^y -  4any -  4n^y + a^y^ -  4a^n9y^ -  San^9y^ + 4a^n^9^y^ + 
I6an^9^y^ + 16«'‘6>V^))~*
M IX2CW  = (-6a^ -  24a^ — 24aa -  + 4aay + 12«^y -  Sa^9y -  40a^n9y -  64an^9y +
-32n^9y -3 a ^y ^  -  \2a^9y^ -  36a^n9y^ -  24an^9y^ ~ \2a^9^y^ -1 2 a }n 9 ^y^  
-\5 6 a ^n ^9 ^y^  -  \44an^9^y^ — 4Sn'^9^y^)g(2{a + n)(2a^ +San + Sn^ -  a^y -  4any +
4n^y + a^y^ +4a^9y^ + \2a^n9y^ +San^9y^ + 4 a ‘^ 9^y  ^ +24a^n9^y^ + 52a^n^9^y^ +
48aa'6»V ' + 16a^6>V'))“^
where again, MIX2CW>MIX2CR. {MIX2CR, MIX2CW} is therefore the outcome 
associated with the mixed strategies equilibrium sub Condition 2. All considerations about the 
mixed strategies equilibrium of Proposition 2 in Part 1 are applicable.
What happens if the value of 9 is not so high nor so low, that is, it lies in the following range:
1 1 2 + 3 y - y '  ^ 1 1 + ---------------- — — < ^ < - — + —N  n + a 2y(3 - y )  N  n
depends on the value for a. If:
2 + 3 y - y
+ y^
v 'V y
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then for all the values of 6 within the range the equilibrium implies immediate unilateral 
concession of CW, and there is no delay in stabilisation. This is a new feature of the game 
with respect to the symmetric version. Workers are much more numerous than rentiers here, a 
realistic feature of the model, and this makes CW’s expected utility in case of unilateral 
concession much higher than CR’s when it is the latter to concede unilaterally. No surprise, 
then, if in the choice between conceding or not, given that the opponent does not concede, 
CW finds it convenient to concede, CR not to concede^ \
Instead, if:
a< 2 + 3 y -y '
then:
1 1 A . .A i n .  n.. ..2
N  n + a y 2y )  N  2yn{3 -  y)
and three cases are possible, depending on the value of 0 . Figure 1 illustrates this.
Case (a): for values of 6 between:
1 1
N  n
^1 + y^
V 2y y
and:
1 + y 
N  n + a\^ 2y
1 1
given that the opponent does not concede at T=l, CR does not concede while CW does. Via 
backward induction the best strategies at T=0 are found: again, CR does not concede while
Under the given condition on the value of a and within the given range for û there are various equilibria, 
because depending on the value of the latter parameter the players’ strategies at T=1 are different. However, all 
these equilibria are such that at T=0 it is optimal for CW to concede and for CR not to concede. Since when
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CW does. The game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies implying unilateral 
concession on CW’s part and therefore no recurrence to debt and inflation.
Case (b): if  9 satisfies the following condition:
1 2 + 3 y - y  I 2 + 3 y - y— _i c  ^  hN  2y{n + a)(3 - y )  N  2yn{3 -  y)
both players find it optimal not to concede at T=l, but then in equilibrium CR does not 
concede at T=0 while CW does, so there are no delays in stabilisation and the fiscal burden is 
attributed to workers, just like in case (a).
Case (c): this case is totally similar to the one of Proposition 3 in Part I. If the following 
condition holds:
N  2yn{3 - y )  N  n + a
M (l-y)and a < 2 + 3y -  Y
then there are three equilibria, two pure strategies and one mixed strategies, the latter such 
that T=1 subgame is a Prisoner’s Dilemma and the game at T=0 is Chicken. The consequence 
on fiscal policy of the mixed strategies equilibrium is that either there is immediate 
stabilisation, or a delay lasting for the whole of the term. The probabilities with which CR and 
CW play concession at T=0, called S' e z respectively, have the following values:
I
y(3 -  y) 2{n + a)
anyone concedes at T=0 the players are not called to play again at T=l, these equilibria are not different in the 
way they manifest themselves and in the consequences on fiscal policy.
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1
z = l ------------- ^
y(3 -  y)  h 0 ------N  2n
where for all a > 0 ,  7 >z  . Starting from these probabilities the values of CR’s and CW’s 
expected payoffs associated with this equilibrium, called EPCR and EPCW respectively, are 
easily calculated:
_ 4 a  + Sn~ 9ay + lSanOy + 36n^0y + 3ay^ -  6anOy^ -  I2n^0y^
2ny{3 -  y ){ a -2 a n 0  ~ An^9) ^
EPCW -  ^ I S t z ^ ^ y  + 54(3M^y + 36/^^^y - 3(3y  ^ -6 a ^9 y^  -  lSan9y^ ~\2n^9y^
2 y{3 -y ){a  + n){a + 2a^9+ 0an9 + 4n^9) ^
where EPCW>EPCR. All considerations about the equilibrium of Proposition 3 in Part 1 are 
applicable,
3.5. The median voter’s choice and the probability a the debt- and inflation-prone 
coalition government to come into existence.
Let us now consider the median voter’s choice between CW and LW. Being interested in the 
case of delayed stabilisations, let us suppose that the values of a and 9 are such that in case of 
CR+CW on power an equilibrium implying unilateral concession with certainty at T=0 is 
excluded. This means that having the conservative coalition in office entails a strategic 
inefficiency. Being, like any other voter, rational and forward-looking, the median voter 
knows this. He also knows that if LW wins, his prefeiTed policy will be implemented as far as 
the attribution of the fiscal burden is concerned. However, if his conservative bias is strong 
enough, the benefit from having is moral Weltanschauung represented on power will be 
greater than the costs in terms of smaller consumption.
Consider also that q '*', the median voter’s conservative bias, is stochastic. It is therefore 
impossible to know ex-ante the median voter’s choice. However, if the density function of q"‘ 
is known it is possible to calculate the probability with which the conservative coalition will
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win the elections. In fact, this probability is the complement to 1 of the cumulative density 
function at the value for q making the median voter indifferent between CW and LW.
Before considering the median voter’s choice analytically, let us reflect on the meaning of 
having a quite conservative median voter. It is the same as saying that the majority of the 
electoral body is strongly conservative as far as the moral issue is concerned. Notice there 
also exists a majority of voters, the n+a workers, who is in favour of g financed by a lump 
sum tax to be paid by rentiers, i.e. the policy LW would adopt. However, this is not relevant, 
because the extra-economic motivation of voters is greater than the economic one. There are 
conservative workers: some are ultra-conservative those who are not still care for the moral 
issue a great deal. This is all it takes to determine that a coalition between parties with 
conflicting fiscal goals finds sufficient support in Parliament to form a government.
Now to calculus. The median voter’s expected utility if LW wins the elections at T=0 is;
because S  is -1 , E (ÿ ' for T=l,2, LW will attribute the whole of the fiscal burden of the 
legislature to rentiers and at t=3 a coin is tossed to decide who should pay for g .
The median voter’s expected utility if the conservative coalition is in office depends on the 
equilibrium of the game, which in turn depends on the values of 0 and a. Since I exclude 
those values implying immediate stabilisation, there are three cases.
Case (1): the equilibrium is the one considered sub Condition 1. (G(CR), G(CW)} is the 
outcome associated with this equilibrium, and the median voter’s expected utility is therefore;
ïf-^7 + 0l(3 -  Y ) g (1 -  T)'  + 3?;\ N  y 2 n + a  ^
i.e. G(CW) plus the element quantifying his moral affinity with CW in terms of utility. In 
order to have that the median voter chooses CW it is therefore necessary that:
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-y | — + Gl ( 3 - y ) g - - —— +3^' " > - — g-^q'oN  J 2 n + a  ^  2 n + a
a condition which is verified if  his conservative bias is greater than the value q , obtained by 
solving the above inequality as an equality:
q = -pg o y(3 -  y )
(1 -  y)(2 -  y )
—  + 9 + y N  J 2(n + a)
Notice that g > 0. This means that even if the median voter is morally neutral or even mildly 
conservative, he will vote for LW, who will win the elections. In fact, it is the fact that LW’s 
victory guarantees a greater consumption that dominates. If q'^ ' > q , instead, the median voter
will choose CW in spite o f the fact that this will imply an economic cost. This cost is in terms 
of smaller consumption, a consequence of the fiscal policy the conservative coalition’s 
strategic interaction entails. The median voter is ready to bear this cost because the extra 
utility he gets from having his Weltanschauung represented on power is greater than the 
economic cost.
It is interesting to see how q changes as the values of the parameters of the model vary:
f = | r ( 3 - 7 ) g > o
g(3 -  2y) e  + 2(2n + a){n + a) >0
y(3 -  y) 1N 2{n + Cl) >0
It follows that:
1) the greater the disutility determined by the distortions caused by inflation, ceteris paribus;
2) the greater the proportion of deficit that coalition governments finance through 
seignorage, ceteris paribus;
3) the higher the value of the public good to be produced, ceteris paribus;
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the greater the bias for the conservative view the median voter must have in order for him to 
find it convenient to vote for CW. This sounds sensible, because increases in those parameters 
imply a smaller payoff for CW in the game, and a smaller G(CW) must be compensated by a 
greater utility the median voter derives from the fact that he shares the same moral position as 
the government in office.
If I call F(^o" ) the cumulative density function of the median voter’s conservative bias on the 
q to q support, 1 -  F{q) is interpretable as the probability that the next government will be a 
conservative coalition. What makes q high makes this probability small, so the conclusion is 
that the greater the strategic inefficiencies the coalition is expected to bring about, the smaller 
the chance that it will be elected.
Case (2): the mixed strategies equilibrium of Condition (2) is anticipated by unattached 
voters. The median voter’s expected utility if the conservative coalition wins the election is 
therefore:
MIX2CW+?>q';;
And from the following inequality;
M IX IC W  + 3g™ > ------   g  -  3g”“ 2(n + a)  "
the value q is obtained:
_ 1^ 
' " A
-M IX 2 C W    g2{n + ct)
This is again a minimum value the median voter’s conservative bias must take in order for 
him to find it convenient to vote for CW. Just like in Case (1), and for the same reasons, this 
value is positive. Its partial derivative in g  is positive, while the sign of the partial derivatives 
in 6 and y depends from the starting values of those parameters. In fact:
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dq dM IXlC W  
dO ~ dO
dq _ ÔMIX2CW 
dy dy
and:
sign
sign
dM IXlC W  
30V
. (d M IX lsignI  36
^dM IX lC W '^ S i g n 3M IX2^
\  j
because the only difference here between LHS and RHS is a>0. From Appendix A we know 
that if the starting values of 6 and y  are small, a small increase makes MIX2 decrease, while 
if their starting values are high a small increase makes it increase. As a consequence, q 
increases in the first case, decreases in the second one. The latter case may sound 
counterintuitive: the greater the potential inefficiencies associated with the presence in office 
of a conservative coalition government, the smaller the conservative bias the median voter 
may have allowing CR+CW to win the elections. The fact is that these inefficiencies are only 
potential, because when the proportion of deficit financed through seignorage and/or the 
distortions caused by inflation are high, CW and CR will play concession with a higher 
probability, hence the delay in stabilisation will probably shorter and expected consumption 
higher.
The probability for the conservative coalition to win the elections may be written as:
\ ~F{ q )
and it gets higher the smaller the value of q . Unlike in Case (1), however, and for the reasons 
just mentioned, if 0 and y increase q may here decrease, which makes the ex-ante 
probability with which CR+CW win the elections higher.
Case (3): the values of a and 0 are such that voters anticipate that if the elections have no 
winner, CW and CR will form a coalition and the mixed strategies equilibrium of Condition
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(3) will be the consequence of their strategic interaction. In order for the median voter to vote 
for CW and for this scenario to obtain q"J must be higher than q , the value of which is the 
following:
 ^ 1-E P C W ------------- g2{n + a)
This is a positive number. Here again, the main finding is that 1 -F (f ) is positive. This 
probability, which is the probability that the next government will be a conservative coalition, 
is decreasing as q increases, and this happens if g  increases and if 0 or y decrease. In fact, 
in analogy with Case (2):
dq _ ÔEPCW 
d 6 ~  de
sign dEPCW'de
. fdE P '= signI de
and from Appendix B we know the RHS is always positive (the case of the derivative in y  is 
totally similar).
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS.
By proposing in Part 1 a war of attrition model with complete information and finite horizon, 
I think I have highlighted that sometimes the problem with coalition governments' decision­
making process may be the lack of credibility affecting their members' conunitments. With 
respect to Alesina and Brazen (1991), which my model owes a lot to, there is also some new 
insight into the meaning of the equilibrium under the assumption of an economy where the 
distortions caused by inflation are not so great and its welfare analysis.
There is one aspect in which my analysis differs from the general opinion about the 
relationship between coalition governments and delays in stabilisation. In my model I do not 
need an exogenous shock on the value of public expenditure to start a strategic interaction 
between coalition partners. It is my opinion that the need for an exogenous shock has been so
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far particularly stressed as an answer to the question why the data show that not all coalition 
governments seem to be debt- and inflation prone. In my view, however, this evidence is 
more the consequence of a difference in the nature of coalition governments (that is, whether 
they are “homogenous” or not) than anything else. Some suggestive empirical evidence using 
cluster analysis seems to support my opinion in this respect (Dalle Nogare (2000) and Chapter 
2).
In Part 2 I have suggested a possible political scenario likely to cause that parties with 
opposite views on the allocation of the fiscal burden form a coalition government. A strong 
polarisation on some extra-economic issue which is important in voters’ and candidates’ 
motivation has been highlighted. The extra-economic issue and the fiscal agenda must split 
the electoral body differently. It is this scenario, and not the presence of coalition 
governments per se, that ends up being the real cause for inefficient fiscal policies. This points 
to the importance of a nation’s cohesion around a common Weltanschauung. In countries such 
as Germany an electoral system favouring the presence of coalition governments has more 
often than not produced excellent examples of virtuous fiscal conducts.
The nonnative side of the analysis of coalition governments' decision-making process is still 
at its early stages. The advantage of seeing this problem as the consequence of a lack of 
commitment lies also in the fact that the theoretical framework now points more clearly in the 
direction of considering forms of precommitment as a possible solution. Reforming the 
procedure by which a financial bill is voted in Parliament (i.e. no sequential voting) is a 
possible way of tying one’s hands, but it might mean merely shifting the problem backwards 
from the time of the approval of the bill by Parliament to the time of its elaboration by the 
governm ent^A  reform of the electoral system (from a proportional to a majoritarian rule, for 
instance), or more generally, in the words of Alesina and Perotti (1996), the passage from a 
collegial to a hierarchical institutional context may be seen as a better alternative.
It has been pointed out (Alesina and Perotti (1994, 1996)) that such a change might introduce 
excessive policy variability. In this theoretical context alternation in office would only affect 
the allocation of the fiscal burden, and therefore variability would not affect welfare. If we 
allow for realistic extensions of the model allowing for differences in parties' preferences over 
the level of public expenditure (Velasco (1997)) however, it would no longer be so, and
A law modifying structure, elaboration process and approval of the financial bill has recently been introduced 
in Italy (law no. 94, 1997), but it is not so easy to assess whether is has been effective in mitigating strategic 
inefficiencies, as many other circumstances, such as joining the EMU, have modified fiscal policy determination 
in Italy meanwhile.
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institutional design is said to face a trade-off between delays in stabilisation and excessive 
variability of fiscal policy.
In my opinion, this point has been overemphasised. This line of reasoning neglects the fact 
that if  one considers a more realistic setting with the presence of more than two social groups 
and more than three parties, a proportional electoral system may produce coalition 
governments that are both debt- and inflation prone and partisan. Italy before the recent 
changes in the electoral system was a good example of this. More hierarchical institutions do 
deteiTnine welfare improvements more often than not.
But the very first problem when we come to talk about reforms to the institutional context has 
to do with the fact that generally they need qualified majorities to pass. It may be difficult to 
introduce them there where the polarised political scenario is also fragmented, i.e. 
characterised by the presence of a number of small parties; but polarisation and fragmentation 
often go together.
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Chapter 2.
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS 
FISCAL PERFORMANCE USING CLUSTER ANALYSIS.
1. Introduction.
There is by now a vast empirical literature investigating the relationship between a 
government’s degree of fractionalisation and its fiscal policy. This literature started at the end 
of the Eighties and was influenced by the contemporary observation of a strong differentiation 
in the fiscal performances of industrialised countries. In fact, that phenomenon suggested that 
also country-specific elements might play a role in determining fiscal policy, and what is 
more country-specific than a nation’s politico-institutional framework?
The empirical evidence generally confirms the existence of a relationship between the degree 
of fractionalisation of governments and their fiscal conducts, but some recent works show less 
clear-cut results. Some issues still seem controversial, among which the following:
are coalition governments totally unable to be fiscally responsible? 
are stabilisations performed by single party governments only?
as far as flseal policy is concerned, do different types of governments behave differently 
only after a negative shock?
The first issue is the most important one. In all works so far published coalition governments 
have been implicitly identified with those cabinets in which there is no agreement on fiscal 
matters. In my view, this is misleading and may have biased results towards an 
underestimation of the strength of the relationship under scrutiny. History, and especially 
recent history, has often produced coalitions between parties sharing a common view on fiscal 
policy, some of which were even formed in order to bring about a stabilisation. No surprise 
then if the empirical works based on samples comprising the last decade do not produce 
strong evidence in favour of the thesis by which single party governments are more fiseally 
responsible than eoalitions.
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A recent classification of governments (Woldendoip, Keman and Budge (1993)) according to 
various qualitative and quantitative items allows to distinguish between govermnents whose 
members share a common view in matters of economic policy and governments which are not 
so “homogeneous” in that respect. Here I use this classification in order to distinguish 
homogeneous and non-homogeneous coalition governments. I expect that only the latter, 
whose existence is probably due to some affinity between party members only on extra- 
economic matters, are likely to be fiscally irresponsible. Homogeneous coalitions, in fact, are 
not so different in nature from single party governments.
The second issue is partly related to the first one. Given a non negligible presence of 
homogenous coalitions, it follows that possibly not all stabilisations are performed by single 
party governments. When a country has a proportional representation electoral system, 
following a fiscally irresponsible coalition it is more likely that a virtuous coalition is elected 
than a single party government. But this is not all. In my opinion, which is different to the 
common view, the end of a war of attrition does not necessarily imply a change in 
government. Models such as Alesina and Drazen (1991) identify one coalition member’s 
concession with its retirement from government. Stabilisations are then attributed to the 
following cabinet, possibly a single party government. But if a war of attrition takes place, it 
means a non-homogeneous coalition was in office. As I have made clear in chapter 1, there 
must have been some extra-economic issue the coalition members shared, or they would have 
not come together. If  the importance attributed to that issue by the coalised parties is strong 
enough, when either of them concedes it may still want to be part of the executive in order to 
represent the extra-economic views of their voters, if no longer their economic interests. This 
implies that not only homogeneous, but also non-homogeneous coalitions are able to take 
measures such as tax rises in order to reduce public debt. The only difference lies in the fact 
that non-homogeneous coalitions are likely to stabilise with some delay, since a war of 
attrition must take place to identify the party to be burdened with the biggest part of the fiscal 
bill. And since stabilisations are delayed, they are likely to be stronger.
Alesina and Perotti (1995) adopt the so-called Blachard Measure to qualify a fiscal impulse as 
very loose, loose, tight and veiy tight. Here I define as “extreme” fiscal policies both “very 
loose” and “very tight” fiscal conducts, and 1 will verify whether non-homogeneous coalitions 
are more often associated with them^ Unlike Alesina and Perotti, however, I consider not
‘ As Alesina and Perotti (1995) have pointed out, it is not always correct to associate prolonged recurrence to 
public debt and inflation with a high frequence of very loose fiscal policies defined as strong positive deficit 
impulses. In theory, in fact, there may be cases of gradual deterioration of public finances, especially when the
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only deficit impulses, but also expenditure impulses. In my view, in fact, war of attrition 
models are not so realistic in their assuming that public spending does not tend to grow when 
a coalition government formed by parties with conflicting views on fiscal policy is in office. 
Every party in a coalition is likely to be willing to favour their constituency, as Weinghast, 
Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) and Velasco (1997) have demonstrated.
Also the third issue has a lot to do with the first one. Since the pioneering works of Roubini 
and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) authors have highlighted that not all coalition governments show 
the same degree of fiscal irresponsibility, but they have tended to say that the reason for this is 
that only some of them were in office at times of strong negative economic shocks. Only 
under such circumstances would coalitions, intrinsically prone to fiscal iiTcsponsibility, 
behave differently from single party governments. I object here that this may not be true. An 
alternative explanation is that there are coalitions of different kinds. Homogeneous ones 
always tend to follow some fiscal discipline, non-homogeneous ones are always likely to start 
wars of attrition.
I consider a sample of 11 industrialised countries covering the 1960-1990 period and I then 
divide it into three subsamples corresponding to the Sixties, the Seventies and the Eighties to 
see if only at the time of the oil shocks the fiscal response of single party, homogenous and 
non-homogenous coalition governments was markedly different.
My investigation tool is cluster analysis. If  one has “cases” which are differently characterised 
under many observable aspects (“variables”), one can use cluster analysis, a number of 
procedures of automatic classification, to see which cases are more similar to one another. 
Similarity measures are metrics and the criteria by which cases are clustered are algorithms, 
so cluster analysis is a tool for grouping cases in an objective way in the sense that the only 
subjective intervention is the choice of metrics and algorithm. To my knowledge, it has never 
been used to investigate the relationship between type of government and fiscal policy. My 
idea here is to consider as cases countiy-year units, such as Australia 1970 and Belgium 1980. 
I take deficit and expenditure impulses as variables and consider how the clusters I obtain 
relate to the classification of cases according to two political indexes, a traditional one 
distinguishing only between single party and coalition governments and a second one taking 
account of the difference between homogenous and non-homogeneous coalitions. I expect
value of public expenditure is constant and not so high and so deficit impulses are not so strong but public debt 
rises constantly. However, non-homogeneous coalitions favour the rise of public spending, so it seems plausible 
that when they are in office public debt rises and strong positive deficit impulses go together.
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that the clusters of cases with highest/lowest values of the fiscal variables have a higher 
proportion of non-homogenous coalition governments. I also expect that the standard thesis 
by which coalition governments are unable to stabilise will be denied. Finally, I apply cluster 
analysis to the subsamples to verify how the fiscal performance of the various types of 
governments has evolved in time.
This chapter is therefore thus organised: par. 2 is a critical survey of the empirical literature 
on the relationship between type of government and fiscal discipline; par. 3 is a presentation 
of the preliminary work on data in order to make them suitable to my goals and of the reasons 
behind the sample choice; par. 4 deals with the choice of the appropriate clustering 
techniques; par. 5 shows the results and par. 6 concludes.
2. Survey of the empirical literature about the relationship between the degree of 
government fractionalisation and fiscal policy.
This analysis is a contribution to the rich empirical literature on the influence of the presence 
of coalition governments on fiscal policy determination. This literature has been characterised 
by different approaches and results.
The first article presenting a “type of government” variable is Roubini and Sachs (1989a). The 
authors construct a dummy variable to distinguish between single party governments, small 
coalitions, large coalitions and minority governments. They introduce this dummy as a 
regressor into an equation where the dependent variable is the change of net public debt over 
GDP and the other independent variables are: 
the very dependent variable, lagged once; 
the change in the unemployment rate; 
the change in the GDP growth rate;
- the product of the change in the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate 
and the change in lagged net public debt over GDP.
This equation is estimated using data referring to 15 industrialised countries over the period 
1960-1985. The introduction of a “type of government” regressor is justified by the necessity 
of adding an extra explanation, with respect to the simple tax-smoothing hypothesis, in order 
to explain the observed differentiation of fiscal policies among these countries in the period in 
question. The regression results are reassuring. The parameters associated with the above 
economic variables are significant and have signs and values in accordance to economic
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theory. As for the political dummy, the conclusion is that the presence of a fragmented 
government does imply a stronger debt growth,
Roubini and Sachs (1989b) repeat the same analysis on a different sample, and all results are 
confirmed. Here they also consider seignorage, and they find its estimated parameter is 
negative, implying that it is justified to see debt and inflation as alternative methods of deficit 
financing (all other parameters remain significant and have the right sign). But this article 
mainly concentrates on the deteiminants of the level public spending. The authors find that 
the desired level of public expenditure has to do with the type of government on power, and 
that the effective level of spending is positively related to the desired one. So the expenditures 
actually incurred are, ceteris paribus, higher when a coalition government is in office than in 
the case of a single party government. Roubini and Sachs suggest this is the consequence of 
the fact that coalition governments generally include different interest groups.
Edin and Ohlsson (1991) replicate the estimates in Roubini and Sachs (1989a), but instead of 
using a single “type of government” dummy they try with different dummies, one for each 
type of government. They find that only the one associated with the minority government 
category is (positive and) significant, so just minority governments, and not also coalition 
governments, tend to produce higher budget deficits.
De Haan and Sturm (1994) re-estimate Roubini and Sachs’ specification using data referring 
to EU members only over the period 1981-1989. The political dummy is not significant, and 
considering more than one dummy, as in Edin and Ohlsson (1991), does not modify this 
result. As an alternative to previous suggestions on how to include the political context within 
the given model, the authors next introduce a variable measuring the frequency of government 
change^. The fact that its parameter turns out to be significantly positive does pose a problem 
in that it is eoalition governments that tend to be short-lived, so that the final message is 
inconclusive. As for the level of public spending, neither the presence of fragmented 
governments nor the frequency of government change seem to play a role.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) have a slightly different goal with respect to Roubini 
and Sachs. Their aim is to discriminate between different Political Economy models of public 
debt, i.e. to assess if the data confirm the conclusions of war of attrition models more than 
those o f models based on Stackelberg games (Persson and Svennson (1988), Tabellini and 
Alesina (1989)).
 ^ They also introduce a variable accounting for the different institutional contexts underlying the budget law 
elaboration and approval, a topic more deeply investigated by Hallemberg and von Hagen (1997) some years 
later. The estimate for the associated parameter is significant and has the right sign.
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They consider 16 countries and classify them according to the type of constitutional regime, 
fractionalisation of the political scenario and polarisation on the left/right economic 
dimensions^. The countries exhibiting fast growing public debts are shown to be all 
parliamentary republics and have all, save Ireland, proportional representation as their 
electoral system. They are generally characterised by high fractionalisation and polarisation. 
Then the authors construct tliree indexes related to the history of the countries in the sample; 
majority, or the percentage of years over the entire period 1970-1989 in which a single 
party government was in office;
durability, i.e. the average duration of governments (also assumed to be connected to the 
prevailing type of goverrmient in office)
stability, that is the average number of years between two significant changes of the 
cabinet in office (change of the Prime Minister in presidential republics; change of the 
premier in parliamentaiy systems, save for the case of coalition governments, for which 
both change of a the premier and of at least some of the parties involved is required).
The relevance of the stability index is connected to the importance of the role played by the 
uncertainty about the next electoral results in those models interpreting public debt rises as the 
effect of an incumbent’s desire to condition his successor’s fiscal policy. In fact, the presence 
of both polarisation and electoral uncertainty may be tested only if some variable is available 
measuring the frequency of alternation on power of the parties representing the opposing 
poles.
Finally Alesina et al. estimate a model where the average ehange of net debt over GDP for 
each countiy over the period 1970-1989 is regressed on the above indexes. What they obtain 
is an ambiguous result" .^ The stability index is not significant; “durability” is and has the 
expected negative sign, but majority is not. The authors conclude that there is some weak 
evidence in favour of those models assoeiating rises in public debt with the presence of 
coalition cabinets^.
Alesina and Perotti (1995) stress the necessity of a public deficit measure allowing to filter the 
effects of the business cycle, so as to be a truer measure of a government’s will: what they call 
a measure of the fiseal impulse. They opt for the so-called Blanchard Measure (of which more 
in par. 3.2). They calculate such index for 20 OECD countries for each year between 1960
 ^ Fractionalisation and polarisation are found to be fairly stable characteristics o f the political scenario in the 
countries the authors consider.
The low number of degrees of freedom puts the validity of this result in question.
 ^ Also Edwards and Tabellini (1992) find scarce if no evidence at all in favour of the conclusions of those 
models interpreting public debt rises as the consequence of a strategic interaction between an incumbent and a 
successor. Their tests are based on data refeiTing to developing countries.
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and 1989, and by comparing those values with the values of various political indexes they 
find that coalition governments are more often associated with strong fiscal impulses, both 
positive and negative^.
Strong negative fiscal impulses are then classified according to their success. The authors 
define a stabilisation as successful if, in the third year after it has taken place, the debt over 
GDP ratio has decreased of at least 5% with respect to the stabilisation year, and as a failure 
otherwise. Going through all stabilisations in the sample, they conclude that success is not 
dependent on how strong a negative fiscal impulse is, but it is more a qualitative matter. In 
fact, a stabilisation can be implemented by either cutting expenses or by raising tax rates. 
Only in the former case the probability of success is proved to be high, especially if the 
cutting measures affect transfers and public employees’ wages,
Alesina and Perotti find that an extremely large number of stabilisations implemented by 
coalition governments have turned out to be failures. They suggest this is due to their inability 
to cut spending. Coalition cabinets tiy to be fiscally responsible, but they tend to choose the 
wrong means to obtain their goal, i.e. they raise tax rates.
However, notice that the authors consider coalition and minority governments as two distinct 
categories. This is not so relevant for their first conclusion, namely that coalition governments 
are often characterised by strong fiscal impulses of both signs, but it plays a major role in 
reaching their second one, the one referring to the success of a stabilisation. In fact, the 
probability of success of a stabilisation implemented by a minority government is even higher 
than the one of a stabilisation implemented by a single party cabinet^. Considering coalition 
and minority governments as one category would therefore make things look different, also 
because minority cabinets are not infrequent in the sample. Nor do the authors explain why 
coalition and minority governments should be regarded as two distinct types of government, 
which Edin and Ohlsson had also failed to do. It is doubtfld that the strategic interaction 
between the political forces within a coalition government is essentially different from the one 
between the party in office and the political forces supporting it in Parliament within the 
context of a minority cabinet an'angement.
In recent years the empirical literature about the relationship between the degree of 
fractionalisation of government and fiscal policy has extended in two distinct directions:
 ^Alesina and Perotti define a positive fiscal impulse as strong if BM>1.5, while a negative one is strong if BM<- 
1.5.
’ This result is not dependent on the fact that within the minority government category also “carataker” 
governments have been included. In fact, these are very few in the sample in question. Notice that Edin and 
Ohlsson (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1995) end up having opposite views on the quality of the fiseal 
performance of minority governments. This difference in judgement is probably due to the fact that they eonsider 
different samples (particularly, Alesina and Perotti also include the 1986-1989 years).
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on one hand, researchers have been investigating the possible connection between type of 
government and budget rules
on the other some similarities have been highlighted between coalition governments and 
“cohabitation contexts” within presidential systems (divided governments).
As far as the first stream of literature is concerned, Alesina and Perotti (1996) suggest an 
analogy between the choice between a proportional and a majority electoral system (the 
former favours the formation of coalition cabinets) and the choice between collegial and 
hierarchical institutions underlying the process of budget formation and approval. The former 
are more respectful of minority rights, while the latter include various contexts such as 
balanced budgets laws and procedures making it difficult for Parliament to amend a 
governmenf s bills.
Instead, Hallemberg and von Hagen (1997) suggest that the thesis by which it is the type of 
government to influence a country’s fiscal performance is antagonist to the one by which it is 
budget rules to determine the level of expenditure and the size of the deficit. In their view, the 
proportionality of the electoral system is only relevant in that it is linked to the probability to 
have a eoalition government. The latter in turn constitutes a problem only because ministers 
belong to different political parties, and so it is difficult to build that hierarchical relationship 
between the Finance Minister and portfolio ministers allowing to squeeze the size of public 
expenditure in the budget formation process. However, if a law prescribed such a hierarchy 
having a eoalition government in office would not make any difference. The empirical 
evidence reported, based on data referring to EU members over the 1981-1994 period, seems 
to confiim their thesis.
Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1998) test the same hypothesis using data referring to Latin 
American countries over the 1990-1995 period, and, contraiy to Hallemberg and von Hagen’s 
conclusions, they find they must reject it. The size of budget deficits seem to depend both on 
an index capturing the characteristics of the institutional context and on the proportionality of 
the electoral system, while the level of public spending is positively correlated to the electoral 
variable but not to the institutional one.,
Poterba (1994) and Alt and Lowiy (1994) are two contributions worth mentioning among 
those belonging to the second line of research^. They both refer to the budget policies of the
 ^ Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) also focus on divided government. They define it as a device through which 
voters try to protect themselves from the effects of the Rational Partisan Cycle (Alesina (1988)). According to 
them, there is a trade-off in the choice between a single party and a coalition/divided government. The former 
tends to implement fiscal measures reflecting too closely their preferences, or favouring too much their 
constituency, but it is quick in responding to shocks, while the latter is likely to implement middle of the road 
policies, but tends to delay stabilisations. Everyone else seems to share the view that, as far as fiscal policy is
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u s  States. Poterba uses data covering the 1988-1992 period for all 27 States producing a 
budget law eveiy year^, most of which have balanced budget laws. His aim is to investigate 
the response to shocks in expenditures and in tax receipts. When the governor and the 
legislature belong to opposing parties such response tends to be not so quick and strong. 
Moreover, a paradox is evident: in the States where the antideficit law is less stringent the 
distinction between single party and divided governments is not so evident, as both tend to 
take rather mild measures to reduce spending.
Alt and Lowry work on a sample of 48 States with observations from 1960 to 1980, which 
they then cut into different subsamples according to the presence/absence of divided 
government and/or antideficit laws. They find that the total response (change in expenditure 
and tax rates) to a deficit is stronger when a single party is in control than with a divided 
government, although the latter category appears to be able to operate strong expenditure cuts. 
This is true regardless of the institutional context, i.e. whether or not balanced budget laws are 
in force. These laws are therefore effective only where and when the political context 
produces single party governments, as if  the enforcement were the very reputation of the 
ruling party vis-à-vis the electoral body. What happens with divided governments, instead, is 
that each party can put the blame on the other. Political factors are therefore more important 
than the determinants related to the institutional context, which is exactly the opposite view 
with respect to Hallemberg and von Hagen (1997).
3. Construction of political and fiscal variables and choice of sample.
3.1. Classifications according to political variables.
The political variables have been constructed starting from the classifications in Woldendoip, 
Keman and Budge (1993). Alesina and Perotti (1995) already use this interesting source 
covering most Western democracies in the period 1950-1990*^, but just for the index of 
government fractionalisation. My purpose is here both to use a similar index and to create a 
variable measuring the degree of cohesion of governments on economic policy matters from a
concerned, the negative implications of having a coalition/divided government are much greater than the positive 
ones.
 ^All other States produce a budget law every second year.
Woldendoip et al. (1993) also provide data for 1991 or 1991-1992 for some countries, which I have taken 
account of.
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combination of different classifications. My aim is in fact to distinguish between 
homogeneous and non-homogeneous coalition governments.
As far as the index of government fractionalisation is concerned, Woldendorp et al. 
differentiate between single party, coalition (among which they further distinguish between 
minimal winning and surplus coalition) minority (single party and multi-party) and caretaker 
governments.
A second, more qualitative classification regards the so-called complexion of Parliament and 
government (CPG):
1) right-wing dominance (share of seats of right-wing parties in government and Parliament 
larger than 66.6 %);
2) right-centre complexion (share of seats of right-wing and eentre parties in government and 
their supporting parties in Parliament between 33.3 and 66.6 % each^');
3) balanced situation (share of Centre larger than 50 % in government and Parliament, or Left 
and Right in a coalition government not dominated by either side);
4) left-centre complexion;
5) left-wing dominance.
Finally, my source classifies governments according to the reason for their termination (RFT):
a) elections, including any election stipulated by law as well as anticipated elections;
b) voluntary resignation of the Prime Minister due to health reasons;
c) dissension within government;
d) lack of parliamentary support;
e) intervention by the Head of State.
As far as the CPG classification is concerned, one has to consider that unfortunately the 
authors do not define Left and Right, so the question arises whether they intend those 
dimensions in an economic or extra-economic sense. On the basis of personal information 
regarding some of the governments in the given sample I have come to the conclusion that 
Woldendorp et al. have mainly looked at the economic programmes of governments in 
constructing this classification.
" Right-wing minority governments with a parliamentaiy support comprising also parties o f the Centre are 
included, as well as centre minority governments with a parliamentary support comprising the Right.
‘^ In particular, the Italian governments formed by Christian Democracy and the Socialist Party (plus some minor 
political entities) in the Eighties have been classified sub 2), not sub 3), and it is common knowledge that the 
Socialists had in fact rather conservative views in economic policy, in spite of their name.
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As for the RFT index, the reasons for termination sub c) and d) are clearly of great interest 
here, but as far as the other reasons are concerned, there is some ambiguity, a) and b) are 
defined as non-political reasons, but b) in particular may well be a cover-up sometimes. In the 
impossibility to determine whether it is so by analysing every single episode of government 
termination, there is nothing left but accepting the authors’ thesis. Moreover, are the 
anticipated elections sub a) just those a government decides to call in order to win a larger 
majority in Parliament? e), too, is not totally unambiguous, but, as explained in par. 3.3, my 
choice is here to exclude presidential democracies from the sample, so the number of 
governments in this class is veiy small.
Starting from the above classifications I have created two new political variables: TOG (= 
type of government) and TOGNOG (= type+nature of government).
As far as TOG is concerned, it is a simple index of government fractionalisation. Coalition 
and minority governments of any sort have been considered as one group, because the 
strategic interaction Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Chapter 1 deal with may be interpreted 
both as a problem concerning the executive and as a conflict between a minority government 
and Parliament. In fact, contrary to Edhin and Olson (1991), my view is that there is no big 
difference between choosing to be part of a coalition or of the group of political forces 
supporting a minority government for a party who wants their view on economic policy to 
influence the process of policy determination^^. TOG therefore classifies governments into 
three groups, assigning each of them a numerical value:
"caretakers": TOG = -1
single party governments: TOG = 0
coalition and minority governments: TOG = 1
Caretakers are not very frequent, and my choice is always to keep them separated from the 
rest^ '^ .
In trying to explain the fact that Scandinavian countries have a tradition of minority governments Woldendorp 
et al. state that it is the institutional framework to determine whether a proportional electoral system, coupled 
with a fragmented electoral body, tends to produce coalition a minority governments.
*'* The reason is that it is difficult to understand what lies behind this definition. Are caretaker governments 
transitory governments, by definition not entitled to propose their own measures of economic policy, or are they 
on the contrary emergency governments formed to overcome a political impasse and impose a badly needed 
stabilisation?
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As a political variable, TOGNOG aims at considering not only the degree of fractionalisation, 
but also the degree of cohesion on economic matters. An intermediate step in its creation is 
the elaboration of another classification, NOG (= nature of government), catching the degree 
of homogeneity of governments. The CPG index may be interpreted as a rough index of the 
degree of cohesion of a government on the economic (hence fiscal) agenda with 1 and 5 as 
peaks and 2, 3 and 4 as bottoms'^. In order to make this indicator a little less dependent on my 
interpretation of the CPG index, however, I have decided to take into consideration the 
information coming from RFT classification. All cases with CPG =1 or 5 and with RFT = c or 
d have been considered as part of the same group as those with CPG = 2, 3 or 4, that is, the 
group of non-homogenous governments. Finally, caretaker governments are still considered 
separately. NOG is therefore thus defined:
caretakers: NOG = -1
governments with CPG = 1 or 5 and RFT= a or b or e: NOG = 0
governments with CPG = 2, 3 or 4 and governments with CPG -  1 or 5 and RFT= c or d:
N O G = 1
Here, too, the relevant distinction is the one between the values 0 and 1.
Using TOG and NOG to classify the cases of the sample here considered highlights that all 
cases with TOG = 0, 110 in all, have also NOG = 0, because none of them has CPG = 2, 3 or 
4 or RFT = c or d. This means that single party governments are usually characterised by a 
high degree of cohesion on a well-defined economic (hence also fiscal) a g e n d a ^ I t  also 
implies that the only cases in the sample that are differently classified by the two indexes are 
those coalitions for which TOG = 1 and NOG = 0, because CPG = 1 or 5 and RFT is different 
from c and d. These are homogeneous coalitions.
TOGNOG is a synthesis of TOG and NOG:
TOGNOG = -l ifTOG = NOG = -l 
TOGNOG = 0 if TOG = NOG =0
If right/left is to be intended as referred to the economic dimension, 3 (and to some extent also 2 and 4) means 
a low degree o f cohesion. When 3 means share of centre larger than 50% one can think of an infra-party non- 
homogenous coalition. Also 2 and 4 are problematic, because they include one or more party of the centre, which 
again is in itself a substitute for a non-homogeneous coalition.
In theoiy, just like there are virtuous coalitions, there may be single party governments starting wars of 
attrition. The fact that the large sample here considered does not contain a single case with TOG = 0 and NOG = 
1 is however a sign that this is not so common. Single party governments are usually the expression either of a
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TOGNOG -  1 if TOG = 1 and NOG = 0 
TOGNOG = 2 if TOG = NOG = 1
TOGNOG = 0 therefore characterises single party governments; TOGNOG = 1 homogenous 
coalitions and TOGNOG = 2 non-homogenous coalitions.
As anticipated, the cases involved in my cluster analyses are country-year units. The 
economic policy effective in a given year in any country is the decision of the authority in 
office there some months before. The choice of a criterion in the attribution of the effects of a 
budget law to a government is not trivial, because there are many countries in which more 
than a government was on power in a given year. I have decided to assign to each case the 
value of the political variables characterising the govermnent in charge in that country six 
months earlier, i.e. in the month of July of the previous year^^. It is of course an arbitrary 
choice, and one may argue that a budget law is a much quicker matter in some politico- 
institutional contexts. There is however a lack of country-specific information and this has led 
me to decide for this approximation'^.
3.2. The creation of indexes of budget deficit and expenditure impulses.
For the construction of the Blanchard Measures and the expenditure impulse indexes I have 
used two OECD sources: National Accounts, vol. II, various years, for all data referring to 
public finance'^ and GDP, and Main Macroeconomic Indicators for the unemployment rate. 
The data were available from 1960 onwards, which has limited my analysis to the 1960-1990 
period^''.
The Blanchard Measure (hereafter BM) is defined as follows:
majority electoral system, in which case the fiscal conflict is resolved by the very electoral competition, or of a 
very homogeneous electoral body, which implies the fiscal issue is not the reason for a conflict.
The only exception is Australia, for which I have taken account of the fact that the fiscal year starts in July. 
Von Hagen and Harden (1994) describe in detail the timing of the elaboration and approval of the budget law 
in all countries of the EU. I do not know of any source doing the same for the extra-EU countries in the sample.
I have considered general government instead of central government because general government data are 
more standardised, hence comparable at an international level. Moreover, central government data were not 
complete over the sample for some of the countries here considered, so there was no choice. However, if quality 
central government data had been available for all countries I would have used them instead of general 
government ones, as the former measure with greater precision the fiscal measures actually implemented by a 
national government.
For all countries the first case of the sample refers to 1962. This is due to the fact that BM and EXPIMP are 
constructed as differences, and the first term in these differences includes some data which have been 
reconstructed using the unemployment rate referring to the previous year. The last case is generally relative to 
1990, but in the case of those countries for which the political data were available till 1991 or 1992 also the cases 
referring to those years have been included.
58
BM, =  PRIMDEF{U,_, ) -  PRIMDEF,_,
where PRIMDEF is primaiy deficit over GDP màPRIM DEF(U) is a measure of primary 
deficit over GDP in which the effect of the business cycle has been eliminated. This is 
constructed as follows: one regresses revenues and transfers over GDP, the two components 
of PRIMDEF that are most sensitive to an economy’s fluctuations, on the rate of 
unemployment. Estimates and residuals are then used to create two new series, defined as the 
residuals plus the unemployment parameter estimates times the unemployment rate in the 
previous year. By so doing one obtains the revenues and transfers that would have been 
registered if the unemployment rate had not changed. All other components of primary deficit, 
still divided by GDP, are then added/subtracted.
In regressing total revenues and transfers over GDP on the unemployment rate, I have also 
introduced two deterministic time trends to account for the problem of the stationarity of the 
series. Just like in Alesina and Perotti (1995), and following Blanchard (1993), the first trend 
covers the 1960-1975 period, while the second goes from 1976 to the last year. Calling total 
revenues (direct and indirect taxes plus social contributions) TOTREV, transfers TRANSF, 
and unemployment U , I have therefore estimated (using OLS) the parameters of the following 
equations for each countiy:
TOTREV, = «0  + a.TRENDl + a^TREND l + a^U, + g,
TRANSE, = + fJ R E N D l  + f^T R E N D l + + v,
I have then constructed TOTREV, (U,_  ^) and TRANSE, (U,„i ) :
TOTREV, ([/,_, ) = âo + d.TRENDl + a^TRENDl + + s,
TRANSE,{ U = /?o + TREND! y  f iJ R E N D l^  + Ô,
Finally, I have constructed BM for each case (that is, for each country-year unit):
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BM, =  {IG, + CG, + SUB, + TRANSF, {U,_, ) -  TOTREV, (U,_, ) -  CFKG, -  KTRRG,
+YPEPG, -  INTPG, -  YPERG, + INTRG, ) -  {TOTEXP,_^ -  TOTREV,_, -  CFKG,^^ +
~KTRRG , + YPEPG,_, -  INTPG, )
where:
IG  is gross fixed capital formation over GDP
CG is expenditure in goods and services over GDP
SUB is subsidies to private industries and public corporations over GDP
CFKG is consumption of fixed capital over GDP
KTRRG is net capital transfers received by government over GDP
YPEPG -  INTPG is property income (net land and royalties) paid by government over
GDP
YPERG-INTRG  property income (withdrawals from public quasi-corporate enterprises, 
dividends, net land rent and royalties) received by government over GDP.
The logic behind the construction of the expenditure impulse index (hereafter EXPIMP) is the 
same as that underlying the construction of BM. EXPIMP is thus defined:
EXPIM, = {CG, + SUB, + TRANSF, {U,_,)} -  [CG,_, + SUB,_, + TRANSF,^,)
Of all expenses, we have considered only transfers, subsidies and public consumption, 
because they are intrinsically more likely to be the object of a bargaining game between 
coalition partners, due both to their being current expenses (hence more at a government’s 
discretion) and to their redistributive nature^'.
In the constmction of BM and EXPIMP for the cases in my sample I have encountered some 
non-negligible problems. First o f all, in some of the regressions of TOTREV and TRANSF on 
the unemployment rate the estimated parameters for the deterministic trends have turned out 
to be not statistically different from 0, which has made some doubts rise about the de-trending 
procedure^^. In few cases also the estimates of the coefficient for the unemployment rate are
Not just transfers, but also subsidies and public consumption may be targeted to specific interest groups or 
constituencies.
If unit root tests proved total revenues and tiansfers to be 1(1) the trend would be stochastic, and it would not 
be appropriate to regress on deterministic trends, but to work with first differences.
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not significant, and some of these are positive in the TOTREV regression, contrary to what 
one should expeet. As these problems involved only a small number of countries, I have 
decided not to do anything about them and go on.
A second problem has to do with the faet that for a few countries some of the series involved 
in the construction of BM, namely (YPERG -ESTTRG), IG and KTRRG, have big jumps in 
some years. These jumps are in most cases due to the fact that these data were collected only 
from a certain within-sample year onwards. They constitute a problem in that they deeply 
affect the value of the BM referred to that year and the following one.
Since the use of cluster analysis does not require complete time series for each country, I have 
eliminated the problem by eliminating the cases affected by it^ .^ In other words, we have 
decided to privilege the quality of my sample cases with respect to using all of thenf"^.
3.3. Choice of countries to be included in the sample.
The choice of the countries to be included in the sample was eonditioned by the availability of 
both political and fiscal data. My sources in fact do not consider the same number of 
countries, and for some countries considered by both fiscal data were not available for the 
whole 1960-1990 period.
I have chosen to consider only parliamentary democracies. The reason for this lies in the 
observation that the effect on fiscal policy of the presence in office of a coalition government 
is likely to be mitigated by the existence of an institution they have to share the executive 
power with, such as a president in presidential democracies. Different institutional contexts 
and praxis determine the relative importance of the role of the president vis-à-vis the 
government in presidential democracies, but the mere presence of a president must be of some 
relevance in decision-making, and more often than not the president is in a stronger position 
than the government. By concentrating on parliamentary democracies my hope was to find 
clearer results on the existence of a relation between the degree of cohesion on economic and 
fiscal matters within a government and fiscal policy^^.
In all, the elimination involved 10 cases: Australia 71-72, Austria 62-64, Belgium 77-78 (here a change in the 
accounting system is the origin of the problem), Ireland 76 and the Netherlands 77-78.
Following the same criterion I have decided not to include in the sample two countries, Norway and Denmark, 
which had originally been considered. In fact, what 1 observed was that their BM values were very different from 
simple primary deficit differences also in years which were not characterised by peculiar shocks. This fact has 
been interpreted as a sign of dubious reliability of their unemployment data.
As for the analogy between divided governments within a presidential democracy context and coalition 
governments recently suggested by the literature, probably the best thing to do is not to take it for granted, but to 
test it. This means analysing the two phenomena separately and then make a comparison o f the results obtained.
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Finally, I have eliminated three parliamentary democracies for which both fiscal and political 
data were available: Norway, Denmark and Switzerland^^. Therefore the sample consists of 
11 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Gemiany, Ireland, Japan, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and U.K., for a total number of 315 cases.
4. Choice of appropriate clustering procedures.
There are two fundamental choices one is confronted with before any cluster analysis: the 
metrics by which case similarity is measured and the clustering method and algorithm. In fact, 
there are several clustering methods (hierarchical agglomerative, hierarchical divisive, 
partitioning, etc.) and within each method one can choose among a number of clustering 
algorithms.
I have chosen clustering methods and algorithms having the peculiar objectives of my 
research in mind. Those performed by the available software (SPSS 7.0) were the hierarchical 
agglomerative method, with a number of clustering algorithms to choose among, and a 
specific algorithm within the iterative partitioning method, the K-means cluster. I have 
considered the hierarchical agglomerative method associated with the Ward algorithm (also 
known as intra-group least squares) and the K-means cluster.
The purpose of a hierarchical agglomerative method is to join together cases into successively 
larger clusters, using some measure of similarity. One begins with each case in a class by 
itself and then “relaxes” the criterion as to what is and is not unique, which is the same as 
saying that the threshold regarding the decision when to declare two cases to be members of 
the same cluster is lowered. At the first step, when each case represents its own cluster, the 
distances between cases are defined by the chosen metrics. However, once several cases have 
been linked together, how are the distances between those new clusters determined? There are 
various possibilities. One can link two clusters together when any two cases in the two 
clusters are closer together than the respective linkage distance (the "nearest neighbours" or 
single linkage option). Or the distances between clusters are determined by the greatest 
distance between any two cases in the different clusters (i.e., by the "furthest neighbours"): 
this option is called complete linkage. Ward’s algorithm is distinct from all other methods
As far as Norway and Denmark are concerned, see note n. 24. Switzerland has been excluded because it
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because it uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters. In 
short, this method attempts to minimize the Sum of Squares (SS) of any two (hypothetical) 
clusters that can be formed at each step.
In the K-means clustering procedure the number of clusters is user-specified. The program 
will start with k  random clusters, and then move objects between those clusters with the goal 
to minimize variability within clusters and maximize variability between clusters. This is 
done through an iterative routine involving the calculation of the clusters’centroids, of the 
Euclidean distances between all cases and the centroids and the re-assignment of cases to the 
nearest centroid.
My aim was to obtain clusters that were not long, but spherical, and composed by a similar 
number of cases. With respect to other hierarchical agglomerative methods, the Ward 
algorithm actually tends to form new clusters at every step of aggregation instead of having 
single-case clusters being included in an already formed bigger cluster. This determines that 
at the highest steps of aggregation it is more common to have distinct clusters with similar 
dimension than to find a veiy big cluster and some small or single-case clusters.
As for the K-means cluster, the performance with respect to cluster dimensions is similar to 
the one of the hierarchical agglomerative method plus Ward algorithm option, but there is an 
advantage with respect to all hierarchical agglomerative methods which lies in the revision in 
the cluster assignment of every case at each step of aggregation. In fact, in hierarchical 
agglomerative clustering once two cases are united in one cluster they will not be divided at 
further steps of aggregation^^. However, the K-means clustering also suffers from a limitation 
which is typical o f all partitioning methods, namely the computational impossibility to 
consider all possible case partitions given a number of elusters one wishes to impose. This 
means one risks to obtain a sub-optimal division of eases in clusters, a sort of local maximum 
instead of an absolute one (this risk is linked to the choice of the initial partitioning, later to be 
automatically revised by iteration).
When using the hierarchical agglomerative method with the Ward algorithm SPSS requires to 
choose among a number of metrics, and my choice has been for the City Block (or Manhattan
presents extremely peculiar characteristics from the political point of view (Woldendorp et al. (1993)).
Hierarchical agglomerative methods have been so far the most widely used (Bartolaminelli and Daveri (1996) 
is an example), in spite of the fact that they are devised to respond to very peculiar clustering objectives. It is in 
fact a clustering method which was invented by evolutionary biologists. My choice to make use also of the K- 
means cluster option is to be interpreted as a way by which 1 try to see if these specific aspects of the hierarchical 
agglomerative methods interfere with my own classifying aims.
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block). This metrics does not use squares, but absolute values to measure the distance of cases 
in terms of the different variables characterising them. I did so because one of the two 
variables (EXPIMP) had a slightly wider range of values. I wanted to avoid the possibility 
that this fact influenced the clustering results in the sense that these reflected too great a 
weight given to EXPIMP in the calculation of case similarity^^. Instead, the Euclidean 
distance is the default option when one uses the K-means cluster.
For both clustering methods several steps of aggregation have been considered: from 6 to 2 
clusters, I show here the results, both for the analysis of the whole sample and for that of the 
subsamples, the economic interpretation of which is most convenient.
5. Results.
5.1. A preliminary data analysis.
TOG classifies the 315 cases of my sample in the following way :
number of cases with TOG = -1:5 
number of cases with TOG = 0: 110 
number of eases with TOG = 1: 200
The coalition governments with a high degree of cohesion (TOGNOG = 1 ) are 88^ ,^ a number 
big enough to give my analysis of their fiscal perfoimance some statistical significance. Non- 
homogeneous coalitions (TOGNOG = 2) are therefore 200-88=112.
As far as the BM values are concerned, the sample mean is 0.054 and the standard deviation
1.306. In fact, most cases are concentrated in the (+1,-1) range of this variable.
It is generally legitimate that the variable with the greatest range be “heavier” in the calculation of case 
similarities when the range comparison is not conditioned by the use of different measure units. I chose the City 
Block metrics because the thesis I wanted to verify was that non-homogeneous coalitions tend to have strong 
(positive and negative) fiscal impulses in terms of deficit; possibly also in terms of expenditure, but I wanted the 
BM variable to remain central in my analysis, being the literature of reference centred on the growth of public 
debt.
Sometimes it is suggested that the question of the different weights attributed to variables in the calculation of 
case similarity can be solved by transforming the very variables into their standardised values, also called z- 
scores. This is however recommended when the variable relative values are conditioned by the use of different 
measure units, and this is not the case here.
Most of these cases are relative to Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands and Germany.
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A cross analysis of the BM and the political variables is shown in Table 1. Notice how the 
TOG classification hides the similarity, in ternis of deficit impulse, between single party 
governments and homogeneous eoalitions.
In order to shed more light on the characteristics of the sample from the point of view of the 
highest and lowest values for BM I have reproduced the analysis in Alesina and Perotti 
(1995). I have also added a eouple of extra lines distinguishing coalition governments 
according to their degree of cohesion. The result is shown in Table 2.
The most interesting eonsiderations can be drawn from the joint consideration of the first and 
second part of the table^^. Here, too, taking eoalition governments as a whole group is 
misleading, because it tends to show that single party and coalition governments are very 
similar from the point of view of their tendeney towards extreme deficit impulses. If 
homogeneous and non-homogeneous coalitions are kept separate, instead, one can see that the 
latter are characterised by strong positive and negative deficit impulses more frequently, while 
the former are even more moderate than single party governments. However, these 
considerations are not uncontroversial, because they may be subject to the criticism according 
to which it is not legitimate to rely on an a priori definition of an “extreme value” for BM.
Let us now examine the sample from the point of view of the EXPIMP variable. The sample 
mean is 0.47 and the standard deviation 1.226. With respect to the BM variable, the 
expenditure impulses are included in a slightly wider range and the biggest concentration of 
cases is in the (0,2) interval.
Table 3 considers the EXPIMP averages in the subsamples with uniform value for the TOG 
and TOGNOG variables. All values are quite similar: apparently, there is no evidence of a 
strong influence of the political context on the detemiination of the expenditure impulse.
The fact that the subsample with TOGNOG = 1 has a greater mean for EXPIMP than the 
whole sample is not due to a concentration of strong positive expenditure impulses in it. This 
is demonstrated in Table 4, where I have defined an expenditure impulse as “very loose” if 
EXPIMP is greater than 1.8 and as “very tight” if it is smaller than -0 .9^\
Finally, let us consider how BM and EXPIMP relate to each other by looking at Figure A. 
The sample is scattered in all four quadrants, and the highest concentration of cases is in the 
first one, close to the origin. The second quadrant is not so crowded, containing only 35 cases.
The comparison between the results in the first part of Table 2 and those in Alesina and Perotti (1995) shows 
only one difference. In Table 2 a case with TOG = 0 has a grater probability o f being characterised by a very 
strong negative deficit impulse than a case with TOG -  1, while the reverse is true in Alesina and Perotti. This 
difference is due to the fact that two different samples are investigated.
These values have been obtained as rough approximations by excess o f the mean plus/minus the standard 
deviation, This seems to be the same criterion used by Alesina and Perotti (1995) to find the +1.5; -1.5 values as 
boundaries for the extreme values for the BM variable.
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This means that contemporary cuts in expenses and taxes, with the latter reductions greater 
than the former, are not so common. The fourth one contains 87 cases, instead, and they are 
not all close to the origin.
Given a value for EXPIMP, the cases characterised by it may have veiy different values for 
BM. However, it is evident that in most cases what is extreme from the point of view of one 
variable it is also extreme from the point of view of the other. This is a good sign, as it may 
anticipate that the automatic classification procedures determine a readable result. By this I 
mean that I can hope to find clusters including very loose fiscal impulses, clusters including 
very tight fiscal impulses and a central cluster of cases characterised by moderate fiscal 
policies.
Particularly, it would be good if the cases in the fourth quadrant with BM close to 0 were 
included in the central cluster. Loose or very loose expenditure policies in a balanced budget 
context are not, in fact, typical of any of the types of government I am considering, according 
to the theoretical literature. What I am testing is the thesis by which non-homogeneous 
coalition governments, being characterised by a conflict on how to allocate the fiscal burden, 
tend first to create deficits (positive BM), a tendency that may be made stronger by an 
inclination to increase spending, and then to implement strong stabilisations.
5,2. Cluster analysis results over the 1960-1990 sample.
The first cluster analysis results over the whole sample I present are those relative to the 
partitioning of cases into three clusters. No matter which of the two preferred clustering 
procedures is followed, the three resulting clusters show the following features:
1) the first cluster^^ is made up by few cases, most of which characterised by high values 
both for BM and for EXPIMP and therefore identifiable as cases associated with strong 
positive deficit and expenditure impulses. Some other cases, a small minority, have either 
BM or EXPIMP with value close to 0, in which case the other economic variable is very 
high;
2) the second cluster contains the vast majority of cases. The expenditure and deficit policies 
characterising them are definable as moderate, in the sense that they do not belong to the 
tails of the distributions of the BM and EXPIMP variables;
I follow the convention to number clusters starting from the highest one in the first quadrant to the lowest one 
in the third quadrant.
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3) the third cluster is a kind of counterpart of the first in the sense that its cases are 
characterised by low values of BM and/or EXPIMP. However, with respect to the first 
cluster, it contains more cases and it is not so distanced from the second cluster.
Using the hierarchical agglomerative method plus Ward algorithm and City Block metrics 
option the resulting third cluster is more numerous (compare Table 6a with 5a). It also 
includes a greater number of cases with BM < 0 and EXPIMP > 0 (31), many of which with 
both variables close to 0. Moreover, the first cluster is placed higher up on the right. All in all, 
it is not that the two clustering procedures give extremely different results: most cases (266) 
are assigned to the same clusters^^ However, the result obtained by using the agglomerative 
method is more difficult to read, as the third cluster is less easily identifiable as a cluster of 
cases associated with veiy tight deficit and expenditure impulses.
Let us therefore consider more closely the result obtained by use of the K-means cluster^" .^ 
Tables 5 a and 5b and Figure 5 illustrate its features^
Let us look at Table 5b. The sense of this analysis is the same as the one in Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) and Tables 2 and 4, but here case partitioning is not arbitrary, through the use 
of automatic clustering techniques I have "let cases speak for themselves”. Moreover, unlike 
in Alesina and Perotti but just like in Tables 2 and 4, I have added the consideration of the 
distinction of coalition governments according to their degree of cohesion.
What does Table 5b say? The probability of a ease characterised by TOG = 1 to belong to the 
first cluster is higher than the same probability for a case with TOG = 0, while the probability 
for the former to belong to the third ehister is lower than the same probability for the latter. It 
seems the traditional thesis is confirmed by which coalition governments are more often 
associated with very loose fiscal policies, while single party cabinets are more likely to 
implement very tight ones (however, notice it is not confirmed that coalitions are totally 
unable to stabilise).
The second part of Table 5b highlights that the degree of cohesion among the partners of a 
coalition government does make a difference in terms of fiscal policy performance. Non-
This is comforting, as it probably means the iterative-partitioning method has not produced a “local 
maximum” as a result.
The boundaiy between the first and the second cluster does not appear problematic here (there is only one case 
included in the first cluster, Ireland 70, with BM close to 0). However, the number o f cases in the third cluster, 
though smaller than the one in the result o f Table 5a, is not so small here, either, and 13 of its cases have 
negative BM and positive EXPIMP. However, all o f them but one (Sweden 71) have EXPIMP < 1 and BM < -1. 
This is much more similar to a relatively strong stabilisation than many cases characterised by - I  < BM <0 and 
EXPIMP > 0 included in the second cluster.
In all tables marked with letter a, as well as reporting the main features of the clusters from the point o f view 
of the economic variables used to obtain them, I also include the cluster average for the political variable TOG. 
The comparison between these values and the TOG sample average gives a first indication of the relative
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homogeneous coalitions are more likely to be fiscally iiTcsponsible, while homogeneous ones 
have a probability to be associated with moderate fiscal policies that is even higher than the 
one characterising single party governments. This is mostly due to the fact that these 
coalitions are not very likely to implement very tight fiscal policies. The probability for a case 
with TOGNOG = 1 to belong to the first cluster is in fact only slightly lower than the one 
showed by a case with TOGNOG = 0.
A third result I report here (Tables 7a and 7band Figure 7) refers to what is obtained by use of 
the hierarchical agglomerative method and Ward algorithm, where I have imposed that the 
aggregating process stops at 5 clusters. Three clusters are here central, and two are extreme^^. 
The third cluster is here better interpretable as the group cases associated with very tight fiscal 
policies (only two of them have EXPIMP > 0, and both have also BM < -1).
The probability to belong to each extreme cluster is here higher for a case with TOG = 1 than 
for a case with TOG = 0. Notice that the result in Table 5b by which the probability for the 
former to belong to the third cluster is lower than the same probability for the latter is not 
preserved here. As for the second part of Table 7b, a strong difference in the fiscal 
performance of homogeneous and non-homogeneous coalitions is confirmed. A case with 
TOGNOG = 2 is here not just more likely, but much more likely to belong to each extreme 
cluster than a case with TOGNOG = 0, while coalition governments characterised by a high 
degree of cohesion appear to be rather similar to single party cabinets from the point of view 
of their fiscal conduct. Unlike in Table 5b, a case with TOGNOG = 1 is somewhat more 
likely to belong to the third cluster, and since here the latter better identifies with the group of 
cases associated with very tight fiscal policies I am inclined to prefer this result to the 
previous one.
All this suggests that if one’s aim is to verify the existence of a relationship between the 
degree of fractionalisation of government and a country’s fiscal performance it is better to 
make a distinction between different kinds of coalition governments. It is only by allowing 
the coalitions with a low degree of cohesion to be a group on their own that the relevance of 
the political context over a country’s fiscal conduct appears in all its strength. The great 
difference in fiscal performance is not between single party governments and coalitions, but 
between single party and homogeneous coalition governments on one side and non- 
homogeneous coalitions on the other.
concentration of cases with TOG = 0 and TOG = 1 in the clusters. I do not report the TOGNOG cluster averages 
because they are not very informative, as TOGNOG is not a binary variable.
The choice to consider a cluster as central or extreme is somewhat arbitrary when there are more than three 
elusters. I have (almost) always chosen to consider as extreme only two clusters: the top-right one and the 
bottom-left one.
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It is interesting to notice that the cases politically characterised as homogeneous and non- 
homogeneous coalitions show greater differences in the probability to belong to the first 
cluster than in the probability to belong to the third one. This is mainly due, as next paragraph 
will show, to the contribution of the cases with TOGNOG = 1 belonging to the 80s.
5.3. Cluster analysis results over the 1962-1971,1972-1981 and 1982-1990 subsamples.
As anticipated, a debated issue in the literature about the influence of the political context 
over a country’s fiscal performance is whether the presence of a divided government is 
relevant only if it happens to be in office when a negative economic shock takes place. A 
softer version of the same thesis states that coalition governments tend to be more fiscally 
irresponsible under such circumstances.
In order to test these opinions I have divided my case set temporally into three subsamples: 
the period before the oil shocks, the 1972-1981 period in which those shocks took place and 
the 80s^^.
As far as the 1962-1971 period is concerned, the average value for BM is 0.066, it is 0.616 for 
EXPIMP and 0.6887 for TOGNOG.
The use of the hierarchical agglomerative method with Ward algorithm and City Block 
metrics allows to obtain groups of cases roughly identifiable as those characterised by loose 
fiscal policies, those associated with tight fiscal policies and those having moderate fiscal 
conducts. However, it is not the best of results.
In fact, just like in the case of the clustering operated on the whole of the sample, there is a 
problem here with the cases in the fourth quadrant. The best thing would be that these cases, 
characterised by BM < 0 and EXPIMP > 0, were assigned to the central cluster if close to the 
origin and to the cluster of cases with strong negative fiscal impulses if showing a low value 
for BM and a value close to 0 for EXPIMP. I could find an optimal solution over the entire 
sample, but here the relative number of these cases is higher and this makes things more 
difficult.
I will show two results, both imperfect but somehow complementary. The 5 clusters partition 
(Table 9a and Figure 9) presents the cases characterised by a low BM divided into two 
groups: one is made up by cases with EXPIMP < 0 (cluster 5) and one by cases with EXPIMP 
> 0 (cluster 4). The next aggregation step determines that these two clusters become one
The third siibsample also contains some cases referring to the years 1991 and 1992. These country-year units 
are part of the data set because Woldendorp et al. (1993) offer a political characterisation of their governments, 
so I could construct their political variables.
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(Table 8a). The resulting group may not be defined as a group of cases associated with strong 
negative fiscal impulses, because many cases with both BM and EXPIMP close to 0 are 
included. But if I consider as "extreme” only the fifth cluster in the first result I risk not 
considering the information about those cases with a very low BM and a value for EXPIMP 
close to 0 that are there included in cluster 4^ .^
Why considering both results? Since neither is satisfactory, considering both allows at least to 
judge if a different definition for the cluster of cases characterised by very tight fiscal policies 
makes a difference. Fortunately, this is not the case. No matter how restrictive the definition 
for the group of cases with strong negative fiscal impulses, the data send a qualitatively 
similar message, as it is possible to see in Tables 8b and 9b.
The main message coming out of Tables 8b and 9b is that the degree of fractionalisation of 
government is likely to affect a country’s fiscal performance even in times of not so big 
economic shocks. This result is in contrast to Roubini and Sachs (1989a) and the common 
view. Coalition governments were more inclined to implement loose fiscal policies than 
single party governments even in the “quiet” 60s, and this is particularly true for coalitions 
with a low degree o f cohesion, while homogenous coalitions were only moderately more 
fiscally iiTCSponsible with respect to single party governments.
As for the probability to belong to the cluster of cases with very strong negative fiscal 
impulses, things are not so clear if we look at the distinction between cases with TOG = 0 and 
cases with TOG = 1, but they become clearer after classifying coalition governments 
according to their degree of cohesion. In fact, both if we consider the partition in 4 clusters 
and if we consider the partition in 5 clusters, a case characterised by TOGNOG = 2 has a 
greater probability to implement strong stabilisations. This is not in contrast, as I have already 
pointed out, with war of attrition models. As for homogenous coalitions, they are much less 
likely to be associated with very tight fiscal policies than single party governments if we 
consider Table 8b, while they are only moderately so if we consider Table 9b. Anyway, in 
both tables the difference in likely fiscal conduct between homogeneous and non- 
homogeneous coalitions is greater than the one between homogeneous coalitions and single 
party governments.
A second problem is the presence of a case with a value for BM close to 0 but negative in the first cluster 
(which is the same in the two partitions). It is not a negligible problem considering that this cluster only contains 
eight cases. The case in question is Ireland 70 and politically it is characterised as having TOG = TOGNOG = 0.
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Let us now consider the 1972-1981 subsample. The BM average, 0.41, is higher than the one 
in the previous decade, and the same is true for the EXPIMP average (0.79). The TOG 
average is 0.5577.
The most interesting results are obtained when the case set is partitioned into three clusters 
using both clustering procedures illustrated in par. 4. The cases located in the fourth quadrant 
do not seem to cause any problem here. The use of the hierarchical agglometrative method 
with Ward algorithm and City Block metrics produces extreme clusters that are slightly less 
numerous, but, all in all, the two results are very similar: 96 out of 104 cases are assigned to 
the same clusters.
There is something important to bear in mind when interpreting these results. In the 1972- 
1981 period the cases with very low values for both BM and EXPIMP are not so many, and 
this determines that the third cluster contains many cases with both variables close to 0, which 
makes it difficult to define it as the group of cases associated with very strong negative fiscal 
impulses. This cluster is therefore extreme only in the sense that at a time when fiscal 
impulses are on average positive and strong, even mild stabilisations are to be considered as 
exceptional. The probabilities to belong to the third cluster must therefore be interpreted with 
caution, having in mind that the cases included in it are often included in the central cluster in 
the results obtained applying cluster analysis over the whole 1960-1990 sample.
Tables 10a and 10b and Figure 10 are relative to the solution obtained by use of the K-means 
cluster method. The first thing one notices is that the concentration of cases characterised by 
very loose fiscal policies is greater here, i.e. more cases belong to the first cluster, and this in 
spite of the fact that its BM and EXPIMP averages are higher than those of the first cluster of 
the results obtained for the 1960-1971 period. This is also reflected in the fact that the 
probability to belong to the first cluster is higher for all types of cases, that is, no matter their 
political characterisation. But with respect to the 60s it is also evident that the difference in 
fiscal performance of the distinct types of government is much more remarkable. In particular, 
the difference in the probability to belong to the first cluster between a case with TOG = 0 and 
a case with TOG = 1 is striking.
All this is confirmed by a scrutiny of Tables 1 la-1 lb, referring to the result obtained by use of 
the hierarchical agglomerative method with Ward algorithm. From the point of view of the 
interpretation of the extreme clusters, and of the third cluster in particular, this second result is 
better than the first (see also Figure 11)^ .^
In the partition obtained by use of the K-means cluster method the third cluster also includes a couple of cases 
with both BM and EXPIMP close to 0, but BM positive and EXPIMP negative (second quadrant). As for the
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Notice that here, too, the difference in the probability to belong to the first cluster between a 
case with TOG = 0 and a case with TOG = 1 is very big. As for the probability to belong to 
the third one, if one looks at the distinction between single party and coalition governments it 
seems that the traditional view is verified by which it is the former type that is likely to take 
the responsibility of a stabilisation.
However, things look different if the distinction between homogeneous and non- 
homogeneous coalitions is taken account of. The coalitions with a high degree of cohesion 
were even less inclined to implement extreme fiscal policies than single party governments! 
The difference in the probability to belong to the first cluster between a case with TOGNOG 
= 0 and a case with TOGNOG = 2 is consequently greater than the one between a case with 
TOG = 0 and one with TOG = 1. As for the probability to belong to the third cluster, the 
consideration of homogeneous coalitions as a group on their own highlights that they were not 
very likely to implement very tight fiscal policies, while the probability to do so of the cases 
politically characterised as both single party and non-homogeneous coalitions is double.
How should one understand the peculiar behaviour of homogeneous coalitions in the 70s? It 
appears as definitely different from the conduct of non-homogeneous coalitions, but it is not 
similar to the one of single party governments, either: in fact, it is even more disciplined than 
the latter.
The fact is that during this decade even single party governments were not so inclined to 
implement moderate fiscal policies. In many cases they tried to cope with the real effects of 
the oil shocks by boosting aggregate demand. Given that keynesian teaching was the 
commonly accepted paradigm, it remains unclear why it did not influence so frequently the 
conduct of those coalitions characterised by a high degree of cohesion. As for the low 
probability to implement strong negative fiscal impulses, it is better to remind that the results 
relative to the third cluster are to be taken with caution, since, as I have anticipated, this 
cluster is rather peculiar here"^ .^
Finally, I turn to the third subsample, the 80s. The BM average is negative (-0,31) and the 
EXPIMP average is close to 0 (0.016); the TOG average is 0.6095.
first cluster, the result in Table 11a includes only cases with very high values for both BM and EXPIMP, with 
the only exception of UK 74, characterised by BM close to 0 and extremely high EXPIMP.
One should also notice that the cases with T0GN0G=1 are quite few in the 1962-1971 period. They are 19 
(they are 41 in the 1962-1971 period and 28 in the 80s). Maybe this subsample is too small for the relative 
frequencies referring to it to make their comparison with those referring to the groups of cases with TOGNOG = 
0 and TOGNOG = 2 significant.
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By stopping the aggregation at the 3 clusters step, using the Ward method with City Block 
metrics, I could obtain a quite interesting result. Clusters one and three are well defined, as 
one can see from Figure 12, and in particular all cases with BM close to 0 belong to the 
central cluster, not to them. The only inconvenience is given by the fact that the cluster of 
cases with loose fiscal policies is a little too close to the one of cases with moderate fiscal 
conduct; in other words, the boundary between them is a little low. This is due to the fact that 
there are not so many cases with veiy high values of BM and EXPIMP in this sublasmple. 
Tables 12a and 12b illustrate this result. A case with TOG = 1 has a greater probability to 
belong to both the first and the third cluster than a case with TOG = 0. However, this 
reassuring finding conceals strange facts that are evident if  the distinction between 
homogeneous and non-homogeneous coalitions is made. In the second part of Table 12b 
everything looks upside down. It is homogeneous coalitions, not non-homogenous ones, that 
are characterised by a high frequency of very loose and very tight fiscal policies in this 
decade!
Let us consider a second clustering solution, which one can obtain by use of the K-means 
method and fixing the number of clusters at six. Here one cluster, cluster 6, has only one case, 
the outlier Ireland 89. I will therefore consider the cases both in cluster 6 and in cluster 5 as 
those characterised by strong negative fiscal impulses. Figure 13 and Tables 13a and 13b 
show this result.
The first part of Table 13b is in some aspects similar to the first part o f Table 12b. The 
probability for a case with TOG = 0 to belong to the third cluster is lower than the one for a 
case with TOG = 1 (and the difference in probability is even greater here). But the first cluster 
is here better defined, and contains a smaller number of cases. This affects the comparison 
between the probabilities to belong to it for a case politically characterised as a single party 
government and a case qualified as a coalition government. In fact, contrary to expectations, 
the former is here more likely to implement a very loose fiscal policy. The second part of 
Table 13b is not so different from the second part of Table 12b. What is particularly strange is 
the low probability to belong to the first cluster characterising a case with TOGNOG = 2 and 
the high probability to belong to the third one for a case with TOGNOG = 1, which were 
never encountered in the analysis of the earlier subsamples. Single party governments, 
homogeneous coalitions and non-homogeneous ones have had a tendency to implement 
different fiscal policies in the years in question, and one cannot even say one type of 
government was more similar to either of the other two in their fiscal conduct. Homogeneous
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coalitions seem to be more inclined to extreme fiscal impulses, which is the result one would 
expect for non-homogeneous ones.
So the consideration of this second clustering result is not sufficient to reverse the conclusions 
drawn starting from the first one, which might have been flawed by the fact that the first 
cluster was located a little too low in the first quadrant. The next step is then to analyse in 
detail the cases belonging to this subsample and politically characterised as homogeneous 
coalitions. Two of those of them belonging to the first cluster, Germany 1990 and Germany 
1991, are quite peculiar, as they catch the fiscal effects of German reunification, an 
exceptional event. What happens if we remove from the sample these two cases? The answer 
is: not much. Table 14 is the counterpart of Table 13b obtained by use of the K-means cluster 
method on the reduced sample, still fixing the number of clusters at six.
Looking at Table 14b, the only new result worth mentioning is the fact that the probability to 
belong to the first cluster for a case with TOGNOG = 2 is now low, but not extremely low. 
Still, it remains lower than the same probability for a case with TOGNOG = 0 and slightly 
lower than the one for a case with TOGNOG = 1.
Summing up, the application of cluster analysis techniques to the third subsample produces 
evidence of the fact that none of the theses here suggested are confirmed:
- nor the thesis by which coalition governments are always, i.e. also in times of no 
recession, more likely to determine strong positive deficit and expenditure impulses; 
nor the one by which non-homogeneous coalitions are always more inclined to implement 
strong fiscal impulses, both positive and negative.
The two phenomena making the 80s peculiar are non-homogeneous coalitions’ relatively low 
inelination towards very loose fiscal policies and an important tendency to implement strong 
negative fiscal impulses on homogeneous coalitions’ part.
The first one is probably the consequence of the fact that many of the countries with 
proportional representation in the sample had joined the ERM, and this started being a 
commitment towards a monetary union. It may have favoured a higher awareness of the fact 
that a prolonged tendency to implement fiscal expansions was not sustainable, because in the 
new monetary regime deficit monetisation was no longer a feasible option. Joining the EMU 
project was, for many of these countries, a binding commitment, causing a stmctural break in 
the way fiscal policy was determined.
As for the peculiar behaviour of homogeneous coalitions, it may be the effect of the fact that 
in some countries with proportional representation there was a shift of power from fiscally 
irresponsible non-homogeneous coalitions to homogeneous ones, with the consequence that
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the latter were forced to implement strong stabilisations to avoid further deterioration of the 
fiscal stance. This shift of power may have been due to the fact that the electoral body became 
more concerned with the fiscal agenda of candidates than with their extra-economic 
positions'^ % so influential in determining the existence of coalitions with conflicting fiscal 
goals before'^^. It is interesting to notice that not less than 4 cases politically characterised as 
homogeneous coalitions and belonging to the clusters of cases with strong negative fiscal 
impulses refer to just one country; Sweden.
Considering the whole of the clustering solutions here considered, I must conclude that the 
answer to the question whether the presence of a coalition government is relevant only if it is 
in office when a negative economic shock takes place is neither a definite yes nor an absolute 
no. This hard version of the differentiation thesis seems to be denied by the results relative to 
the 1962-1971 subsample, but the 80s neither confirm nor deny. In the 80s it looks as if a 
differentiation in fiscal conduct between different types of governments exists, but it is not of 
the kind usually assumed. However, a historical perspective, taking also account of the fact 
that public debt is a state variable and the countries in the sample reached the 80s with 
different levels of it, sheds some light on those years. What this analysis does confirm is the 
softer version of the differentiation thesis, by which coalition governments tend to be more 
fiscally irresponsible than single party ones in times of recession. This, however, is much 
more evident if  a distinction is made between homogeneous and non-homogenous coalitions. 
In fact, the clustering solutions relative to the 1972-1981 period show a very big difference in 
the values of the probability to belong to the cluster of strong positive fiscal impulses for 
cases politically characterised as single party and non-homogeneous coalitions, and these 
differences are in accordance to what one expects. As for the cluster of cases associated with 
very tight fiscal policies, the difference is not so big.
6. Concluding remarks.
When applied on a sample of 11 OECD countries covering the 1962-1990 period, cluster 
analysis techniques offer interesting insights on the relationship between a country’s politico- 
institutional context and its fiscal performance.
This is an explanation in line with the model in Chapter 1.
An alternative explanation is the declining fortune of keynesianism.
75
The results obtained using the whole sample highlight that not all coalition governments (and 
not all minority governments, here grouped with the former) tend to have an irresponsible 
fiscal conduct. There exist coalitions with a high degree of cohesion among their members 
who behave more like single party governments than like coalitions in which a war of attrition 
takes place.
When considered as a group on their own, coalitions with a low degree of cohesion on fiscal 
matters are revealed to have an important tendency to detemiine strong positive fiscal 
impulses. But non-homogeneous coalitions are also the type of government associated with 
the highest probability to implement very tight fiscal policies, which contradicts the view by 
which coalition governments (and especially those reflecting conflicting fiscal goals) are 
unable to stabilise. This is easily explained by the veiy fact that they tend to stabilise with 
delay: by the time they do so, they must be vigorous in their action.
As for the cluster analyses performed on the three sub samples 1960-1971, 1972-1981 and 
1981-1992, their main finding is that there has been an evolution in time in the relationship 
between degree of fractionalisation of government and fiscal conduct.
The clustering solutions relative to the 1962-1971 subsample reject the thesis by which the 
presence of a coalition government is relevant only if it happens to be in office when a 
negative economic shock takes place. However, recessions definitely tend to make differences 
in fiscal performance greater. Finally, the results obtained working on the 80s’ are not so 
clear-cut.
Up to the beginning of the 80s homogeneous coalitions were more similar to single party 
governments than to non-homogeneous coalitions, because they were generally characterised 
by a prudent behaviour when they were to determine how much to spend and how to finance 
those expenditures. The last decade of the sample is characterised by a new situation by which 
homogeneous coalitions, non-homogeneous ones and single party governments all tend to 
adopt their own fiscal policy. The problem lies in the fact that the fiscal conduct associated 
with each type of government is not in line with any of the predictions suggested by the 
theory. Non-homogeneous coalitions do tend to implement more often very tight fiscal 
policies in the 80s as well as in the previous decades, but the same is not true for very loose 
fiscal policies. The gradual process towards a European Monetary Unions may be an 
explanation, as many proportional representation democracies in the sample may have started 
to perceive this implied a binding commitment on fiscal as well as on monetary policy. As for 
homogenous coalitions, they often implemented strong stabilisations in the 80s. This may just
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be a reflection of a shift of power from fiscally irresponsible non-homogenous coalitions to 
homogenous ones.
It is worth dedicating a few final words on a methodological issue. Some critics of cluster 
analysis point out that clustering solutions lack any sort of statistical validation. This is true, 
but in my opinion, it is not a serious problem here. In fact, I have replicated every result using 
two different clustering methods and by so doing I have always obtained rather similar sample 
“cuts”. Even when applied to the three subsamples, cluster analysis has produced quite robust 
solutions, in spite of the smaller number of cases involved. I have not obtained very different 
partitions when I considered other three subsamples, 1962-1972, 1973-1982 and 1983-1992. 
This is in my view a further sign of the robustness of these results.
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Data Appendix.
Data referring to public finance of general government and GDP:
OECD, National Accounts, vol. II, 1964-1981, 1976-1988, 1977-1989, 1979-1991, 1980- 
1992
Unemplovment rate:
OECD, Main Macroeconomic Indicators, 1960 to 1992 
Political indexes:
J. Woldenorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, 1993, Party government in twenty democracies, European 
Journal o f  Political Research, 24: 1-120
See Par.3.1 and Par.3.2 for detailed description of how the political and economic variables 
here used have been constructed starting from the data in these sources.
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TABLES.
BM average BM average
TOG = 0 0.04 TOGNOG =0 0.04
TO G = 1 0.083 TOGNOG = 1 0.049
TOGNOG = 2 0.1099
Table 2: cross analysis of cases according to political classifications and BM ranges
Prob. ofBM>1.5 Prob. of 
-1.5<BM< 1.5
Prob. of BM<-1.5
TOG = 0 9.09 80.01 10.9
TO G = 1 10 80 10
TOGNOG = 1 7.95 85^2 6.81
TOGNOG = 2 11.6 75.89 12.5
Note: the probability of a very loose (very tight) fiscal policy is given by the ratio between the 
number of cases characterised by such conduct with a value for the political variable as indicated on 
the left over the total number of cases with the same value of TOG or TOGNOG (= relative 
frequency multiplied by 100).
Table 3: EXPIMP averages of groups of cases politically classified as identical
EXPIMP average BM average
TOG = 0 0.4317 TOGNOG =0 0.4317
TO G = 1 0.4979 TOGNOG = 1 0.5112
TOGNOG = 2 0.4875
Table 4: cross analysis of cases according to political classifications and EXPIMP ranges
Prob. of 
EXPIMP>1.8
Prob. of 
-0.9<EXPIMP< 1.8
Prob. Of 
EXPIMP<-0.9
TOG = 0 10 82.72 7.27
TOG= 1 11 80 9
TOGNOG =1 7.89 85.22 7.27
TOGNOG = 2 13.4 75.89 10.71
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Table 5a: K-means clustering, 3 clusters
Cluster Number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOG
average
1 43 2.24 
(-0.04, 4.21)
2.2
(-0.14, 4.52)
0.6744
2 204 0.11 
(-1.84, 1.81)
0.52 
(-1.8, 2.99)
0.65
3 68 -1.51 
(-3.96, 0.02)
-0.79 
(-5.07, 1.57)
0.6119
Note: here and in the following tables:
The numbers in brackets are the minimum and maximum values of the fiscal 
variable for the cases belonging to the given cluster;
The TOG averages are calculated excluding the cases characterised by 
caretaker governments (T0G=-1).
Table 5b.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 2 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 3
(%)
TOG = 0 12.72 63.63 23.63
TO G = 1 14.5 65 20.5
TOGNOG = 0 12.72 63.63 23.63
TOGNOG = 1 11.36 70.45 18.18
TOGNOG = 2 16.96 60.71 22.32
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Table 6a: hierarchical agglomerative, Ware , City Block, 3 clusters.
cluster number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOG
average
1 23 2.99 
(2.09, 4.21)
2.59 
(0.99, 4,52)
0.69
2 197 0.34 
(-1.84, 2.6)
0.7
(-1.13,3.96)
0.61
3 95 -1.25 
(-3.96, 0.68)
-0.53 
(-5.07, 1.57)
0.61
Table 6b.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 2 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 3 
(%)
TOG = 0 6.36 63,63 30
TO G = 1 8 62 30
TOGNOG = 0 6.36 63.63 30
TOGNOG = 1 4.54 70.45 25
TOGNOG = 2 10.71 55.35 33.92
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Table 7a: hierarchical agglomerative, Ware , City Block, 5 clusters.
Cluster Number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOG
average
1 23 2.99 
(2.09, 4.21)
2.58 
(0.99, 4.52)
0.6957
2 111 0.28 
(-1.84, 1.82)
1.26
(0.51,3.96)
0.713
3 86 0.41 
(-0.29, 2.6)
-0.02
(-1.13,0.64)
0.5465
4 64 -0.82
(-1.79,0.68)
-0.42 
(-2.23, 1.07)
0.619
5 31 -2.129 
(-3.96,-1.2)
-1.11 
(-5.07, 1.57)
0.7
Table 7b.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 
2+3+4(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 5 
(%)
TOG = 0 6.36 85.45 8.18
TO G = 1 8 81.15 10.5
TOGNOG = 0 6.36 85.45 8.18
TOGNOG = 1 4.54 86,36 9.09
TOGNOG = 2 10.71 77.67 11.6
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Table 8a: 1962-1971, hierarchical agglomerative, Ward, City Block, 4
Cluster Number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOC
average
1 8 2.1
(-0.04,4.13)
2.33 
(-0.14, 4.52)
0.75
2 34 0.47 
(-0.52, 1.31)
1.13
(0.42,2.17)
0.7647
3 36 0.19 
(-0.4, 1.27)
0.09
(-0.71,0.79)
0.6111
4 28 -1.16 
(-3.47,-.39)
0.16 
(-1.31, 1.57)
0.6786
Table 8b.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 
2+3 (%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 4
(%)
TOG =0 6.06 66.66 27.27
TO G = 1 8.21 65.75 26.02
TOGNOG =0 6.06 66.66 27.27
TOGNOG = 1 7.32 70.73 21.95
TOGNOG = 2 9.37 59.37 31.25
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Table 9a: 1962-1971, hierarchical agglomerative, Ward, City Block, 5
Cluster Number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOG
average
1 8 2.1
(-0.04, 4.13)
2.33 
(-0.14, 4.52)
0.75
2 34 0.47 
(-0.52, 1.31)
1.13 
(0.42, 2.17)
0.7647
3 36 0.19 
(-0.4, 1.27)
0.09
(-0.71,0.79)
0.6111
4 21 -1.09 
(-3.47, -.39)
0.47 
(0.13, 1.57)
0.6667
5 7 -1.38 
(-2.24, -.79)
-0.76 
(-1.31,-.48)
0.7143
Table 9b.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 
2+3+4 (%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 5 
(%)
TOG =0 6.06 87.87 6.06
T 0 G = 1 8.21 84.93 6.84
TOGNOG =0 6.06 87.87 6.06
TOGNOG = 1 7.31 87.8 4.88
TOGNOG = 2 9.37 81.25 9.37
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Table 10a: 1972-1981, K-means, 3 clusters.
Cluster Number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOG
average
1 22 2.6
(0.23,4.21)
2,65 
(0.64, 4.49)
0.6818
2 59 0.12 
(-0.84, 1.81)
0.73 
(-0.79, 2.99)
0.5789
3 23 -0.95 
(-2.28, 0.33)
-0.84 
(-5.07, 0.14)
0.5217
Table 10b.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 2 
(%)
Prob, for a case to 
belong to cluster 3 
(%)
TOG = 0 16.66 57.14 26.19
TO G = 1 25 55 20
TOGNOG = 0 16.66 57.14 26.19
TOGNOG = 1 15.79 73.68 10.53
TOGNOG = 2 29.26 46.34 24.39
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Table lia : 1972-1981, hierarchical agglomerative, Ward City Block, 3.
Cluster Number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOG
average
1 19 2.8
(0.23,4.21)
2.75 
(0.64, 4.49)
0.6842
2 67 0.15 
(-0.84, 1.81)
0.7
(-1.01,2.99)
0.5692
3 18 -1.15 
(-2.28, -.31)
-0.96 
(-5.07, 0.14)
0.5556
Table 1 Ib.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 2 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 3 
(%)
TOG =0 14.28 66.66 19.05
TOG -  1 21.66 61.66 16.66
TOGNOG -0 14.28 66.66 19.05
TOGNOG-  1 10.53 78.95 10.53
TOGNOG = 2 26.83 53.65 19.51
Table 12a: the 80s, hierarchical agglomerative, Ward, City Block, 3.
Cluster Number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOG
average
1 20 1.41
(0.64,2.91)
1.11 
(-0.11, 1.9)
0.7
2 62 -0.22
(-1.5,0.73)
0.08 
(-2.16, 2.81)
0.6167
3 23 -2.04 
(-3.96, -.77)
-1.18 
(-5.04, -.21)
0.7273
Table 12b.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 2 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 3
(%)
TOG =0 17.14 65.57 17.14
TOG -  1 20.89 55.22 23.88
TOGNOG =0 17.14 65.71 17.14
TOGNOG = 1 32.14 39.28 28.57
TOGNOG = 2 12.82 66.66 20.51
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Table 13a: the 80s, K-means, 6 clusters.
Cluster Number of 
cases
BM average EXPIMP
average
TOG
average
1 10 1.94
(1.35,2.91)
1.06 
(-0.11, 1.9)
0.6
2 24 0.4
(-0.37, 1.07)
1.09 
(0.37, 2.81)
0.75
3 23 0.09 
(-0.77, 0.73)
-0.62 
(-2.16, 0.12)
0.6364
4 27 -0.69 
(-1.5,-0.3)
0.089
(-0.91,0.95)
0.5385
5
20 -2.13 
(-3.96,-1.3)
-0.98 
(-1.94, -0.2)
0.7368
6 1 -2.56 -5.04 1
Table 13b.
Value of the 
political variable
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. For a case to 
belong to cluster 
2+3+4(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 
5+6 (%)
TOG =0 11.43 74.28 14.28
TOG -  1 8.95 68.65 22.38
TOGNOG =0 11.43 74.28 14.28
TOGNOG = 1 14.28 60.71 25
TOGNOG = 1 5.12 74.36 20.51
90
Table 14: the 80s without Germany 91 and 92, K-means, 6 clusters
Value of the 
political variable
Prob, for a case to 
belong to cluster 1 
(%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 
2+3+4 (%)
Prob. for a case to 
belong to cluster 
5+6 (%)
TOG =0 13.51 74.28 14.28
TOG -  1 10.76 68.65 22.38
TOGNOG -0 13.51 71.42 14.28
TOGNOG -  1 11.53 61.53 26.92
TOGNOG = 1 10.25 69.23 20.51
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Chapter 3.
THE DEGREE OF SUBSTITUTABILITY BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
AND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS USING 
ITALIAN LONG TIME SERIES (1862-1996).
1. Introduction.
In recent years a number of empirical works have attempted to estimate the degree of 
substitutability between private and government consumption in different countries and for 
different periods of time.
The interest in the subject is clearly connected to the relevance of this parameter within the 
so-called neoclassical approach to fiscal policy. The textbook treatment of this approach 
implicitly does not consider as a substitute for C, but Barro (1981) among others has 
pointed out that some of the conclusions of the theoiy about the effects of fiscal policy are 
dependent on that assumption. In fact, if the degree of substitutability between private and 
government consumption were (close to) 1, there would be important implications:
1) unexpected temporary and permanent changes in public spending on goods and services 
would have the same (null) effect on aggregate demand;
2) there would be no difference in the timing of the effects of an announced and an 
unexpected change in the level of public spending.
This is because when private and public consumption are perfect substitutes, there is no 
permanent income effect at work, but always, i.e. in the temporary as well as in the permanent 
case, a substitution effect.
These effects work in the same direction in the case of a permanent change in the value of 
government spending in goods and services, that is, they both imply that a rise in public 
consumption causes a one-to-one decrease in private consumption^. When G perfectly 
substitutes for C, it is as if there were not any changes in households’ permanent income, as
* G will stand for government consumption throughout the analysis.
 ^I make reference here to the model where labour supply is assumed to be inelastic. See par.7 for considerations
on the extension where labour supply is elastic.
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no resources are subtracted to the private sector by government, who simply takes and gives 
back the same amount. Households simply take into account that part of the goods they wish 
to consume are provided by govermnent, hence they simply consume the amount of private 
goods determined by maximising their utility minus what they are given by the government. 
When one considers temporary changes, however, if G does not substitute for C the 
permanent income effect, though present, is negligible, so that private consumption stays the 
same and there is a one-to-one increase in aggregate demand. In the case of perfect 
substitutability, instead, households behave exactly as in the case of a permanent change^.
As for the difference between the effects of an announced and an unexpected change in 
government expenditure on goods and services, when a permanent income effect is at work 
consumption is affected by any news about it as soon as they are available. But when it is not, 
which is the case when there is perfect substitutability between G and C, there is no reason 
why this should be. If government announces a cut in public consumption in next year’s 
budget, households will respond by increasing their consumption next year, so that there is no 
announcement effect.
The above implications are relevant to both policy-makers and economists. The first one, in 
particular, points out that the type of goods a government decides to buy is crucial in 
determining the effects of fiscal policy, and this is not just with reference to the distinction 
between capital and consumption goods'^, but also to the different types of consumption 
goods. An unexpected and temporary increase in spending in defence is likely to cause a 
temporary inerease in aggregate demand, while greater purchases in, say, education will 
probably have no effect at all, as private consumption will correspondingly decrease.
As for the second implication, it is worth remembering here the large number of empirical 
works on consumption aiming at testing one of the most peculiar results of the Pennanent 
Income Hypothesis, namely the fact that changes in permanent income determine changes in 
consumption starting at the time the information about those changes is made available, not 
when they actually occur (Hall (1978), Flavin (1981), Hayashi (1982), Campbell and Mankiw
 ^ The intermediate case of imperfect substitutability is marked by a less than one-to-one change in aggregate 
demand.
Traditional keynesian analysis o f the effects of government spending on the economy states that such effects 
are the same no matter the type of spending, hence the fact that no distinction is made between government 
consumption and government investment. This is related to two of the main features of this approach, i.e. 
consideration of the very short inn and disregard towards the effects on aggregate supply, which is due to the 
assumption that economies are generally not at full employment. On the contrary, the neoclassical school 
assumes agents are rational and optimise over infinite horizons, and all markets, including the labour one, are in 
equilibrium, hence considering what type of spending a government does is of great importance. As far as the 
analysis o f private consumption is concerned, while government investment does not produce any effect, a rise 
in government consumption affects agents’ choice between consumption and saving via a permanent income 
and/or a substitution effect.
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(1989)). Aschauer (1985), adopting the Euler Equation approach, points out that interpreting 
the significance of changes in t-1 variables on changes in consumption at t as excess 
sensitivity of consumption, hence failure of the PIH as a sensible explanation of consumption 
decisions, may be wrong if those variables contain news about future changes of government 
spending on goods and services and G substitutes for private consumption. In this case, in 
fact, there is a substitution effect that operates at the time of the implementation of the change 
in fiscal policy, whether or not it is a surprise change.
So far the attempts at estimating the degree of substitutability between government and 
private consumption have mainly used US quarterly data starting around 1950. The parameter 
has been estimated to be between 0.2 and 0.4, but most results have proved to be 
disappointing from the point of view of their robustness. To my knowledge, there are very 
few works in this research area using series referring to Italy. Here, too, estimates vary a great 
deal, which may he due only in part to the fact that the different authors consider partially 
different time periods. These never go further back than 1960. Although there exists some 
empirical literature on consumption in Italy using long time series (Modigliani and Jappelli 
(1987)) it does not consider the possibility that government spending may substitute for 
private consumption.
For both these reasons, therefore, 1 have come to conceive this work, the object of which is to 
try to estimate the degree of substitutability between public and private consumption using 
data for Italy covering the 1860-1996 period. I will make a distinction between different types 
of government spending: this is also quite new in the literature concerning the Italian case. In 
fact, only Levaggi (1999) decomposes government consumption, but this is in the context of a 
micro specification.
The article is organised as follows: par.2 reviews the literature on the subject; par.3 presents 
the derivation of the regression equation; par.4 justifies the choice of the Generalised Method 
of Moments as estimation technique; par. 5 presents the time series used; par. 6 summarises 
the results; par.7 discusses some more issues related to the subject; par.8 concludes.
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2. Survey of the literature on the substitutability between government and private 
consumption.
I will only report here about the contributions making reference to the macro literature on 
consumption and using aggregate data, as this is the context this work fits h f . This literature 
is closely connected to the empirical tests checking the validity of the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis plus Ricardian Equivalence (hereafter PIH+RE) that were so popular in the 80s. 
Curiously, the authors of these contributions were not always aware of the necessity to 
translate the advances in the consumption theoretical literature into their specifications, but 
adopted rather ad-hoc models with no role for future variables, no clear distinction between 
expected an unexpected changes in them and, as far as G is concerned, no distinction between 
permanent income and substitution effect. One of the most influential works of this kind is 
Kormendi (1983). He aims at verifying the effects in consumption of a change in fiscal policy, 
presumahly unexpected and temporary. His model is the following:
AC, =(7Q+fl,jAf/ + ^^ 2AC, + AIT, + <7^ ATR,
where C is private consumption of nondurables and services plus an imputed flow from the 
stock of durables, Y is NNP, W is private wealth (including human wealth), TR is transfers 
and G is government spending on goods and services. According to the author, AT,, AT,_|
and AIT, enter the specification for their informational contents with respect to changes in 
permanent income, transfers to account for eventual redistributional effects of fiscal policy. 
As for AG,, contrary to most contributions up to then, the author explicitly takes in
consideration the possibility that there may be some degree of substitutability between public 
and private consumption, and sets his expectations about the sign of the parameter estimate 
accordingly: if G perfectly substituted for C, a 2 should capture exactly this substitution 
effect and should therefore be expected to be -1^.
The result obtained by estimating the above model by OLS and using US data over the 1930- 
1976 period shows estimated coefficients for all variables that are significant and consistent
 ^The subject has been dealt with also by the micro literature, but the starting point, i.e. the utility function used 
there, is different, since much more emphasis is placed on non rivalry as a peculiar characteristic of publicly 
provided goods.
Kormendi abstracts from the problem related to the fact that if current AG has informational content also 
about future values for the same variable, the relative parameter is a composite one and cannot be inteipreted 
directly as the degree of substitutability.
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with the neoclassical approach to fiscal policy, is however rather small, -0.23, which does 
not speak in favour of the thesis of perfect substitutability^. How should we interpret such a 
finding? As it is impossible to say if the changes in G in the period in question were all 
perceived as very temporaiy, it is difficult to say if their permanent income effect was really 
negligible. If we could say that, perhaps we could still interpret as a measure of 
substitutability between C and G. Here, instead, it is a composite parameter summarising both 
permanent income and substitution effect. As these both go in the same direction, it means the 
degree of substitutability is even smaller than -0.23^.
In a further investigation, Kormendi substitutes government spending on goods and services 
with three regressors: public spending in defence (possibly a proxy for government 
consumption in defence^), government investment and government spending in nondefence 
minus government investment as a proxy for government civil consumption. An OLS 
regression on the same sample as before gives, not surprisingly, an estimated coefficient for 
government investment that is not significantly different from 0; the parameter associated to 
public consumption in defence is —0.23 and the one for government nondefence consumption 
is -0.28. Their relative magnitude is correct, but they are not very different values, as one 
should expect’®. Besides, this result is said to be not very robust to sample changes. This was 
to be the big problem of all later contributions: even those having a closer link between their 
model and theory, allowing for a clearer interpretation of the parameters, would show a 
marked instability in the value for the one measuring the substitutability between public and 
private consumption.
As anticipated, Aschauer (1985) adopts the Euler Equation approach to test for PIH+RE. 
Therefore, his approach to specification has a better theoretical foundation than Koimendi’s.
’ The estimation of a second specification, nesting the predictions of both the neoclassical thesis and the standard 
model of keynesian origin confirms the validity of the former. The estimated parameter for AG does not change 
much. Graham (1995) re-estimates this second model using labour income and taxes as regressors, stating that if 
W is included net capital income is already accounted for. His results are less favourable to PIH+RE, but the 
standard model is not confirmed in its prediction of no role for A G , though its coefficient estimate is quite 
small. Kormendi and Meguire (1995) reply using: 1) a different way of separating labour and capital income; 2) 
revised data for the 1930-1976 sample; 3) addition of 16 more years. PIH+RE is confinned again and the 
estimated parameter for AG is still-0.23.
® Note 6 highlights a second reason why a 2 should not be interpreted as a measure of the direct crowding out 
between current government and private consumption
 ^ This is not, however, the interpretation Kormendi gives to this regressor. In his view, defence spending is 
“dissipation”, not proper consumption.
Notice however that if the coefficients in question are composite ones, including some permanent income 
effect, one should expect that the one associated with government spending in nondefence be much smaller only 
if the permanent income effect of changes in government consumption in defence is the same or smaller than the 
one associated with changes in government consumption in nondefence. This may not be so in the given sample.
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He innovates Hall’s (1978) model by starting from the generic utility function, first proposed 
by Barro (1981):
w(c;) = w(c,
where C* is effective consumption of nondurables and services, C is private consumption, G 
is per capita public consumption and 0  measures how much the latter substitutes for the 
former. This utility function was to be the starting point of almost all later works in the field” . 
Aschauer assumes quadratic utility, and therefore derives from the Euler Equation the 
following consumption function:
= (X + — OE(G  ^) + %,
He then estimates this together with an auxiliary equation expressing how G, is predicted by 
agents. Assuming this equation is:
G, + £-(L)G,_, + u ; ( L ) D , _ ,  + v ,
where D stands for government deficit and L is the lag operator, substitution of the latter 
equation in the former originates the new specification:
C, = Ô + +7;(Z)G,„] +//(X)£),_] -\-u^
where:
5 = a - O y
7i =0(.P-£0  
rj.= -6 si i = 2,...n
j = 1,2,...m
“ An exception is Bean (1986), whose utility function also includes leisure. His estimate for 0 ,  using US 
quarterly data over the 1949-1979 period, is 0.3,
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What Aschauer actually does is to set n=m=2 and then to estimate the system by FIML, using 
US data from 1948:1 to 1981 :IV. He performs a log-Iikelihood ratio test to check the validity 
of the above restrictions. The data are incapable of rejecting the null hypothesis of their 
validity, so the constrained model estimates are good. As I have partly already anticipated, 
these support the PIH+RE hypothesis in that, apart from lagged private and government 
consumption, only the lagged variables able to predict G, enter the Euler Equation
significantly. My main interest in the whole story is however the fact that in the constrained 
model one of the estimated parameters is 6 , the very suhstitutability parameter. Its value is 
estimated to be around 0.23: a small value, similar to the estimates in Kormendi (1983). Still, 
the result does not appear to be robust: 0 tends to rise with the number of included lags of 
government consumption and deficit, to as much as 0.42 with the inclusion of two more years. 
This is clearly no good news. Graham (1993) replicates and finds pronounced parameter 
instability also to changes in the sample.
He suggests that the problem with Aschauer’s results lies in the fact that his specification does 
not include disposable income, YD. In fact, Graham shares the same approach to the PIH+RE 
question as Campbell and Mankiw (1989), i.e. he nests the assumption by which all 
households are rational consumers within a model framework allowing for a proportion of 
them (to be estimated) to be liquidity constrained. However, his IV estimates of the suggested 
specification’ :^
AC, = (x — âAG, +  TATD, +  w,
using the same US data as in Aschauer and obtaining 0 = 0.15, do not reach robustness, 
either. The author then suggests that a further problem may be the use of total government 
consumption as a regressor, because in the course of time the composition of government 
consumption has changed greatly. He therefore estimates, using the same methodology and 
data (three different subsamples, one of which extended to include the 80s), the following 
model:
AC, = c k - 0 ,A G F C , - 0 2 A G F D , -0 3 A G 5 L , +T A T D , + u .
This model is the same as in Aschauer (1985) if we set j3 — which is sensible in the light of Aschauer’s 
estimate, and T =  0 .  Graham proves the latter restriction is not supported by the data.
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where GFC is federal nondefence expenditure on goods and services, GFD is federal defence 
and GSL is state and local public consumption. Â always is estimated to be around 0.3, 
speaking in favour of the thesis by which not all consumers are able to behave as in the 
neoclassical model” . As for the various thetas, 0  ^ is never significantly different from 0. So 
is 0 3 , to the surprise of the author” , while 0 ,, when significant, is quite high (from 0.5 to 0.8)
but in the sample 1969:1-1990:IV it is not significantly different from 0. The question of 
parameter stability remains unsolved.
Graham’s suggestion to substitute distinct components of government consumption for the 
aggregate measure is followed by Darby and Malley (1996). Their specification, directly 
deriving from Aschauer (1985) but not adopting the Euler Equation approach, also allows for 
the construction of the degree of substitutahility between private consumption and total 
government consumption. This is a time-varying measure which is a weighted average of the 
current amounts of the different components of G (federal defence, federal nondefence and 
state and local), where the weights are given by their estimated coefficients. These estimates, 
derived using GMM on US quarterly data for the period 1953:3-1993:3, are found to be 
robust in within-sample recursive estimations, a clear improvement with respect to earlier 
contributions” . This is the reason why I follow their model derivation here; I will make 
extensive reference to their work in par.3.
As for their results, since the coefficients of defence and nondefence G are estimated to he 
negative and positive respectively, the time-varying 0  is sensitive to the relative importance 
of defence in government consumption, being lower before and in times of war. This explains 
its trend: rising from 0.1 up to 0.35 in the 1953-1975 period (with a slump in the 60s marking 
the Vietnam War), and then falling to 0.27 under the Reagan administration to later stabilise 
on a slightly higher value.
As far as the literature using data from other countries is concerned, Nicoletti (1991) starts 
from a different model, derived from Theil’s differential approach (1976), enabling him to 
consider the relevance of the Hicksian conection and the possible effect of the real interest 
rate on consumption as well as PIH+RE and substitutability. He uses annual data over the
However, Aschauer (1993) shows that if the restriction by which income and taxes share the same parameter 
(deriving by the use of YD as regressor) is removed, the two variables have markedly different parameter 
estimates, with the one associated to taxes not significantly different from 0, so that one of the major conclusions 
of the neoclassical approach is verified.
In Graham (1995) the author introduces the idea that disposable income should be disposable labour income. 
In addition, he suggests reasons why in the US state and local government consumption tends to cause problems 
when included, and re-estimates using only total federal expenditure on goods and services. He finds its 
parameter estimate is small.
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1961-1985 period referring to a number of OECD countries. His conclusion is that a 
significant and positive estimated 0 is typical of the US only. In the OLS and IV regresssions 
referring to most other countries he considers it is not significant, while it is significant but 
negative for Germany and Italy, which, he suggests, may be due to the fact that government 
consumption has distributional effects in those countries. Notice however that his series are 
very short and therefore his findings subject to a problem of lack of degrees of freedom. 
Leiderman and Razin (1988) is interesting for their innovative derivation of a model” . Their 
results, obtained by NLQ on a system of equations: the consumption fiinction and the 
stochastic processes governing the evolution of its determinants (labour income, taxes and 
government consumption) and using monthly Israeli data from 1980-1985, are however 
puzzling as far as the estimate for 0 is concerned, as it turns out to be negative and quite high 
(-0.47). The only explanation offered is a hint at improper measurement of government 
consumption in their data set.
Following a similar approach, Khalid (1996) investigates the PIH+RE and substitutability 
issues for a number of developing countries. In most cases, the value for 6 is estimated to be 
not significantly different from 0; for some countries it is negative and only for Brazil it is 
positive and very high (not significantly different from I !).
To my knowledge, the only works in this research area using series referring to Italy are 
Nicoletti (1991), Rossi (1991), and Levaggi (1998,1999). In spite of the fact that Rossi adopts 
a similar specification, derived from the micro literature, to the one in Nicoletti, his estimated 
degree of substitutability between public and private consumption for Italy is 0.2. He uses 
NLS on quarterly data over the 1971-1982 period. Levaggi (1998) adopts a rather ad-hoc 
specification where the regressors are lagged private consumption and current and lagged 
disposable income, financial wealth and public consumption (all in logs)” . NLS is used on 
data over the 1960-1994 period, and the estimated parameter for permanent public 
consumption is found to be positive but not significantly different from 0. Again, 
distributional issues are hinted at in order to explain the puzzling sign of the estimate. In a 
second, micro-based contribution dedicated to the subject and using the same data set, 
however, Levaggi (1999) does find that a certain category of government consumption, what
State and local government consumption does not seem to be as problematic a regressor here as in Graham 
(1993).
The authors nest PIH-RE within a specification allowing to account for possible deviations from it both in 
terms of agents with finite time horizons and no altmism (making reference to Blanchard’s model (1985)) and of 
presence of liquidity constraints. They find that PIH+RE cannot be rejected.
It is a non-linear specification as it derives from the substitution into a linear model, including only cunent 
permanent disposable income, wealth and permanent government spending, o f Friedman’s definition of
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she defines as impure public goods (education, health and social security), directly crowds out 
at least a subset of private consumption, namely food, drink, alcohol, clothing and footwear ” , 
while pure public goods do not. Her model is a variation of the Linear Expenditure System 
function in which the fact that publicly provided goods may be rationed goods is taken 
account of, and these are allowed to be non-separable from other goods. The expenditure 
elasticity evaluated at the sample mean of a change in the quantity of impure public goods 
provided is -0.10, a small effect. The other two subsets of private consumption, namely 
housing, renting, furniture and fuel on one hand and leisure goods, transport and 
communications on the other, are also found to be unaffected by the size of government 
consumption in pure public goods, but are puzzingly found to be positively related to how 
much a government spends to provide impure public goods.
3. From model to specification.
Almost all theoretical work about the degree of substitutability between private and public 
consumption starts from the following generic utility function” :
uiC:) = u{C,+6G,)  (1)
where C* is effective per capita consumption of nondurables and services, C is per capita 
private consumption, G is per capita public consumption and 9  measures how much the latter 
substitutes for the former^®. This parameter is 0 in the standard neoclassieal treatment of fiscal 
policy (i.e. in the Ramsey model), but in the extension I am considering here it may take any 
value within the range [0, 1], with 0  = \  implying perfect substitutability^’. I also take 
account of the fact that the value for 6  may depend on the size and composition of public
permanent disposable income and a similarly constructed measure of permanent government spending on goods 
and services. Future variables play no role, as this is not a context of rational, but adaptive expectations.
Estimates of the non-linear model are obtained using a maximum likelihood method.
Notice leisure does not enter this utility function. Recently, the necessity to treat the effects of fiscal policy on 
private consumption and leisure jointly has been emphasised; see par.7.
If G were pure public goods, i.e. their consumption were characterised by non-rivalry, it would be appropriate 
to model utility as dependent on total, not per capita public goods. Barro (1981) however claims that G is much 
more often composed by private goods, and that the analysis would not be altered appreciably if some elements 
of nonrivalry were introduced.
Imperfect substitutability would not necessarily imply that G is valued less than privately produced goods. In 
fact, we neglect here the possible presence of an additional term in the utility function accounting for “other 
effects” of G on agents’ utility. The standard assumption is that this term enters separably, so that it does not 
influence consumption decisions.
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consumption, and may therefore vary over time. Following Darby and Malley (1996), this is 
done by assuming that it may be written as:
(2)
where G ‘^ and G'"^are government consumption in defence and nondefence areas 
respeetively, Y is GDP and so dividing both components of public consumption by it may be 
intended as a normalisation. Each component increase implies simultaneous effects on the 
level and composition of public consumption^^: the former may have a negative impact on 
0^^, while the sign of the impact of the latter is negative for positive for . The 
prediction is therefore that y  ^ < / 2 , and, if one assumes that the composition effect is stronger 
than the level effect, one should also find and
The distinction between defence and nondefence government consumption is not the only 
possible and interesting one. As I have already mentioned, Levaggi (1999) distinguishes 
between pure and impure public goods. I have also attempted at replicating this approach; 
however, lack of reliable data for the period before 1960 makes it not so successful (see par.
5.1, Data Appendix and par. 6).
Following Darby and Malley (1996) I opt for a very standard functional form for the utility 
fiinction of the representative agent:
in which utility decreases as the Euclidean distance between total consumption and bliss 
consumption C** increases^'’. Intertemporal utility is just the actualisation of present and
An increase in, say, defence consumption, ceteris paribus, determines an increase in the G/Y ratio and a 
redefinition of the proportions of defence and nondefence spending in goods and services.
This is, at least, Barro’s (1981) view, who however does not justify his statement. One can think he has 
“waste” in mind: the greater G, the greater the diseconomies of scale in the production of public goods.
Quadratic utility functions have been widely used in the literature, in spite of the fact that they are quite 
specific and have strong implications such as increasing absolute risk aversion and absence of precautionary 
saving (Deaton (1992)). They are in fact quite convenient, in that they allow to find closed form solutions to 
intertemporal utility maximisation problems. In order for local non-satiation to hold, the bliss point is assumed 
not to lie inside the feasible set of consumption bundles. It is interesting to notice that while the literature on
no
future utilities, i.e. there is a standard assumption of a time separable intertemporal utility 
function.
Period t budget constraint is given by
C, = ( / / ,  + + (4)
where is the net stock of total wealth (including public bonds) at the end of period t-1, N
is income, T is taxes net of transfers, SC is social contributions net of benefits and r is the 
interest rate. Here I consider not only financial, but also real wealth and, as far as disposable 
income is concerned, it is not, as in Darby and Malley, N-T, that is non-property income 
minus taxes, but N-T-SC, that is net labour income. The difference lies in the treatment of 
social contributions net of benefits, which are here excluded. The reason is that in Italy 
pensions have always been a public area of action, with a pay-as-you-go scheme as the only 
method of financing. This means that social contributions and benefits are not so different 
from taxes and transfers, and so the government time t budget constraint should not be written 
in the standard way:
=  (?, +  a ,  - ( i - H f ) - '  a ,+ , (5 )
where is public debt at the end of period t-1, but as:
(6)
The intertemporal government budget constraint, assuming a no Ponzi game condition holds, 
is therefore:
+  + S C „ , )  =  | ; [ ( l  +  r ) - ^ G „ J + S ,  (7 )J=0 j=0
Substituting it into the representative agent’s intertemporal budget eonstraint, obtained 
imposing again a solvency condition:
consumption tout court has long been concerned with finding alternative utility functions, the more specific one 
on the effects o f fiscal policy on consumption has not.
I l l
CO CO p
X  (1 +  r ) =  X  [(1 +  r )  ( N , , J - 7 % , -  ) ]+  W,J-0 7=0 (8)
the consolidated intertemporal budget constraint obtains:
CO 00  p
Y . ( ^  + r r C „ , = Y , [ ( l  + r r { N „ j - G „ j ) ] + W , - B ,  (9 )
7=0 7=0
This is the same as the one in Darby and Malley, but only if I define N as just gross labour 
income, not as non-property income (including both gross labour income and net social 
contributions).
By consolidating the public and private intertemporal budget constraints one implicitly takes 
the Ricardian Equivalence for granted.
Adding 2 ^/+7^/+7 both left and right hand side of the above consolidated intertemporal
7=0
budget constraint is the same as rewriting it in terms of a constraint on the actualised stream 
of total, not just private consumption. I am therefore able to write down the maximisation 
problem a representative consumer with perfect foresight must solve:
m ax ^ ( l  +  (^) ^
7=0
(10)
00 00 p
s.t. X  (1+r r  c ; . ,  =  X  1(1+ <-r +  ( « „ ,  -  d g ,_ ,  ] + (w, -  b , )
j=0 7=0
where S  is the rate of time preference. Manipulations of the FOC give the optimal level of 
effective consumption he chooses at time t^ :^
S - ~ r  r ^ + 2 r  — SC, = ----------C + .......... —-—r ( l  +  r) (1 +  r) (1^, -  5 , ) +  £  [(1 +  r)-^- (iV „, +  -  1 )G „, )]7=0 (11)
A pretty detailed description of all the manipulations needed to solve the consumer’s problem is to be found in 
Appendix A of Darby and Malley (1996).
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and through substitution of C* by its components and further easy manipulation the solution 
in private consumption obtains:
-  Po + A {W,  - 5 , )  +  £ [ ( l  +  r)-^ ( V „ .  - 1 ) G „ , ) ]
7=0
( 12)
where
r(l + r)
and
(13)
Px = r +2r — S(1 + r ) :
(14).
Introducing uncertainty and assuming rational expectations makes the problem only slightly 
different. The solution is the following:
Ct -  Po + A {W,  - S , )  +  £ , £ [ ( l  +  r ) -^ (W „ , + ( 0 „ ,  - 1 ) G „ , ) ]
7=0
+ £■. (15)
where E, is the expeetations operator conditional on information available at time t and s  is
a white noise disturbance. Notice that the combination of terms in square brackets, i.e. the 
sum of today’s wealth net of public bonds and present and future net labour incomes, may be 
interpreted as peiinanent income as evaluated at time t.
This is a nice closed-form solution to the representative agent’s maximisation, but from the 
point of view of its estimation it presents the relevant problem of a series of terms, the 
expectations about friture values of N and G, that are unobservable. One way out of this 
problem has been suggested by Hayashi (1982) and adopted by Darby and Malley; I will stick 
to their choice, leaving to future work to find out alternative solutions.
Following Hayashi, if  I define in the following way:
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77, = £ , £  [(1 + r )  ( # „ ,  + % , ,  -  1)G ,., )] (16)
7=0
I can manipulate the solution to the utility maximisation problem to obtain:
H, = M c , - l 3 , - l 3 , { W , - B , )  + e , G , - s , ]  (17)
H\
Now consider that, as a series, H^ has a relation to the same series starting at t-1:
H,  = (l + r)[//',_j -  -l)G ,^[] + e, (18)
where e, a white noise disturbance, accounts for the fact that the information set at time t may 
be different than the one at time t-1.
I can now substitute into this equation the value for just obtained, and the same can be 
done for if ,_ i, which is analogously given by:
^,-1  = - +  [C,-1 -  -So -  A  C»',-. -  5,-1 ) + S,_, G,_, (19)
Pt
After these substitutions, I finally solve for C ,, which obtains the following:
= (l + r ) C ^ _ j + ( l  + r)[(l-ySj)^^_j +  p ^ [ \ - { \  +  r ) L \ W ^ - B ^ )  +
- ^ j ( l  +  r ) V ^ _ l  + [ l - ( l  +  f ) i ] e ,
where L is the lag operator. By using the symbol A'', standing for quasi-difference, i.e.:
A’ = [ l - ( l  + r ) i ]  (20)
the above specification may be conveniently re-written as:
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= -ry?Q +(l + r)[(l-ySi)0^_l+-8j]G^_j-0^G^+/?^[A^(r^-5p-(l + r)V^_j] + t
(21)
where I have also used v, to signify the composite error term:
A G (22)
This equation is the same as [10] in Darby and Malley, but for the fact that is multiplied
by minus the interest rate: there is probably a typographical error in their intercept term. 
Notice that all expectation terms have been substituted out, and so all variables are now 
observable. The unknown parameters are p^ and /?, (because Ô is unknown^^) and P ,.
This is an interesting non-linear specification. As it is derived algebraically from a 
consumption function, its parameters relate directly to the deep parameters of the model, so it 
is possible to give them a precise economic meaning and see if their estimates eoiTespond to 
what the theoretical model predicts. In particular:
Py measures the proportion of permanent income that will be optimally consumed by the 
representative agent, and should be positive a smaller than 1 ;
6 measures how much government consumption substitutes for private consumption, and 
should lie in the [0 , 1] range.
The latter parameter, however, is itself a linear function of even deeper parameters, y y and 
/ g , so that the actual specification that I consider is the following:
A^C^ = - r p ^  + (\ + r) G
G ndt - \
T -1
Gd Gnd
t - l ■Ir t t
(23)
The interest rate is supposed to be known and constant instead.
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The predictions about y y and y^ are, as I have anticipated, that the former be smaller than the 
latter, and that possibly the former be smaller, the latter greater than 0 ; anyway, such that the 
combination of their values makes it possible for 0 to lie in the reasonable range at all times.
4, Choice of an appropriate estimation technique.
The chosen specification has many interesting features that have been discussed at the end of 
the previous paragraph. From the point of view of an econometrician, however, it poses a 
couple of questions: non-linearity and a disturbance term that is correlated to the explanatory 
variables and non serially uncorrelated, because it has a MA component. Particularly the latter 
problem must be taken seriously: all dynamics is relegated in the error here, and the choice of 
an estimation technique disregarding this would end up producing inconsistent estimates. 
Darby and Malley suggest the use of GMM estimation method. In fact, NLIV would address 
the problem of correlation between v, and the explanatory variables through substitutions of
these by a set of appropriately chosen instruments, but it would not consider the extra 
question of its MA component. The generalised method of moments, instead, does not require 
serially uncorrelated eiTors. In fact, it consists in the minimisation of a criterion fanction 
containing an estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the errors that may not be 
diagonal.
GMM starts from a theoretical requirement that the parameters should satisfy: that the 
expectation of the unconditional moments, i.e. orthogonality conditions between the 
disturbance term and a number of instiuments, be equal to 0 , in our case:
E z'h
f  Ç 'd  ç^ i\d  ç t  in \
t^-X
=  0
where z is a set of appropriately chosen instruments (as many as the unknown parameters or 
more) and h is LHS-RHS of equation (23). Then the unconditional moments are replaced by 
their sample counterparts^^, which I will call vector m{Pj,yy),  with j=0,l and i=l,2. If the
instruments are just as many as the parameters to be estimated, the estimates are obtained as
This procedure is justified by invoking the law of large numbers.
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the solution of the system of equations; if  there are more unconditional moments than 
parameters, instead, Hansen (1982) suggests to minimise the following criterion function:
J{Pj^7i) = rn{pj , )'Am{P.,y , )
where A is a matrix the purpose of which is to “weight” each unconditional moment, hence 
each instrumenté^.
A may be any matrix, and GMM estimates are guaranteed to be consistent, if  the instruments 
are correlated to the variables they substitute for. As for asymptotic efficiency, a necessary 
condition has been demonstrated to be that for w -> oo A should tend to (a matrix proportional 
to) the inverse of the covariance matrix of the sample moments m .
The first task is therefore to estimate such matrix, often called S. There are different 
estimation techniques according to whether the sample moments, hence the residuals, are 
correlated or not, of which more later. In any case, in order to estimate S an estimate of p j , y.
is needed, or else we cannot construct the sample moments. This circular reasoning (one 
needs S to estimate the parameters, but the estimated parameters are necessaiy to estimate S) 
is resolved by a two-step procedure. First an estimate of the parameters is obtained that is just 
consistent, not efficient, by minimising a criterion function containing an arbitrary A matrix; 
S is then constructed, and a criterion function containing it minimised. This process is finally 
iterated, so that the resulting estimates are invariant with respect to the scale of the data and 
the initial choice of A.
If the errors are not serially correlated S is a diagonal matrix and its estimate may be 
calculated as:
= 7  Z  [“ / ( T . f ,  > 2 , ) ] k  ( A , r , , 2 , )] ^ /=i
But this is not our case. When the sample moments, hence the error terms included in them, 
are not serially uncorrelated, and I assume that all autocovariances are 0 beyond some lag, S 
can be demonstrated to be equal to:
The answer to the presence of more instruments than parameters to estimate (overidentification) is similar to 
the one in the IV literature. The idea is to use instruments that are linear combinations of the original ones.
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s=  £ r (v )
where r(v) is an autocovariance matrix:
= Z  k ,  ( A  > , z, )] [«Î,-. iPj, r , , z,-„ )]
7  / = V+1
and p is the lag beyond which all autocovariances are assumed to be 0^^ . A consistent estimate 
of S is therefore:
S = f(O) + £ (f(v )  + f(v)0
V=1
where f ( 0) = 6"* and f(v ) is the sample counterpart of r(v ) (constructed starting from
consistent estimates of the parameters, leading to consistent estimates of the sample
moments). In fact, f (v ) '- r ( -v ) . This is the first of a elass of estimates for the asymptotic
covariance matrix known as heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent estimates, or HAC 
estimates.
Newey and West (1987) have pointed out that it is not infrequent to have estimates of the 
asymptotic covariance matrix that are not positive semi-definite. To avoid this problem they 
suggest giving a lag-dependent (linear) weight to each of the elements of the series in the 
above formula. Such weights also depend on the choice of p, the lag truncation parameter, 
whieh they detemiine as an increasing function of the number of observations in the sample^^. 
Lag tiuncation and bandwidth selection (i.e. the way the weights depend on the value of p) are 
therefore determined simultaneously.
More recently other authors have suggested their own frinctional form for these weights, and 
so nowadays most econometric software allows to choose among them (the so-called “kernel” 
option). Andrews’ (1991) suggestion is particularly interesting. He proposes to make use of 
all T-1 autocovariance estimates (no arbitrary lag truncation) and proposes quadratic spectral
The result is more general, as it is valid also when all autocovariances are nonzero, provided they tend to 0 as 
the absolute value of the difference between the lags tends to infinity (Hamilton (1994)).
To keep consistency, p must not grow faster than T ^  .
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weights^'. The value of each weight is determined by inserting in the kernel both the lag and 
the bandwidth selection choice. Andrews suggests making p dependent on the very 
autocorrelations in the data. This requires specifying a model proxying the correlative 
structure of the sample moments, estimating it and using such estimates to determine the 
bandwidth. Most econometric packages do all this automatically if  one chooses the 
“Andrews” bandwidth.
Of the possible choices for a kernel and a bandwidth, I have chosen to follow Andrews (1991) 
in my estiinates^^. In fact, he proves by simulation that his method of estimation for the 
asymptotic covariance matrix perfonns slightly better than all previously proposed methods 
for finite samples^^.
I have also adopted the “pre-whitening option” suggested by Andrews and Mohanan (1992). 
In fact, Andrews (1991) finds that all GMM estimators perform rather poorly when the 
moments involved are 1(1) or AR(1) with a correlation as high as 0.9. The estimation 
technique proposed by Andrews and Mohanan, instead, is applicable also in those cases. Their 
idea is to construct the HAC asymptotic covariance matrix as:
s  =
Here S  is Andrews’ HAC matrix, but constructed starting from the autocovariances not of the 
sample moments, but of the residuals of a low-order VAR model applied to them (the very 
“prewhitening” phase), and 5  is a matrix, derived from the VAR estimates, doing the 
“recoloring”, i.e. reversing the prewhitening^"^. So first a VAR is estimated in order to “soak 
up” the correlations in the sample moments before estimation: it is like filtering the sample 
moments to make them suitable for the application of the HAC matrix estimation techniques. 
Then the result is “translated” in terms of the original, correlated sample moments. Andrews 
and Mohanan prove by simulation that generally, but especially in the case of high 
autocorrelation of the sample moments, prewhitening solves the problem of t-statistics that 
tend to reject too often. The bias of GMM estimates is in fact considerably lower.
All these authors heavily borrow from the spectral density function estimation literature, exploiting the 
similarities in the problems the two research areas deal with.
Instead, Darby and Malley follow Newey and West.
Eviews 3.1, whieh I have used to compute the estimates I present in par.6, follows Andrews in adopting an 
AR(1) stmcture for the sample moments in order to determine p. I have no prior information on the data 
allowing me to object to this choice.
The authors adjust this matrix, in case of sample moments being (very near) unit root processes, so as to have
I - B A 0 ; otherwise it is impossible to invert. However, Eviews does not perform this adjustment.
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GMM is a very flexible estimation method in that it requires very few assumptions about 
disturbances. The drawback lies in the fact that right because so little is required, not so many 
diagnostic tests may be applied when one uses it. The one I will consider is Hansen’s test of 
over-identifying restrictions. The test uses the criterion function evaluated at the parameters’ 
estimates. In the case of just identification this value is 0, but when there is overidentification 
this may not be the case. T times the distance between J { p j , f p  and 0, which is proved to be
asymptotically distributed as a wtq; (no. of instruments -  number of parameters) degrees 
of freedom, may then be interpreted as joint test of instruments’ validity and general 
specification. In this work, in particular, good results of this test should wipe out any 
perplexity regarding the admittedly very structured specification, which owes its being 
constraint-packed to the fact that it is derived rigorously from a theoretical framework.
5. The data.
5.1. Sources and reconstruction.
It comes as no suipiise to economists interested in the relationship between consumption and 
fiscal policy in Italy that most empirical work on the subject has been so far based on time 
series stretching not further than 1960, or, in some cases, 1950. Exceptions are few and work 
with data proxying the relevant variables with some degree of imprecision (Modigliani and 
Jappelli (1987))é^. There is in fact a lack of consistent long time series for those variables. 
This contrasts with the availability of data regarding other macroeconomic items going as far 
back as 1860, the time Italy’s process of unification was completed. The collection and 
reconstruction of data regarding consumption and related variables are the object of a working 
paper I have written in collaboration with Mariacristina Cristini (Cristini and Dalle Nogare 
(1999)), and this paragraph, as well as the Data Appendix, extensively draws from it. For
Modigliani and Jappelli (1987) take the 1952-1982 series in Modigliani, Jappelli and Pagano (1985), the 
sources of which are mainly OECD, National Accounts and Bank of Italy, Annual Report, and attach to them 
data from different sources (in their own words, not always entirely consistent) going from 1862 to 1951. They 
depart from all other works on consumption in that they use final consumption of both durables and nondurables, 
a series they take from Ercolani (1969) up to 1951. They proxy labour income with disposable income (from 
Ercolani up to 1951), which clearly includes capital income. But it is the wealth series that is most peculiar. It 
excludes durables and up to 1952 it only includes land and capital (still from Ercolani), while it includes houses, 
equities, bonds, deposits, currency, and net worth of insurance policies (but not land) later. Wealth also includes 
government debt, as the authors move within the LCH tradition.
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some series further re-elaboration was needed in view of this empirical analysis: the Data 
Appendix tells which.
Not all variables needed for my work were tabula rasa, to tell the truth. Particularly, some 
useful reconstructions, especially as far as private consumption, public consumption^^ and 
labour income of employees are concerned, are to be found in Rossi, Sorgato and Toniolo 
(1993). Those series do not go as far back as 1860, and the latter is not complete, but they 
have been a valid starting point to obtain data for the whole period I take in consideration, 
using methods that will be described in detail under the respective headings in the Data 
Appendix.
The one variable we have found almost nothing about was total labour income, and a 
consistent measure of total wealth (including real wealth) was also absent from all previous 
work we have come across. These have therefore been the areas where our work has been 
most creative.
As far as wealth is concerned, it is real wealth that caused most of the trouble. We decided to 
use the perpetual inventory method whenever data on stocks were not available, and we have 
taken into account the series in Rossi et al. (1993) for housing and durables.
In contrast to the reconstruction in Cristini and Dalle Nogare, I have here opted for the 
exclusion of land from the wealth series. It has been a tough but necessary decision. I am 
aware that land accounted for a major part of real wealth in the first 30-40 years of the 
sample, and its role was not negligible for a few more decades. The problem was that all 
permanent income measures including the value of land resulted in poor estimates for the 
coiTesponding coefficient. Land, in fact, is a veiy peculiar series. Its has a marked downward 
trend starting around 1876 and lasting almost 20 years^^. This contrasts with the flatness of 
the consumption series in the same years^^. As far as the more recent decades are concerned,
Rossi et al. (1993) reconstruct private and public consumption as part of the expenditures on gross domestic 
product. The expenditures on GDP tables usually divide national demand into private consumption, comprising 
the consumption o f both households and “various social institutions”, and public, i.e. government consumption, 
but sometimes the distinction is between households’ consumption and “collective” consumption, where 
collective stands for both government and various social institutions. Rossi et al. seem to adopt the first 
distinction, but a closer look reveals that what they call public consumption is actually collective consumption. 
In fact, private consumption is the same as households’ consumption in their table on the composition of 
domestic households’ consumption. Besides, they use the term collective consumption in the text describing the 
expenditures on GDP, in contrast to the heading of the relative series. The series in question is therefore 
unquestionably collective consumption. However, I will use it here as a proxy for public consumption, which is 
reasonable considering that for the period since 1960 a series for government consumption is available, it is very 
close to the one in Rossi et, al. and there is no reason to think that the two were very different in the previous 
decades,
It might be related to the agricultural crisis which affected the country as a consequence of the fall of the price 
of corn and wheat (Ciocca and Toniolo (1998)), but it might also be a question of wrong reconstruction.
If the data on land for the period in question are reliable, there are two possible explanations, not necessarily 
excluding each other; land ownership was concentrated (which makes per capita wealth including land a bad
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reliability of data is still an issue. Since 1994 INEA has started a substantial revision of the 
data collection methods for land prices. In 1997 they published a new series for the value of 
land for the time period 1968-1996 which is dramatically different from all previous studies. 
Revisions are probably needed also for the earlier period; attempts at linking the new series to 
the data for the previous years produce the most puzzling plots.
The total labour income series was impossible to reconstruct as the sum of employees’ and 
self-employed workers’ labour incomes for total absence of data on the latter before 1980. 
Rossi et al. (1993), however, have reconstructed total units of labour in the different business 
sectors from 1911 onwards (with a ten years’ break around the Second World War). We 
therefore assumed to be in a neoclassical world and used the various sectors’ income per 
standard unit of labour of employees as a proxy for the sectors’ income per standard unit of 
labour (of employees and self-employed). In order to find values for the series before 1911 
and around World War II we have then made use of the net national product series by ISTAT 
(1957), in a way that is described in detail in the Data Appendix.
As for the fiscal policy series, the problem was that no economic classification of general 
government consumption is available up to 1960. All that is to be found are economic 
classifications of total central government expenditures, which include transfers and capital 
expenditures as well as consumption. Clearly, total central government expenditures in, say, 
defence is but an imperfect proxy for general government consumption in the same field. In 
this specific case, however, there are reasons to believe that the use of such a proxy is quite 
legitimate (see Data Appendix). A total government consumption series was easily 
constructed, so having this and a series proxying public consumption in defence, government 
consumption in nondefence was derived by difference.
More dubious is the use of the data I have for the pre-1960 period for creating a classification 
that distinguishes between the value of the production of pure and impure public goods. I 
have nevertheless made an attempt.
5.2. A first look at the series.
Although the specification here considered, being non-linear in both its parameters and 
regressors, makes it hard to anticipate something about the estimation results just from a look 
at the series involved, it is anyway worth it to present them. Especially the public 
consumption series are interesting, because the time-varying 6 I constmct starting from those
proxy for a representative housedold’s wealth) and consumption on nondurables was mainly food consumption
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estimates may be better interpreted in the light of the economic and political events 
underlying them.
Real per capita consumption of nondurables and services and labour income are characterised 
by three breaks:
1) one dating about the turn of the centuiy. Those years were marked by the first wave of 
industrialisation in the country. It is necessary to stress here that some authors are not so 
satisfied with all recontructions of income and consumption regarding the pre-Gioiitti era, 
claiming that the series in question started to rise long before ISTAT (1957) and all (including 
Rossi et al. (1993)) those who re-elaborated its data show (Toniolo (1990)). Fenoaltea (1983) 
is one of them, but his own reconstructions are not readily available at the moment;
2) one dating around 1950, after which the two series tend to grow at a much faster rate than 
before. The post-war era was in fact a time of massive industrialisation that would change the 
very structure of the country’s economy;
3) a more recent break point is 1992, marking the start of a prolonged recession. In September 
the Italian lira was forced out of the ERM and experienced a strong devaluation, as capital 
was leaving the country. Drastic measures were taken by the government: introduction of a 
much-needed, although partial, reform of the pension system, large tax increases, some cuts in 
public spending in goods and services and freeze of public sector wages. Changes in the 
employment legislation and a privatisation programme, as well as a reform of the electoral 
law making it less proportional, followed.
The effects of the First and Second World War are also evident, but much more those of the 
latter than those of the former.
Real per capita consumption of nondurables and services (Figure 1) looks like a stationary 
series up to 1900, after which it starts to grow. W W l has no evident effect apart from greater 
year-to-year changes. The upward trend goes on till 1929, then consumption falls till 1935. 
After a short-lived reversion of trend, WW2 marks a much deeper fall in the series. The post­
war series only reverts its positive trend in 1993; a period of more moderate growth follows. 
As for real per capita labour income (Figure 2), it looks, too, as a stationary series up to 1900, 
after which it starts to grow at a faster rate. WWl was marked by declining values only in 
1917 and 1918. After the war the positive trend continues till 1935^^, then a 10-year period of 
negative growth rates, particularly remarkable in the last years of WW2. Afterwards labour
at the beginning of the period, hence not so reactive to downward turns in permanent income.
Mattesini and Quinter! (1997) point out that the effects of the Great Depression were as severe in Italy as in 
the rest o f the industrial countries. The fact that real labour income does not show this is probably due to the fact 
that the fall in prices was more pronounced than the fall in wages.
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income starts growing in line with the economic boom of the 50s and 60s, but continues on 
the same trend also in the 70s and 80s, 1992 marks the start of a clear fall.
Real per capita wealth is marked by a period of stagnation till the mid-1890s, then it starts to 
rise, which does not stop during WWl and throughout the Fascist era. With respect to real per 
capita labour income, it is characterised by a more dramatic change of trend after WW2 and 
only a small slowdown in growth after 1992 (Figure 3). It is however important to stress, in 
this respect, that this wealth series does not include future pension benefits"^^.
Real per capita public consumption has an almost constant value between 1862 and 1910, 
exhibits a big jump around the First World War, returns to lower values in the early 20s (still 
around 9 percent of GDP, as in the pre-war period) and then starts rising around 1925 (Figure
4). This rise sharply increases in the first years of the next decade, then stops in 1944. After 
1950 and up to 1992 real public consumption shows a positive trend, although it is to be said 
that other components of public expenditures, especially transfers, grew much more in the 
same period"*^ At the end of the 80s it almost reached 18 percent of GDP (Figure 6). There is 
what is most likely to be a structural break in 1992: after that date public spending on goods 
and services took on a negative trend^ ^^ ^
Real per capita government civil expenditures on goods and services is a series generally 
tracking the one of real per capita public consumption except for the war years (Figure 7). 
During W Wl it shows a rise, and another modest rise starts in 1925 and becomes stronger 
since 1930. This was a turning point in the economic policy of the fascist era, which had been 
marked by a laissez-faire strategy in the early years but later, also in response to the 1929 
crisis, turned to more state intervention. Between 1941 and 1945 government nondefence 
consumption shows a dramatic fall. Between 1950 (1960) and 1996 the ratio between 
government consumption in non defence and total government consumption increases from 
0.72 (0.79) up to 0.92, following a trend only reverting modestly for some years in the mid- 
Eighties. The cuts in expenditures of the 90s have affected defence and nondefence spending
Future pension benefits are equivalent to transfers in the relationship between households and government. If 
RE holds, they should not be considered as wealth (Nicoletti (1991), note 7).
Between 1972 and 1976 public consumption slightly decreased. This is most of all the effect o f calculating 
real public consumption by dividing its nominal counterpart by the consumption price deflator. In fact, what 
happened was that public employment kept rising but wages in the public sector took some time to adjust for 
high inflation (Giarda (1986)). However, between 1974 and 1978 there was also a slight fail in real spending in 
goods, especially in the defence sector.
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on goods and services in the same way (Figure 5), as one can also infer from the fact that 
from 1992 to 1996 there has practically been no change in the ratio between nondefence and 
total government consumption in that period (Figure 9). As for the ratio between government 
civil consumption and GDP, one of the regressors that will be used, see Figure 8 .
The fact that government nondefence consumption looks like total government consumption 
in nonwar years is due to the fact that it is constructed as public consumption minus defence, 
which, apart from wartime, is traditionally a fairly stable component of government spending 
on goods and services in Italy, although it is to be noticed that it tends to decline in relative 
importance in the long run. Up to 1910 there are little changes in the series’ data, but notice 
the high start in 1862 (the process of unification had just ended), a rise in 1866, the time of 
the third war of independence against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the more modest 
ones associated to the military campaigns in Eritrea and Ethiopia dating 1887 and 1895-1896 
(Figure 10). Then a sharp rise in the second decade of last centuiy, marked by the conflict 
with Turkey for the conquest of Libya (1911-1912) and the involvement in W W l. The time in 
between the wars shows a rise starting in 1934, a time of rearmament in prospect of the war 
with Ethiopia (1935-1936); the trend only reverts for a couple of years, after which WW2. 
Then a sharp fall followed by an upward trend, only briefly reverted in the second half of the 
70s. The 90s show more consistent cuts. The ratio between defence spending on goods and 
services and public consumption has values between 0.2 and 0.35 in the years between 1862 
and 1910, it reaches 0.55 in W Wl and 0.9 in WW2 only to go back to 0.2 in the 50s, and 
gradually declines to 0.1 in the most recent decades of the sample period (Figure 12). Defence 
spending on goods and services over GDP is shown in Figure 11.
6. Regression results.
Table 1 presents the results obtained by adopting different GMM estimation techniques 
(GMM-AM stands for GMM - Andrews and Mohanan, GMM-NW for GMM -  Newey and 
West and GMM -  A for GMM - Andrews) on the 1862-1991 period, a very large subsample. 
I have used twice and three times lagged values of per capita consumption, wealth, labour 
income and government consumption as instruments; as for public consumption in defence 
and nondefence over GDP, following Darby and Malley, I have used once and twice lagged
Most of the fiscal adjustment characterising the 90s was however performed by raising taxes, not by cutting
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values'^é The use of different HAC matrices does produce different results, but, all in all, both 
signs and values of all estimated parameters are similar, and they are significant'^'^. Notably, 
all estimates have values in accordance to economic theory'^^. The representative consumer 
spends each year 0 .8-1% of their expected permanent income in nondurables and services. 
The signs of the estimates of the y parameters indicate that the greater government 
consumption in defence, the smaller the degree of substitutability between public and private 
consumption, while the more a government spends in nondefence areas, the greater the direct 
crowding out effect. Hansen’s tests are good for all regressions, implying that the model is 
well specified.
The 2SLS estimates are also shown for comparison: surprisingly, they are similar to the 
GMM results (especially to the one obtained adopting the Andrews and Mohanan approach). I 
am more inclined to think this is due to the specific characteristics of the series here used than 
to the scarce relevance of the MA component in the error of the given specification.
Figure 14 shows the different time-varying thetas constructed using y, and y 2 obtained by 
the GMM regressions of Table 1:
/~n7 nd
 ^I
where I have made use of the definition of 6*, given by equation (2) The graph highlights 
that the use of different HAC matrices produce values for 6^  that are all within the admissible 
[0,1] range, save for the WW2 years. The value of 9 is modest in the pre-WWl period, a
expenses.
The results here reported all assume 1-0.05; I have tried with 0.04 and 0.06, but it does not make a lot of 
difference.
Darby and Malley scale both sides of the regression equation by an exponential trend in consumption obtained 
as the exponent of the fitted values from a regression of the log of real per-capita consumption on a constant and 
a time trend. Their aim is to reduce heterosckedasticity in the error term. I have tried to do the same, but results 
are not so different from those found without applying this scaling. In fact, heterosckedasticity should already be 
taken account of by the use of a HAC matrix in GMM, so that the very scaling seems unnecessary. All results I 
show have been obtained without scaling.
is positive, so r <  A (see equation (13)). Notice that this circumstance poses a problem, in that it implies
that the economy is dynamically inefficient. However, I am inclined not to overestimate this question. It is 
probably the reflection of the fact that my wealth series suffers from some measurement problem, in the sense 
that, although it is entirely consistent in itself, its relative value vis-à-vis the consumption series is not. Notice 
also that Darby and Malley found a negative constant, too.
The quite similar values of all three thetas at each point in time reveals that the difference in magnitude of the 
y  y, y  2 estimates obtained using different HAC matrices is not so relevant, since it is their relative magnitude 
that counts.
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higher level and a greater volatility characterise it in the intra-war time while the post WW2 
era is marked by a positive trend.
The latter phenomenon is much more remarkable if we consider Theta 3, constructed starting 
from the estimates obtained by use of the Andrews-Mohanan approach, which, for the reasons 
I have anticipated, will be my favourite,
Theta 3 (Figure 13) starts at a value less than 0,2, but steadily grows in the second part of the 
XX cent, reaching 0.67 in 1991. Short period changes are also interesting in that they 
highlight how slumps correspond, as expected, to times of war; not just the World Wars, but 
also “minor” conflicts are visible (1862; 1866; 1887 and especially 1895-1896; 1911-1912; 
1935-1936). The peak in 1921 seems to be due to a strong temporary rise in public spending 
for civil purposes. The markedly upward trend of the pre-1935 decade is again the effect of 
the increase of public resources for civil goals, a well-known policy of the fascist regime in 
those years. The small peak just after 1970 is the reflection of the short-term slump in 
government consumption in defence.
It is interesting to compare the values found for Theta 3 in the last decades of the sample with 
the other estimates of 0 found for Italy. Clearly, the presence of a direct crowding out effect 
is confirmed by the analysis, in contrast to the findings in Nicoletti (1991) and Levaggi 
(1998). It is a remarkably strong effect, much stronger than the estimates in Rossi (1991) 
would show.
As for the comparison with the literature based on the use of post-WW2 US series, the Italian 
case seems to be characterised by a fairly higher direct crowding out effect, probably a 
consequence of the smaller role played by defence as a spending category. As for the trend, 
the only possible comparison is with Darby and Malley’s results: up to 1975, in both countries 
9 grows, but afterwards it keeps growing in Italy, while in the US Reagan’s rearmament 
makes it fall and then it appears as stationary.
The short term “rebouncing” of all thetas in the post WW2 years is puzzling, especially 
because it is rather pronounced. This evidence and the negative values characterising the 
1940-1942 years are likely to let the question arise whether the results are sensitive to the 
outliers of the 1940s.
Fortunately, this is not the case. Considering that there is a great difference in the way the 
series involved in my regression are affected by the years in question, with real per capita 
consumption, wealth and labour income much less subject to great year-to year changes with 
respect to pubic consumption, I have tried to deal with the problem by estimating a new 
regression, in which 9  ^ is defined as:
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Q d  Q  nd
6, -  Y y ~ ~ ^ Ï 2  - y —+
where duml is a dummy variable taking the value 1 in the years 1940-1946. The regression 
results are shown in Table 2. The GMM-AM estimates show that the duml estimated 
coefficient is not significant, and all other parameters are quite similar to those in Table 1 and 
stay significant. As for the GMM-NW and GMM-A estimates, here â  is positive and
significant, and Py are almost unaffected while fy becomes smaller and greater, thus
turning even more similar to those of GMM-AM in Table 1. This finding is evident in Figure 
15, where it is shown that even in the post-WW2 period the thetas constructed starting from 
the GMM-NW and GMM-A estimates of Table 2 (Thetatable2nw and Thetatable2a) have the 
same trend as Theta 3 of Table 1. It may be interpreted as a sign of the fact that the 
prewhitening-recoloring procedure involved in GMM-AM already solves the problem of the 
possibly too great a weight given to outliers'^^.
The results on the 1862-1991 sample are not only insensitive to the presence of the outliers in 
defence consumption of WW2, but they are also quite robust if  we consider earlier ending 
dates. Adding the 1992-1996 period, however, determines a complete change in the regression 
results. In particular, while the GMM-NW estimates keep both right sign and magnitude, both 
GMM-A and GMM-AM produce reversions in signs for the estimates of the coefficients of 
public consumption, which are never significant. Technically, this seems to be due to the fact 
that the selected bandwidth for the constmction of the HAC matrix changes dramatically, and 
it is amazing to see how just 4 data may change the whole picture.
One way to try to deal with the problem is to simply add to my model a dummy, d u m l , 
taking the value 1 in the 1992-1996 years. It is a rather rough procedure, but it allows one to 
try to deal with what seems to be a structural break in all the series involved in the regression, 
and to consider the effects of the reform package which was implemented in those years as a 
whole. The GMM-AM result is in column 2 of Table 3 (column 1 is the same as column 1 of 
Table 1, and is reported for comparison purposes). The coefficient of the dummy is significant
I have also tried the alternative approach of inserting duml linearly in the regression equation. In the GMM- 
AM case, the parameter associated to it is not significant and all other parameters do not change much and 
remain significant. In the GMM-NW case, it is negative and significant, but again all other parameters are 
significant and very similar to those in Table 1. GMM-A does not converge after 100 iterations. All these results 
are available upon request.
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and negative, as one would expect considering that private consumption fell in these years. 7 , 
and y 2 also significant and have the right sign. Their values are such that the theta 
constructed starting from them looks similar to Theta 3 of Figure 13, only slightly lower in 
value over the whole period. In the post-1992 period it shows a negative trend, going from 
0.51 to 0.47.
Three main fiscal measures were taken in 1992 and confirmed, if not strengthened, in the 
following years: a tax rise, a reform of the pension system aiming at reducing the excessive 
generosity of the previous decades and an expenditure cut involving also a reduction in public 
consumption. Given that I am assuming that the Ricardian Equivalence holds, the first two 
should not have affected private consumption, while the third one should have made it 
increase. Therefore, my theoretical framework becomes inadequate here: it seems it cannot 
account for the decrease of private consumption. Possibly the type of tax rise, pension reform 
and expenditure cuts adopted had vast distributional effects. I have tried to take account of 
this by expressing the term for wealth in my specification as:
IF, +  A * d u m l
The GMM-AM estimates of this seeond regression equation are in Table 3, column 3. The 
similarities to the result in eolumn 1 are evident, and X is negative and statistically 
significant'^^. Flansen’s test, though much lower, still accepts the null hypothesis of 
instruments validity and good specification.
A third experiment considered writing down 0^  as:
^  nd
+ B'^duml
following the same line of reasoning as the one adopted when dealing with the 1942-1946 
problematic period. The GMM-AM result is reported in Table 3, column 4. p  is negative and
Recursive estimation from 1992 to 1996 obtains X  always significant and very small, sometimes positive, 
sometimes negative. The fact that the sign is very unstable is not surprising. It is a sign that the Amato reform of 
the pension system, because of its being only partial, was not perceived as a one-and-for-all change in the 
institutional context, but as the first step of a process. The general effect was the introduction of a lot of 
uncertainty.
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significant, py is lower than the estimate in column 1, but the values for fy and f^  are such 
that the corresponding theta’s values at all times are extremely similar to those of Theta 3.
As I have anticipated, another problematic question regarding the series I am using relates to 
the reliability of the data sources as far as the 1862-1890 period is concerned. One is then led 
to try and see what happens if we exclude those years from the sample. The regression results 
are in Table 4, and show that the only relevant difference with respect to Table 1, regardless 
of the estimation method and, in the case of GMM, of the HAC matrix that is used, is in the 
estimated constant. This of course does not mean that if my series for the 1862-1890 period 
were not so flat all estimated parameters would be unaffected, but asymptotic theoiy suggests 
that the changes would not be great.
The biggest structural break in the series I use is around 1950, and it is therefore interesting to 
divide the whole sample in two to check for the stability of the above estimates'^^.
1 will call the first subsample the pre-WW2 sample, because I have decided to eliminate the 
1940s from it (I have not excluded the 1862-1890 period, instead, considering that this would 
make it too small). 1 have tried different ending dates, and the best results in terms of 
significance of the GMM-AM estimates are those reported in Table 5, covering the 1862- 
1937 span. As expected, considering the smaller expected permanent income in the early 
years of the sample, which are characterised by a much slower process of accumulation, and
the fact that some basic nondurables are necessary for life, Py is much bigger than in the
estimation on the 1862-1991 period, fy and have the right sign and are significant. They
have values such that the corresponding (9, always lies in the reasonable range, but it is even
smaller than the one constructed starting from the GMM-AM estimates of Table 1, which in 
the period in question was generally already quite small (Figure 13). By changing the ending 
date of the subsample, however, fy and lose statistical significance^^, though they keep 
the right sign and more or less the same values.
The post-WW2 subsample is constrained to start in the middle of the 1950s by the fact that, 
since I am using twice lagged values of the regressors as instruments, and some series enter 
the specification as lagged values themselves, I would not otherwise eliminate the influence
I only consider two subsamples: pre- and post-WW2. A finer division of the sample would imply the creation 
of subsamples that are too small for asymptotic theory to apply.
Table 3 also shows 2SLS, GMM-NW and GMM-A regression results when the ending date is 1937. Here, too, 
statistical significance of the relevant coefficients is a problem.
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of the war years in the estimation procedure. This is a problem because it makes the 
subsample rather small: there are only 38 data from 1954 till 1991. The results, summarised in 
Table 6 , are therefore to be taken as only suggestive. The biggest difference lies in the 
estimate of /?q, which is now negative, although significant only with GMM-AM. yâ, is
always positive and significant, higher than the values in Table 1 but smaller than those in 
Table 5. The estimated parameter associated to government consumption in defence is never 
significant, its sign and magnitude are right except in the GMM-NW case. is positive, as 
expected, and has a reasonable value in all cases; it is significant at the 5% confidence level in 
all cases except GMM- AM, where it is only significant at 10%^\
All in all, the consideration of two distinet subperiods, though flawed by the fact that the more 
recent one is probably too short for GMM to be of any use, speaks in favour of a not very 
high stability of the estimated parameters. However, with GMM-AM the signs of yâ,, f , and 
A  stay the same, and their values, though different, keep having a meaning from the point of 
view of economic theory. This is already a great result, considering that the series I am using 
are clearly marked by a big structural break around 1950.
In order to check if the results are sensitive to the fact that in the definition of (9, I have 
nonnalised government consumption in defence and nondefence by GDP, I have tried a 
different normalisation. I have defined 0. as:
By substituting this new definition of 6, in the regression equation and manipulating, a
specification similar to (but not exactly the same as) the one in Graham (1993) obtains. This 
attempt also allows for the detection just o f the composition effect. By substituting the new 
definition of (9, into the specification and estimating it by GMM-AM on the 1862-1991
period I have obtained the result in Table 7. With respect to the GMM-AM result of Table 1 
the two major changes are the size of the parameters associated to government consumption 
in defence and nondefence (but not so much their relative magnitude) and the fact that is 
not statistically significant (p-value 0.15). In spite of the latter problem, and just for
Considering 1955 as starting date does not make a lot o f difference with GMM-AM, while starting from 1956
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suggestive comparison purposes, I have constructed 0 ,^ which I have called Theta 4, from the 
results in Table 7 and plotted it against Theta 3 (Figure 16)^  ^ \ not consider this as a bad
result^é^
Finally, in Table 8 I report the result obtained when a different decomposition of government 
consumption is used: the one suggested by Levaggi (1999) between pure and impure public 
goods '^^. The fact that in Table 8 y y and are not statistically significant is probably a sign 
that the very rough procedure by which the series have been obtained is far from satisfactoiy. 
Their signs and values are however compatible with economic theory, while Py has not only 
a sensible value, but it is also significant^^.
It is difficult to relate this result to Levaggi’s (1999) because y y and y^ sununarise both a 
composition and a level effect, hence they are not so easily compared to substitution effect 
indexes of micro-modelling origin, on the whole and not on distinct categories of private
consumption. The values for 0, from the 60s onwards implied by their estimated values
suggestively indicate that the direct crowding-out effect has been probably stronger in the 
period in question than her estimates would show. Remember however that these estimates 
are non-significant.
7. Suggestions for future refinements.
Although the effort in data collection and reconstruction was great, there probably remains a 
lot to do in order to have a number of series that proxy the relevant variables satisfactorily.
The data set is likely to be subject to further revisions as far as both labour income and wealth 
are concerned. Notably, wealth should be inclusive of land, if reliable data were available. It
makes the coefficient of government consumption in defence positive and not significant.
If we consider Theta 4, the post-WW2 period is eharaeterised by a not so remarkable rise in the strength of the 
direct crowding out effect. Since 0  catches only the composition, not also the level effect here, this might be 
interpreted as a sign of the fact that, contrary to Barro’s view (1981), the level effect adds to the composition 
effect. However, remember y 2 is not significant in this regression, and so extia evidence is needed to confirm 
this result.
Darby and Malley make the same attempt, and define their result, which they do not even report, as 
unsuccessful.
I have defined as the sum of (a parameter times) each of these categories of government consumption 
divided by GDP.
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is however important to say that right when the weight of land in total wealth was great, that 
is in the first part of the sample, the property of land was highly concentrated, which probably 
made distributional issues more relevant than the present analysis shows. As for income, the 
pre-1911 period is still subject to a lively debate among scholars, as I have already mentioned. 
That it is very difficult to find reliable sources for data refening to the remote past is no 
surprise to anyone, and this is probably not a question regarding Italy only. There are, 
however, other problems with my data that can be considered as country-specific. One of 
them regards government consumption. It is well documented that in Italy, especially in the 
last 30 years, there have been big transfers from government to public sector coiporations, 
constantly unable to balance their budgets due to the politically fixed prices of their services 
and their inefficiencies. These transfers have been classified in the general government 
statistics as current account expenditures under the heading of contributions to production (i.e. 
transfers) and as capital expenses^^, but they hide a lot of government consumption, as they 
have been at least partially used to pay public sector employees producing public goods 
(Modigliani et al. (1985), Giarda ( 1986))^  ^ Besides, the year-to year change in public debt 
has been considerably larger than the deficit reported in the national accounts for a long 
period of time, which reveals that part of public expenditures are systematically not reported 
in those statistics, and part of these expenditures may be government consumption^^. The 
recent necessity to meet with the Maastricht criteria may have worked as an incentive to even 
more “creative accounting” (Virno (1995)).
If there are reasons to believe my measure of government consumption is underestimated, 
there are other ones pointing to the fact that, however exactly estimated, it would never 
precisely track the value of public goods produced. These reasons are not related to the 
specific case of Italy. In all empirical works I have come across, government consumption is 
proxied by government expenditure for wages and purchase of intermediate goods. This is
I have also tried with different definitions of pure and impure public goods with respect to those in the Data 
Appendix: I have put “infrastructure and support to the economy” in the first category; I have not considered the 
category of interest payments before 1960. The results are similar to those in Table 8.
Alesina, Maré and Perotti (1998) explain how current account spending can be registered as capital 
expenditure. The government budget systematically underestimates the transfers needed by public sector 
coiporations, so that these have to take loans from banks. These loans are then remitted by the government, and 
the corresponding amount registered in next year’s budget as capital expenses. This is a sort of creating 
accounting enabling the government to finance current account expenses by issuing debt, which a combination 
of laws formally forbids.
It is for this reason that Nicoletti (1988) uses general government data for all countries except Italy, for which 
he uses public sector data. These are however available only for the last decades, not for all the period I take in 
consideration.
Modigliani et al. (1985) tiy to create a ti’uer measure of government consumption by adding to the government 
consumption reported in the national accounts a fraction of the new debt issues in excess o f the deficit. However, 
they do not specify what fraction, and what criteria they used to fix it.
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justified by the fact that, since goods provided by the government are usually at price zero for 
the consumer^^, their valuation cannot but be at factors’ cost. Consider, however, that in the 
last decades the role of government has developed more in the direction of expanding 
transfers than in that of providing more and more public goods. Besides, in many countries, 
including Italy, public investment has never been a negligible part of public expenditure^^. 
Both transfers and investments have an impact on the amount the government pays in wages: 
the former because the more the transfers, the larger the bureaucracy managing them'’', the 
latter both for the same reason and because installation costs are basically costs of personnel. 
In my opinion, these circumstances make government spending for wages and goods a poor 
proxy for government consumption. The former may rise without implying more public goods 
offered. Ideally, one should be able to impute the actual wage and intermediate goods costs 
incurred by government to either the production of public goods or other public objectives. 
This may be at least partially possible with the data available for the last decades (I960- 
1996): ISTAT in fact presents general government accounts in tables where a functional and 
an economic classification intersect. It is not possible, however, on the whole period.
Other extensions of this work may centre on the issue of specification. Taking the Ricardian 
Equivalence for granted may be just as controversial dealing with Italy than with any other 
country. A recent survey (Ricciuti (2001)) summarises the contradictory results of the 
empirical literature on RE using Italian data^^ Some may point out that the problematic 
results obtained by including the 1992-1996 years have something to do with the fact that I 
am assuming RE is valid, while it may be not, intei*preting the fall in consumption as a 
consequence of the reform of the pension system. Leiderman and Razin (1988) might be a 
good starting point if the aim is to consider PIH+RE and substitutability issues together.
The assumption of a fixed interest rate throughout the time period considered is also 
debatable, as it does not allow to consider intertemporal substitution effects on private 
consumption.
The standard macro analysis o f public goods usually neglects the fact that some public goods are actually not 
completely free for the consumer. However, even when they have a price, it does not reflect their market value.
Public investment and transfers to firms (some of them belonging to the public sector) have constantly been a 
relevant heading in government budgets, most o f the time amounting to 10% ca. o f all public spending. Since 
1980, however, there has been a steady decline in this kind of expenditure.
Also the size of public debt may have a non-negligible impact on the size of bureaucracy.
Among these contributions, just Modigliani and Jappelli (1987) use long annual time series, which are 
however constructed, in their own words, starting from not always entirely consistent sources (see note 35). 
Moreover, their specification and estimation methods are severely criticised by Rossi (1989), who argues that 
their rejection of RE heavily depends on them. The advantage of using long annual time series in testing for RE 
should however be evident. The data set here used, with the addition of a government debt series, is well suited 
for a flirther investigation into the topic.
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A final issue one should not neglect concerns the econometric properties of the estimates here 
presented. In particular, I am referring here to the stability of the estimated value for the y, 
and y2 parameters. Just as 0 is rightly thought to be varying in time according to public 
consumption composition, so probably do y, and y^  if G‘‘ and G'"’ change in nature as well as 
in scale over time. And this is probably the case here for G'"', because the time span 
considered is veiy large and the spirit itself of a governmenf s involvements in non-defence 
matters has changed considerably in time. Think of education, for instance: XIX century’s 
standard was to provide basic education, while in the second half of the last century most 
university education was also provided by the State in Italy.
Recent advancements in the neoclassical approach to fiscal policy have highlighted the 
importance of intertemporal labour substitution effects (Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum 
(1992)). These modify the basic theoretical framework used here because there may be 
aggregate supply effects as well as aggregate demand effects.
From a theoretical point of view, if labour supply is elastic but there is perfect substitutability 
between G and C, there is neither an effect on permanent income nor, in the case of 
unexpected temporaiy changes in government consumption, an effect on the interest rate. This 
implies that labour supply stays the same, meaning that any effect of government 
consumption on private consumption via influence on aggregate supply is excluded. But, in 
principle, one cannot rule out the more realistic cases of imperfect substitutability. Here things 
are not so easy. Labour supply may rise both in the case of a permanent and in that of a 
temporary rise in G^ ^^  and consumption is subject to two different effects: a direct one, by 
which it should tend to decrease (permanent income plus substitution effect); and an indirect 
one passing through a rise in labour supply. The presence of the latter is justified by the fact 
that labour supply changes affect growth, hence the optimal consumption path®''.
The macroeconomic literature on consumption has generally made extensive use of the 
assumption of a fixed labour supply, and I have shared this approach here. Flowever, if it 
should be confirmed that supply side effects are not negligible, partial equilibrium analysis 
would have to be abandoned. This actually seems to be the latest trend in the empirical 
literature on the effects of government consumption (Perotti (2000)). It implies giving up 
searching for the value of deep parameters. The objective is to find estimates for reduced-
More in the former than in the latter.
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form models the coefficients of which are composite multipliers, i.e. combinations of deep 
parameters. The VAR approach is used, and a direct reference to economic theory is lost.
8. Concluding remarks.
The relative weight of public consumption in government current expenses has seen a 
constant decline in recent years, transfers being a mueh more dynamic heading. Nevertheless, 
it still accounts for about 15% of the GDP of OECD countries taken as a whole at present. 
This may be due to either democratic majorities’ preference for a high level of public goods’ 
production, or, more plausibly, to an asymmetric past behaviour of governments, who have 
increased public consumption in times of recession, in the belief it would stimulate aggregate 
demand, without doing the reverse in boom periods. The final message of this work stresses 
however the relevance of the direct substitution effect between public and private 
consumption when government produces primarily nondefence goods.
The regression results obtained using the Darby and Malley (1996) approach on Italian annual 
data on the 1862-1996 sample confliin that composition matters, and so the direct crowding 
out effect is higher when the relative weight of government consumption in nondefence 
increases. Just because the latter has seen its relative weight grow so much in the post-WW2 
period, the degree of substitutability has followed an upward trend, reaching values as high as 
0.67 in the early Nineties. The values found on the whole 1860-1996 sample seem to be all 
considerably higher than the estimates in previous works on the subject. They are also quite 
high if we compare them with what has been found so far in the literature using US time 
series, but this may just be a confirmation of the importance of government consumption 
composition, being the weight of defence spending much higher in the US than in Italy.
On the whole sample, the results seem to be robust to the use of different estimation 
teehniques, although the above mentioned upward trend characterising the last five decades is 
much more marked if I use the HAC matrix suggested by Andrews and Mohanan (1992). This 
seems appropriate in order to mitigate the effect of the outliers of WW2. They also seem 
robust to an alternative way of defining the degree of substitutability parameter that is still 
dependent on the composition of government consumption between defence and nondefence. 
An attempt at detecting the effects of changes in the relative weight of the costs of the
The original idea that temporaiy changes in G have an impact on aggregate demand while pennanent ones 
have not is put into question by this latest stream of literature.
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production of pure and impure publie goods is not so successful instead, probably because of 
lack of quality data.
These findings speak in favour of a more cautious attitude vis-à-vis the use of government 
consumption for stabilisation purposes, stressing that the stimulus to aggregate demand is not 
to be taken for granted. A high direet crowding out effect works together with the pennanent 
income effect in the direction of denying that changes in government consumption, no matter 
how qualified (temporary/permanent, expected/unexpected), have an expansionary influence 
on the economy.
The analysis has been conducted in a context where labour supply is held fixed. Further 
empirical investigation to assess if the above conclusions are not dependent on this 
assumption imply a radical change in approach (VAR models), which however implies giving 
up searching for the value of deep parameters.
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D a ta  A p p e n d ix .
In what follows, I will report all the data sources and describe in detail the use Cristini and 
Dalle Nogare (1999) have made of them in order to obtain their annual series. I also specify 
which of these have been used here without being re-elaborated and which were modified 
instead.
DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF NONDURABLES AND SERVICES: it is derived as the 
difference between households’ total domestic consumption and households’ domestic 
consumption of durables. For both these series the sources are Barberi (1961) for the years 
1862-1890, Rossi et al. (1993) for the period 1890-1990 and Bank of Italy, unpublished data, 
for the remaining years. For the years 1862-1889 we have rescaled the consumption series in 
Barberi (1961), using the variation rate method, so that Barberi’s 1890 value is equal to the 
initial value of the series built by Rossi et al. (1993).
WEALTH: we have reconstructed both real and financial wealth.
REAL WEALTH: Cristini and Dalle Nogare (1999) reeonstructed real wealth for the time 
period 1863-1996 as the sum of the stock of consumer durables, land and residential buildings 
owned by households. Here, instead, real wealth includes the value of the stock of consumer 
durables, capital and residential buildings owned by households. As anticipated, land is 
excluded, and capital is added^\
Stock of consumer durables: the statistical reconstruction of the value of the stock of 
consumer durables follows Marotta (1988) who derives this aggregate for the period 1975- 
1984 using the perpetual inventory method based on the formula:
STOCKDUR (t) = (1-d) STOCKDUR (t-1) + (1 - d/2) DURABLES (t) (1)
where DURABLES is households’ domestic expenditure on durable goods (of which above) 
and d is the physical depreciation rate between period t-1 and t. In conformity with Marotta, 
we assume a value for d equal to 20%.
Capital was proxied by the value of national shares, part of financial wealth, in Cristini and Dalle Nogare 
(1999). However, the stock of capital series I use here stretches as far back as 1861, while the estimated value of 
national shares was only available for the post-WW2 period, so that a considerable improvement has been made, 
in my opinion, by the use of the former series.
142
After converting STOCKDUR and DURABLES at constant price using the expenditure on 
durables price deflator in Rossi et al. (1993), we have assumed that the stock of durables in 
1866 was equal to the sum of the expenditure on durables in 1866 and in the four years 
before. We have then applied the above equation for the period 1866-1975, rescaling the 
series to Marotta's data.
The data on the value of the stock of durables for the years 1862-1865 are extrapolated 
backwards using the rescaled observation for 1866. We have adopted the following equation, 
derived from (1)^ *^ :
STOCKDUR (t-1) = [STOCKDUR (t) - (l-d/2) DURABLES (t)]/ (1-d) (2)
Marotta's information on the value of the stock of durables in 1984 is used to derive, still 
using equation (1), the value of the stock of durables for the period 1985-1996.
Residential buildings owned bv households: this aggregate is obtained following the same 
method adopted to reconstruct the value of the stock of durable goods. For the period 1890- 
1990, Rossi et al. (1993) provide information about gross fix investment in residential 
housing and net housing stock at current and constant price. For the years before 1890, we 
have rescaled gross fix investments in Ercolani (1969) to the data in Rossi et al. and used the 
implicit price deflator Ercolani (1969) provides. Then we have derived recursively the value 
o f net housing stock using an equation similar to (2), where all the variables were expressed at 
constant price. From 1990 onwards, the data about gross fix investment in residential housing 
and implicit price deflator are taken from ISTAT - Annuario Statistico Italiano (hereafter 
ISTAT-SA), various issues. The value of households' residential buildings has then been 
derived using a formula similar to (1).
Rossi et al. (1993) do not give any information about the implicit value of the physical 
depreciation rate, d, adopted to derive their housing series. In order to find it we have 
regressed the formula of perpetual inventory on the series in Rossi et al., using OLS. The 
estimate for d suggests an average life for residential buildings of 100 years ca.
Stock of capital: from 1890 to 1990 the source is Rossi et al. (1993). The data referring to the 
previous decades in the sample have been reconstructed by backward application of the 
perpetual inventory method, with a physical depreciation rate of 3%, to the series for gross
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fixed investment (machinery plus non residential buildings) in Ercolani (1969) rescaled to the 
one in Rossi et al. From 1991 onwards we have applied the perpetual inventoiy method, now 
with a 6% physical depreciation rate, to the series for gross investment in ISTAT- SA, various
67issues .
The early decades of the sample were characterised by a strong growth of the railways sector. 
Investment in this sector was both private and public at these early stages. By considering just 
gross fixed investment in machinery and non-residential buildings, and not also public works, 
we are therefore likely to have underestimated early accumulation. This was however the only 
viable option, for we had no clue as to how to distinguish between private and public 
investment in public works.
FINANCIAL WEALTH: net financial wealth held by households, defined as the sum of these 
items:
currency (coins, notes and foreign currency)
deposits (postal and bank deposits, other accounts, certificati di deposito) 
medium and long term bonds issued by firms and by “special credit institutions” 
other national assets (mainly represented by net worth of insurance policies) 
foreign assets
investments funds (since 1975) 
minus:
short term liabilities (debts on credit cards, car loans, other forms of consumers’ debts) 
long term liabilities (mortgage on houses, properties and additions) 
has been easily reconstructed for the time period 1963-1996*^ .^ The series are taken from 
Cotula and Caron (1971), Tresoldi and Visco (1975) and Marotta (1988). For the years 1971-
We could not apply equation (2) to derive the stock of durables for the years 1862-1974 starting straight from 
Marotta’s data because this gave negative values for some years.
Statistical sources usually distinguish between three types of gross fixed investment: machineiy, non- 
residential buildings and public works. In the last years, however, ISTAT has divided aggregate gross fixed 
investment just between machineiy and “other”. Since we wanted to reconstmct the stock of private capital, we 
needed to start from private gross fixed investment. It has therefore been necessary to make an assumption about 
the proportion of “other” imputable to public works (presumably all publicly financed in the period considered). 
Considering that in the previous decade public works were less than one half o f the value of investment in non 
residential buildings, we have calculated gross fixed investment as the sum of machinery and 70 % of what is 
under the heading “other”.
We did not include in net financial wealth of households’ future pension benefits for lack of data. The only 
reconstruction we came across was about a small part o f it (fondi di quiescenza) and considered only the last 
eight years of our sample (Marotta (1988)). Recently I have found out that some more comprehensive estimates 
are available for a longer period of time (Beltrametti (1996)); still, no data are available for most of my sample, 
i.e. from 1862 till 1951. Even if I were to find a more complete series, however, I would not use it in this 
theoretical context, because future pensions should not be considered as wealth under the assumption that RE 
holds.
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1974 and 1987-1996 they have been completed with the information on net financial assets 
published yearly in Bank of Italy's Annual Report (hereafter BI-AR)^^.
There is no information about households’ financial wealth before 1963. Cotula and Caron 
(1971) compute the time series forming financial assets and liabilities of the economic sector 
for the period 1950-1970, where the economic sector is defined as the sum of households and 
business sectors; BI-AR does the same for the 1971-1996 time period. A statistical 
reconstruction of households’ net financial wealth for the time period 1950-1962 has been 
derived comparing each item forming households’ net wealth to the corresponding one of the 
economic sector. Different statistical methods have been applied. For example, the time 
series: cuiTency, deposits, other bonds, other national assets and foreign assets owned by 
households show the same cycle dynamics of the corresponding ones for the economic sector, 
so we have simply rescaled the latter to the corresponding households’ items, using the 
variation rate method. Using variation rates is not a proper method for getting households’ 
short and long term liabilities from the corresponding time series of the economic sector, 
because these aggregates show different trends. On the contrary, a regression of households’ 
liabilities on eeonomic sector’s liabilities, using OLS, provides satisfactory predictions.
For the period before 1950 the only time series available are currency and (postal and bank) 
deposits held by the public, both of them reconstructed by Fratianni and Spinelli (1991). For 
the years 1862-1949, the financial wealth held by households was derived summing these two 
items. We have thus implicitly assumed that, before 1950, the currency and deposits held by 
households were a stable proportion of the eurrency and deposits held by the economy, and 
that currency and deposits were the main components of households’ financial wealth^®. 
Rescaling to the initial value of households’ net finaneial wealth starting in 1950 seems 
unnecessary.
In accordance with the National Accounts European System (SEC), BI-AR has changed the definition of 
household in 1991, so that in the National Financial Assets and Liabilities Table households are now divided into 
two sub-sectors:
- pure households or consumer households (excluding individual firms)
- production households.
In order to guarantee homogeneous time series the information about net wealth after 1989 is obtained 
considering only the pure households' sub-sector. We have thus kept the old household definition adopted by BI- 
AR.
This is not so unrealistic: in 1950 the sum of currency and deposits represents around 54% of total financial 
net wealth of households, and presumably the weight of these two items on total households’ financial wealth 
was even bigger before that date.
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While in Cristini and Dalle Nogare (1999) financial wealth included public bonds, here I have 
reworked on the series in order to exclude them, as Darhy and Malley’s specification takes the 
Ricardian Equivalence for granted^ \
GROSS LABOUR ESICOME OF TOTAL WORKERS: it was impossible to reconstruct this 
series as the sum of employees’ and self-employed workers’ labour incomes, because data on 
the latter is only available after 1980 (ISTAT, 1998). All we had was a number of series on 
the standard units of total labour^^ in the different business sectors (agriculture, industry, 
services, public sector) in Rossi et al. (1993) and in ISTAT- SA for the time periods 1911- 
1938 and 1951-1996, plus data on the gross domestic labour income of employees per 
standard unit of labour, still in the different business sectors (Rossi et al. (1993) and ISTAT), 
years 1893-1996. By comparing the series of gross labour income of employees with the 
corresponding series refening to se lf  employed workers after 1980 we have come to the 
conclusion that it is not unreasonable to use labour income for standard unit of labour of 
employees as a proxy for labour income for standard unit of total workers (employees plus 
self-employed workers). So we have calculated gross labour income of total workers for the 
periods 1911-1938 and 1951-1996 by simply summing the products of each business sector’s 
standard units of total labour and gross domestic labour income of employees per standard 
unit of labour. For the years 1862-1910 and 1939-1950, for which data on the standai'd units 
of total labour are missing, we have tried two different procedures.
The first one was based on the use of a net national product series we had reconstructed by 
rescaling the series in ISTAT (1957) to match the series in Pagliano and Rossi (1993) 
covering the 1951-1990 span, with the 1991-1996 data taken from ISTAT-SA, various issues. 
In fact, we noticed that for the period the series for gross labour income of total workers had 
been reconstructed it had the same cycle dynamics as the one of NNP. We then used the 
variation rates of the latter to calculate the values for the former for the time period 1862- 
1910^^. As for the Second World War gap we have used same method, but considered the
To be precise, I should make a distinction between deadweight debt and debt raised to finance capital 
expenses. The former is excluded because the Ricardian Equivalence is assumed to hold. As for the latter, when 
debt is used to finance capital expenses, capital then produces a stream of profits that will pay back debt and debt 
interests, thus making it unnecessary to raise taxes for the same purpose. So this debt should be excluded even if  
I did not assume the Ricardian Equivalence to hold.
Before 1970, ISTAT used to refer to units o f labour, i.e. number of workers no matter if  flill-time or part-time, 
as well as workers employed in more than one job. In order to get rid of all dishomogeneities, ISTAT introduced 
the notion of standard unit o f labour, which measures the effort made by a full-time worker, with only one job, 
during one year.
It is important to remind that some authors hold the reconstruction of the income series made by ISTAT for 
the first decades of the sample as veiy dubious (Toniolo (1990)).
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double constraint given by the values of gross labour income of total workers in 1938 and 
1951.
The second procedure was the same, but instead of using NNP we chose a measure of total 
labour income obtained by subtracting to NNP capital income. A series for the latter was 
roughly derived by multiplying our W at t-1 and a series for the long term government bond 
yield kindly provided by Spinelli (unpublished data).
The two procedures gave very similar results. I have decided to use the series obtained by the 
first one in the empirical work I present here.
GENERAL GOVERNMENT TOTAL CONSUMPTION: Sources and Uses General Account 
reconstructed by Rossi et al. (1993) for the period 1890-1990; for the years 1862-1889 we 
have used information taken from the Sources and Uses Account reported in Ercolani (1969), 
whose data we scaled down to those in Rossi et a l. From 1991 onwards the data are from 
ISTAT- SA, various issues.
GENERAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IN DEFENCE/NONDEFENCE: for the 
subsample 1960-1996 ISTAT ((1984) and Collana dTnformazione, various issues) reports a 
cross-tabulation with decompositions of public expenditures into functional (consumption, 
transfers, capital expenditures) as well as economic categories: general services, defence, 
education, health, social insurance and assistance, housing, economic services (a quite 
relevant heading also including transfers to government enterprises), and other services 
(mainly consisting of interest payments on government debt). All that is available up to 1960 
are the reconstructions of central government total expenditures classified by economic 
purpose made by Repaci (1962) and Pedone (1969) and some series on general government in 
Brosio and Marchese (1987), as well as their primary source: Ministero del Tesoro (1969). 
The former two do not take in consideration local governements and social security 
institutions; these lacked a major role in Italy for a long time after Italy’s unification, yet that 
role may not have been totally negligible. All of them then classify public expenditures, 
which is to say that each series contains not only public consumption, but also other current 
account entries (transfers) and capital expenditures. However, at least one of these series can 
be used as a proxy of general government consumption in the economic category it refers to: 
defence. This is because defence is a task local governments have never been asked to 
perfomi, and, as a public spending category, it eontains almost no transfers and very little
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capital expense^" ,^ as the data after 1960 confnm. By harmonising data before 1960 (taken 
from Ministero del Tesoro (1969/^) and after 1960 I have therefore reconstructed public 
consumption in defence for the whole period, and by subtracting it to the series of total 
general government consumption a series for public consumption for civil purposes obtains.
GENERAL GOVERNMENT PRODUCTION OF PURE/IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS: as I 
have anticipated, there is a lack of data for the different categories of general government 
consumption before 1960, so the series have been constructed by scaling down the series for 
central government spending (including transfers and capital expenditures) so as to match the 
1960 level of general government expenditure in the production of pure and impure public 
goods. The sources are the same as those for government consumption in defence/nondefence. 
The procedure is not so well justified as in the case of the distinction between defence and 
nondefence, because neither pure nor impure public goods include, as spending categories, 
little capital and transfers, and the fact that before 1960 data are about central, not general 
government may make a difference. I have included in the pure goods government 
consumption category the following headings: defence, order, administration and interests 
payments^^, while social expenses, education and expenses in infrastructure and support to the 
economy have been classified as impure goods.
As all series were aggregate and at current prices, I have divided them by population (in 
millions) times total consumption price deflator, year 1985. Population is taken from Ercolani 
(1969) for the period 1862-1966, and from Relazione Annuale sulla Situazione Eeonomiea del 
Paese, various issues, for the years 1967-1996. The price deflator is taken from Barheri (1961) 
for the years 1862-1890, from Rossi et al. (1993) for the period 1890-1990 and from Bank of 
Italy, unpublished data, for the remaining years.
In the estimates I present here defence and nondefence public consumption are divided by 
gross domestic product, following Darby and Malley (1996). The GDP series is taken from 
Rossi et al. (1993) for the period 1893-1990, and from ISTAT- SA, various issues, from 1991
It is important to point out that, by international agreement, all mobile infrastructure related to defence is 
classified as public consumption (ISTAT (1984)).
The use of primary sources gives a more complete and homogeneous reconstruction of government accounts.
The heading “interest payments” in government consumption only includes the costs of their management, so 
it is a kind of administiative cost; the same is true for expenses in infrastmcture and support to the economy. 
Some authors (Kormendi (1983)) classify administrative costs as “waste”, not as consumption, and they may 
have a point there.
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onwards. For the period 1862-1889, the series has been obtained by rescaling the series in 
Ercolani (1969)^^ to the data in Rossi et al.
The GDP series in Ercolani is a re-elaboration of the ISTAT (1957) series, and so some historians regard it 
with suspicion.
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Figure 3: real per capita weaith net of public bonds
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Figure 5: real per capita government total, nondefence
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Figure 6: government consumption over GDP
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Figure 7: real per capita gov. nondefence consumption3000000.
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Figure 10: real per capita gov. consumption In defence600000
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Figure 11 ; gov. defence consumption over GDP
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Table 1: 1862-1991, GMM and 2SLS estimates.
GMM-AM GMM-NW GMM-A 2SLS
k 1.039.395 1,147.342 1.136.909 1.147.340(5.56) (9.25) (9.34) (5.92)
k 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.007(2.91) (5.94) (10.34) (2.74)
f i -3.609 -1.754 -1.163 -2.411(-3.30) (-3.46) (-2.82) (-2.97)
Ï2 4.652 2.352 1.648 3.885(2.82) (3.33) (2.67) (3.40)
Hansen’s test 
(p-value)
0.72 0.59 0.58
Note: here and in ail following tables t-statistics in parent] leses.
Figure 13: Thêta 3.0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
- 0.2
-0 .4
- 0.6
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
T H E TA 3(G M M -A M )
155
Figure 14: estimated thetas.0.8
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Table 2: 1862-1991 excluding 1940-1946, GMM estimates.
GMM-AM GMM-NW GMM-A
k 1.110.407 1.191.646 1.141.862(7.31) (9.86) (11.23)
h 0.008 0.010 0.012(2.88) (5.19) (5.32)
f \ -3.572 -3.075 -3.083(-4.94) (-3.97) (-3.73)
7i 4.663 3.924 4.158(4.9) (4.74) (4.19)
à 0.431 1.000 1,802
(1.48) (4.32) (9.51)
Hansen’s test 
(p-value)
0.71 0.78 0.72
from Table 2 (NW and A).0.8
0 .6 -
-0.4 -
- 0.6  -
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
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Table 3: 1862-1996, GMM estimates.
GMM-AM
1862-1991
GMM-AM 
1862-1996 (a)
GMM-AM 
1862-1996 (b)
GMM-AM 
1862-1996 (c)
k 1.039.395 1.104.030 1.127.699 1.142.228(5.56) (6.11) (9.49) (9.24)
k 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.006(2.90) (3.78) (3.81) (2.25)
f i -3.609 -2.841 -3.619 -3.860(-3.30) (-3.10) (-4.08) (-4.78)
f r 4.652 3.526 4.570 4.839(2.82) (2.64) (3.31) (4.06)
Dummy estimated -362.724 -4.35E+09 -3.009
coefficient (-5.63) (-2.12) (-4.29)
Hansen’s test 
(p-value)
0.72 0.36 0.07 0.39
Table 4: 1890-1991, GMM and 2SLS estimates.
GMM-AM GMM-NW GMM-A 2SLS
k 838.948 990.146 1.020.564 990.146(3.36) (5.95) (6.37) (4.14)
k 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.008(3.03) (5.74) (8.25) (2.85)
Ÿx -3.920 -2.288 -1.699 -2.414(-3.48) (-4.59) (-3.98) (-2.79)
Ÿi 4.778 2.953 2.232 3.709(2.97) (4.29) (3.63) (3.08)
Hansen’s test 
(p-value)
0.75 0.67 0.60
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Table 5: 1862-1937, GMM and 2SLS estimates.
GMM-AM GMM-NW GMM-A 2SLS
h 860.555(5.08) 987.338(5.59) 1.459.729(12.56) 990.146(4.09)
/ê, 0.039(3.58)
0.028
(2.47)
-0.009
(-0.90)
0.029
(1.95)
Y \ -1.239(-2.08)
0.007
(0.00)
2.281
(1.60)
-1.297
(-1.49)
f z 1.575(2.01)
-0.138
(-0.10)
-2.997
(-1.62)
1.884
(1.75) :
Hansen’s test 
(p-value)
0.56 0.67 0.52
Table 6: 1954-1991, GMM and 2SLS estimates.
GMM-AM GMM-NW GMM-A 2SLS
k -1.196.620(-2.41) -418.200(-1.20) -348.583(-1.14) -1.196.620(-1.71)
h 0.021(5.12) 0.018(7.45) 0.017(7.40) 0.022(4.17)
fx -5.656(-0.26)
1.667
(0.23)
-4.880
(-0.82)
-5.191
(-0.36)
Ï2 4.541(1.67)
4.156
(2.83)
6.192
(5.91)
4.624
(2.11)
Hansen’s test 
(p-value)
0.97 0.75 0.68
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Table 7: 1862-1991, new normalisation.
GMM-AM
h 1.172.700(7.83)
h 0.008(2.38)
f i -0.452(-2.12)
Ÿi 0.608(1.44)
Hansen’s test 
(p-value)
0.64
Figure 16: Thêta 3 and Thêta 4.
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Table 8:1862-199 , pure/impure G.
GMM-AM
h 1.068.346(7.88)
h 0.013(4.48)
Pi -0.180(-0.35)
P i 2.262(1.21)
Hansen’s test 
(p-value)
0.74
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Conclusions.
The aim of this thesis was to contribute originally to two branches of economic literature 
centred on fiscal policy; the Political Economy approach to fiscal policy determination and 
the empirical literature on the effects of government consumption on private consumption. In 
the next paragraphs I summarise the main results I have obtained, articulated for each chapter. 
Before that, I would like to make two general considerations. The first one is that working on 
this thesis inevitably led to reflect also on some methodological issues, and more than a hint 
at these reflections has been reported in each chapter. The second is that if there was one 
element unifying the analysis, this was the feeling that when addressing fiscal policy issues an 
economist should try to seek the collaboration of scholars of other social sciences. When one 
comes to the normative part of contributions such as the one in Chapter 1, for instance, there 
is a lack of specific knowledge of electoral systems on an economist’s part that only a scholar 
in Political Sciences could fill. The analysis in Chapter 2 would probably be more accurate if 
political scientists worked on classifications of governments according to criteria suggested 
by economists. Finally, also Chapter 3 could benefit from further interaction with scholars in 
Economic History as far as the data construction is concerned. Hopefrilly the collaboration 
among scientists of different social disciplines will be more extensive in the future. In my 
view, this cannot but be beneficial, and not just for Economics, but for all social sciences.
Chapter 1 : extra-economic polarisation, coalition governments and delavs in stabilisation.
In Part 1 of this chapter I have explored the possibility to express the strategic interaction 
between coalition partners as a game of complete information. It turns out that this is possible, 
and that the symmetric equilibria of the game all imply the possibility of a delayed 
stabilisation.
The game is a complete information variant of the war of attrition model first proposed by 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), where I assume that inflation affects everyone’s utility in the 
same way and there is a given point in time the game necessarily comes to an end if it is has 
not ended before (after two years for simplicity). Depending on the parameters’ values, the 
game is either a double Prisoner’s Dilemma, or a double Chicken, or a Chicken game that 
may have a sequel as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the first case there is a unique Nash 
equilibrium implying that coalition partners will never concede. However, parameters’ values 
are such that not so much strategic inefficiency is implied. The welfare analysis of this case is
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quite new and interesting, as it highlights that here a delayed stabilisation is a means through 
which coalition partners succeed in sharing part of the fiscal burden, the alternative being, 
under the assumption of absence of a commitment technology allowing for co-operation, that 
either party pays for it all. When neither party concedes inflation is used alongside public debt 
to finance public spending, and it is the real balance effect of inflation determining the 
sharing.
In the second case there is a mixed strategies equilibrium implying that either or both parties 
may concede/not concede in both years. Parameters’ values are such that if a stabilisation is 
perfonned with delay as a consequence of the players’ draws, a lot of strategic inefficiency is 
introduced.
In the third case, there is a mixed strategies equilibrium implying that either there is 
immediate stabilisation or no stabilisation before the end of the game. As far as the 
parameters’ values is concerned, this case is intermediate with respect to the first two.
One of the advantages of seeing the interaction between coalition partners as a game of 
complete information lies in the fact that it highlights the real problem with coalition 
governments' decision-making process, i.e. the lack of credibility affecting their members’ 
commitments. This points to possible solutions in terms of either a reform of the procedure by 
which financial bills are approved by Parliament (i.e. no sequential voting) or a reform of the 
electoral system from a proportional to a majority mle.
In Part 2 a possible political scenario has been suggested that is likely to cause that parties 
with opposite views on the allocation of the fiscal burden form a coalition government. A 
strong polarisation on some extra-economic issue which is important in voters’ and 
candidates’ motivation plays an important role. The extra-economic issue and the fiscal 
agenda must split the electoral body differently, so that there may be parties with opposite 
fiscal agenda but common extra-economic views wanting to form a coalition government. 
Voters are assumed to be rational and forward looking, and the electoral result depends on the 
choice of the median voter in voters’ distribution according to the opinion about the extra- 
economic issue. If his extra-economic motivation in voting is greater than the economic one 
he may choose to vote for a party that he can anticipate will form a fiscally irresponsible 
coalition government. An inefficient fiscal policy is the price to pay to have his extra- 
economic views represented on power. It is this scenario, and not the presence of coalition 
governments per se, that ends up being the real cause for inefficient fiscal policies. This points 
to the importance of a nation’s cohesion around a common Weltanschauung.
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Chapter 2: is the fiscal performance of all coalition govemments bad? Evidence of the 
contrarv.
The empirical literature about coalition governments’ fiscal performance has so far taken for 
granted that the thesis to verify is that all of them tend to be debt- and inflation prone after a 
shock has hit the economy. In line with the findings of Chapter 1 I argue that when a coalition 
is formed by parties with conflicting fiscal goals a shock is not needed for a war of attrition to 
start. When a coalition is formed by parties with a common fiscal agenda, instead, there 
should be no relevant difference in fiscal conduct with respect to single party governments, 
not even after big economic shocks. Finally, it is also usually assumed that stabilisations are 
performed by single party governments only, but this is no direct consequence of the 
theoretical analysis. Recent history has often witnessed coalitions which were formed in order 
to bring about a stabilisation. It is even possible that a stabilisation is performed by the same 
coalition who caused a prolonged rise of debt and inflation: when they do stabilise, they must 
be vigorous in their action.
In Chapter 2 I have used cluster analysis on data over 11 parliamentary democracies from 
1960 to 1990 to verify whether these heterodox theses may be validated. Cases are country- 
year units, and the variables used in the clustering are two measures of the fiscal impulse 
filtering the effects of the business cycle, so as to be a truer measure of a government’s will. 
These are the Blanchard Measure for budget deficit and an index, EXPIMP, for expenditure 
which is constructed in a similar way. The results are read taking in consideration the political 
characterisation of cases, where the distinction is between single party, homogeneous and 
non-homogeneous coalition governments. Clustering has been performed using the Ward 
algorithm (intra-group least squares) with City Block metrics and the K-means cluster 
iterative partitioning method.
The results obtained using the whole sample confirm two of the above theses, namely that not 
all coalition governments tend to have an irresponsible fiscal conduct, as there are coalitions 
with a high degree of cohesion among their members who behave like single party 
governments, and that coalitions with a low degree of cohesion on fiscal matters tend to 
determine both strongly positive and strongly negative fiscal impulses.
The clustering solutions relative to the 1962-1971 sub sample reject the thesis by which the 
presence of a coalition government is relevant only if it happens to be in office when a 
negative economic shock takes place. However, the solutions relative to the 1972-1981 
subsample reveal that recessions definitely tend to make differences in fiscal performance
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greater. Finally, the results obtained working on the 80s’ are not so easy to read. The gradual 
process towards a European Monetary Unions may be an explanation, as many proportional 
representation democracies in the sample may have started to perceive this implied a binding 
commitment on fiscal as well as on monetary policy. As for homogenous coalitions, they 
implemented strong stabilisations in the 80s more often than single party governments. This 
may just be a reflection of a shift of power from fiscally irresponsible non-honiogenous 
coalitions to homogenous ones.
Chapter 3: public consumption as a substitute to private consumption: evidence from Italian 
long time series.
In Chapter 3 an empirical investigation of the degree of substitutability between public and 
private consumption using Italian data from 1862 to 1996 has been presented. I have followed 
the approach suggested by Darby and Malley (1996), who use a non-linear specification of the 
consumption function directly derived from utility maximisation. They also define the degree 
of substitutability between government and private consumption as a time-varying measure 
which is a weighted average of the current amounts of the different components of G, where 
the weights are given by estimated coefficients of the latter. As distinct components of 
government consumption I consider defence and nondefence, as no finer distinction is 
possible with the available data.
The disturbance term of the specification is correlated to the explanatory variables and non 
serially uncorrelated, because it has a MA component. GMM is known to give consistent 
estimates in these cases, and reaches asymptotic efficiency if a HAC estimate for the 
asymptotic covariance matrix of the sample moments is used. I have chosen to follow 
Andrews (1991) in my estimates. I have also adopted the “pre-whitening option” suggested by 
Andrews and Mohanan (1992), as this seems appropriate in order to mitigate the effect of the 
outliers of WW2.
The regression results confimi that composition matters: the direct crowding out effect is 
higher when the relative weight of government consumption in nondefence increases. The 
degree of substitutability has followed an upward trend in the post WW2 period, reaching 
values as high as 0.67 in the most recent years.
These results seem robust to an alternative way of defining the degree of substitutability 
parameter that is still dependent on how much of government consumption is defence and 
how much nondefence. An attempt at detecting the effects of changes in the relative weights
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of the costs of the production of pure and impure public goods is not so successful instead, 
because of lack of quality data.
These findings speak in favour of a more cautious attitude governments should have towards 
the use of public consumption for stabilisation purposes, because the stimulus to aggregate 
demand is not to be taken for granted.
'  '  '  '
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